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This study examines the extent to which the transfer of legislative competence to 
polities above and below the state problematizes a national model of membership. 
The study first examines fragmentation of competences determinative of social 
membership across the polities of two ‘asymmetric constitutions’ (constitutional 
structures in which both the whole and the parts are distinct territorially-bounded 
political communities, and in which legislative competence is allocated unevenly 
across the constituent polities). Two case studies then explore how those polities 
exercise those competences so as to define the boundaries of equal social 
membership, and how these boundaries interact across the constitutional structure. 
The study highlights three observations in support of its conclusion that 
constitutional asymmetry presents a challenge to a national model of membership: 
constituent polities of the asymmetries under examination allocate social rights 
primarily by reference to residence, thus lending (qualified) support to transnational 
and a-national theories of membership; differentiated social rights enjoyed by a 
particular sub-set of nationals are incompatible with the presumed equality of 
nationals under a national model of membership, resulting in the perception of 
inequity and discrimination; and the interdependence of membership competences 
across the constitutional asymmetry means that it is no longer possible for a polity to 
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Citizenship in its modern form is intricately bound together with the nation-state: 
from the eighteenth century self-conscious ‘membership organisations’ united by a 
common culture and language have asserted a democratic right of self-governance, 
vesting the sovereign power of the state in a unified body of peoples. The solidarity 
and loyalty fostered by a shared national identity has facilitated the realisation of 
citizenship as a principle of equality, secured through the grant of civic, political and 
social rights which form the substantive benefit of membership. The traditional 
‘national’ model of membership based on the coincidence between the nation and the 
state is one in which rights are granted by the state to nationals on the basis of a 
shared national identity. 
  The homogeneous identity upon which national citizenship is predicated has 
been subject to contestation: it faces challenges ‘from above’ by way of globalisation 
and the movement of people across state borders, and ‘from below’ by self-conscious 
national minorities. Membership organisations no longer map neatly onto the 
territorial boundaries of the state, thus problematizing the national model of 
membership and raising questions of how a liberal democratic state should meet its 
obligations towards resident non-nationals and minority cultures. 
 Much of modern citizenship theory is devoted to reconfiguring the 
boundaries of equal membership in terms of a revised balance between rights, status 
and identity, so as better to meet the demands of social justice in the face of these 
challenges. The vast majority of these reconfigurations have responded to the 
fragmentation of national identity, whilst presuming that the state remains the 
dominant organisational framework within which the benefits of membership are 
delivered. A shifting constitutional landscape rebuts this presumption, with 
legislative competence transferred to polities above and below the state.  
Whilst a substantial degree of literature has examined the formation of these 
constitutional structures by reason of claims to self-determination of national 
minorities, few have considered how citizenship operates across those revised 
structures, once those claims have been realised. Little scholarly attention has been 
devoted to the criteria according to which non-state polities define the boundaries of 
equal social membership, and the manner in which these boundaries interact across a 
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constitutional structure to contest established notions of equality of nationals. The 
objective of the following study is to investigate these questions, and in doing so to 
consider how the transfer of legislative competence to polities above and below the 
level of the state further problematizes a national model of membership.  
Chapter one of the study presents a brief ‘state of the art’ of citizenship 
theory, expanding on the points raised above in order to introduce the premise on 
which the study is based, and to justify the objective of the research through 
identification of an under-represented area of scholarship. The chapter explains in 
further depth the approach adopted in the study, and gives further information on the 
selection of the case studies.  
Chapter two of the study maps the re-location of competences determinative 
of social membership across the constituent polities of the UK and Spain as two 
‘asymmetric constitutions’ (constitutional structures in which both the whole and the 
parts are distinct territorially-bounded political communities, and in which legislative 
competence is allocated unevenly across the constituent polities), and contextualises 
the relationship between transfer of legislative competence and the recognition or 
development of alternative identity groupings. The chapter identifies three forms of 
‘membership competence’ – the competence to provide  social goods and services1 
(sub-state and state), to allocate  social goods and services (sub-state, state and EU), 
and to secure access to  social goods and services (state and EU). It notes that with 
the transfer of membership competences to non-state polities, the conundrum of how 
to allocate the benefits of membership in order to meet the demands of social justice 
is replicated across polities at multiple levels. The study also notes that membership 
competences are fragmented across the constitutional structure, with the result that 
no single polity has exclusive control over the bounds of social citizenship.  
Two case studies then examine the distribution of selected social rights across 
the constituent polities of the UK and Spain, each of which focusses upon a different 
dimension of the constitutional asymmetry. Chapter three examines the interaction 
between EU and State competences to define the boundaries of equal social 
membership, through the lens of minimum income allowances. The case study first 
examines the provision of minimum income allowances (non-contributory and non-
                                                 
1 The terms ‘social good’ and ‘social service’ are used to refer to a broad range of goods and services 
provided by a polity that secure the ‘social element’ of citizenship (see further at n.123, below). 
9 
 
discretionary social benefits that form a ‘safety net’ of social protection) by the state, 
and the extent to which their receipt is conditioned under national law by criteria 
pertaining to nationality and residence. It then turns to consider the basis upon which 
those allowances are allocated under EU law to persons falling within the scope of 
social security co-ordination. The focus of the chapter is on the reactive exercise of 
state competences so as to condition the minimum income allowances that an 
individual receives by virtue of their rights of residence and equality under EU law. 
It observes that both the UK and Spain have asserted control over the rights of 
residence enjoyed by EU Citizens and their family members, and examines the way 
in which the UK has excluded certain EU Citizens and their family members from 
receipt of those benefits. These measures have proved contentious, and their 
compatibility with the right on non-discrimination enjoyed by EU Citizens is 
questionable. 
 The case study in chapter four addresses the interaction between sub-state 
and state competence to define the boundaries of equal social membership, through 
the lens of differential fee imposition for public services (liability for higher 
education tuition fees and charges levied on prescriptions). The chapter first presents 
an overview of divergences in social policy enacted across sub-state polities, and 
examines the basis on which the benefit of those policies are extended or withdrawn 
across the group of persons with social membership of the state. The study then uses 
the example of access to higher education in the UK to consider how the construction 
of privileged sub-state social membership groups below the level of the state are 
overlaid by EU law rights of equal treatment, thus granting privileged access to 
migrant EU citizens over certain UK nationals. The chapter then considers the extent 
to which these differences have been considered as ‘anomalous’ and 
‘discriminatory’, noting attempts that have been made to challenge to the legality of 
such differentiation. 
The conclusion of the study highlights three observations drawn from the 
case studies which suggest that constitutional asymmetry presents a challenge to a 
national model of membership. First, examination of the criteria conditioning receipt 
of social rights illustrate that constituent polities of the constitutional asymmetries 
under examination allocate social rights on the basis of residence, thus lending 
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qualified support to post-national and a-national theories of citizenship in respect of 
social rights. Secondly, differentiated rights enjoyed by a particular sub-set of 
nationals are incompatible with the presumed equality of nationals under a national 
model of membership, and result in the perception of inequity and discrimination. 
Conversely, extension of rights to EU Citizens suggests that participation in a 
singular national identity is no longer determinative of the receipt of rights. Finally, 
the interdependence of membership competences across the constitutional 
asymmetry means that it is no longer possible for a polity to determine the 
boundaries of social membership on the basis of national interests, nor to exclude 
from the benefit of social membership those that do not participate within a shared 
national identity. 
The study aims to probe the complexities of membership definition in 
asymmetric constitutions, offering an insight into tensions and idiosyncrasies that 
characterise this hitherto under-developed field of scholarship, as a conceptual 
grounding for further theoretical and empirical study. In doing so it employs a 
context-led methodology associated with ‘constitutional ethnography’, which ‘looks 
to the logics of particular context as a way of illuminating complex relationships 
among political, legal, historical, social economic and cultural elements’.2 In the 
early stages of developing this research agenda I benefitted greatly from participation 
in a number of workshops and policy forms hosted by both the Federal Trust and by 
the James Madison Trust, which provided invaluable insight into the prevailing 
policy discourses surrounding both devolution and European integration.3 This 
partnership both encouraged me to engage more closely with the political (rather 
than the purely doctrinal) study of federalism, and also guided my interest in 
membership groups, which I perceived to be the unarticulated dimension of policy 
divergence. Collaboration with the Federal Trust has also enabled me to explore 
some of the topics raised within the following study in greater depth through ‘policy 
                                                 
2 Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Ethnography (2004) 38 Law and Society Review, see further at 
n.109 
3 The Federal Trust is a research institute studying the interactions between regional, national, 
European and global levels of government, with which I am ‘partnered’ under a Collaborative 
Doctoral Award granted by the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council. The James Madison Trust 
is a charitable trust established to support and promote federal studies, which is a principal benefactor 
of the Federal Trust and which has a substantially overlapping membership body. 
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briefs’,4 and the process of writing for a non-academic forum has proved a highly 
instructive – if at times challenging – experience of the requirement to adapt my 
analytical perspective and writing style. 
 
  
                                                 
4 Anja Lansbergen, (2009) Testing the Limits of European Citizenship Federal Trust Policy Brief 
<http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/filepool/Testing_Limits_of_Citz.pdf> ; Anja Lansbergen, (2012) Recent 
CJEU Decisions on European Citizenship: A case study on judicial activism Federal Trust Policy 
Brief No 32 <http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/filepool/Policy%20Brief%2032%20-
%20%20Recent%20CJEU%20Decisions.pdf> accessed 10 May 2012 
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1. Citizenship and Constitutional Asymmetry 
 Citizenship and equality of membership 1.1.
‘citizenship, even in its early forms, was a principle of equality’ - T.H. Marshall5 
 
A logical place for a study of citizenship to commence may be with an examination 
of the various manifestations of citizenship throughout history. It might examine its 
early roots in the city states of ancient Greece and its transformation in the Roman 
Empire. It might chart its marginalisation in the Anglo-Saxon, Gothic and Vandal 
kingdoms of medieval Europe, and its expression in the Guilds of medieval cities.6 
Space precludes such an analysis within this study, but even such a cursory outline 
serves useful in identifying the nature of the illusive subject under discussion. Whilst 
its complexities may be hard to capture within a succinct definition, a historical 
snapshot shows us that citizenship is about the limits of human association: limits 
that operate across territory, across power, and across people. The location of those 
limits shift across time and space, but their significance is eternal.7 
A common starting point for a definition of citizenship is one of membership 
in a community.8 The enduring question central to citizenship theory then pertains to 
the nature of the relationship between the individual and the collective: what does 
                                                 
5 T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and social class: and other essays (Cambridge University Press 1950), 
page 33 
6 For discussion on the history of citizenship see Derek Heater, A Brief History of Citizenship 
(Edinburgh University Press 2004); J.G.A. Pocock, ‘The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times’ 
in Gershon Shafir (ed), The Citizenship Debates: A Reader (University of Minnesota Press 1998); 
Max Weber, ‘Citizenship in Ancient and Medieval Cities’ in Gershon Shafir (ed), The Citizenship 
Debates: A Reader (OUP 1998); and Geoffrey de Ste. Croix, ‘The Athenian Citizenship Laws’ in 
David Harvey and Robert Parker (eds), Athenian democratic origins: and other essays (Oxford 
University Press 2004). 
7 A historical examination of citizenship has prompted some theorists to conclude that ‘citizenship 
entails a relatively stable core meaning surrounded by a periphery of historically contingent 
meanings’ (Kloek, J. and Tilmans, K (eds.) (2002) Burger Amsterdam University Press, referenced in 
Dora Kostakopoulou, The Future Governance of Citizenship (Cambridge University Press 2008), page 
44). Kostakopoulou rejects this presumption, arguing that ‘citizenship’s evolving meanings and 
content have been, and will continue to be, shaped by different historical exigencies, institutional 
contexts and structural developments. But it would also be incorrect to believe that citizenship, 
including the existing nationality model of citizenship, in inhospitable to alternative readings and thus 
non-malleable’ (Kostakopoulou (2008), page 44). 
8 Linda Bosnaik identifies the ‘chronic uncertainty of the meaning associated with the concept of 
citizenship’, but notes that ‘[m]ost analysts concur in defining citizenship as membership of a political 
community, or of a ‘common society’’ (Linda Bosnaik, Citizenship Denationalized (2000) 7 Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 447, page 454).  
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membership entail?9 Two defining characteristics of a liberal model of citizenship, 
which set apart the citizen from the serf or the subject, are those of freedom of the 
individual and equality of membership.10 Equality as a characteristic of citizenship 
permeates all modern citizenship scholarship, reoccurring themes of which are 
elaborated within the egalitarian theory of right-based citizenship by the sociologist 
T.H. Marshall. 
 
TH Marshall’s seminal paper ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ was delivered in 
the form of a commemorative lecture in 1949, in the context of a post-War Britain 
that was witnessing the birth of the modern Welfare State. Marshall’s paper was built 
around a classification of three ‘elements’ of citizenship: civil, political and social. 
Civil rights, he explained, were those ‘necessary for individual freedom – liberty of 
the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to 
conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice’. The ‘political element’ of 
citizenship is ‘the right to participate in the exercise of political power’, and the 
‘social element’ is ‘the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare 
and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life 
of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society’.11  
Marshall argued that the development of civil and political rights in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries served to secure the democratic and universal 
status of freedom,12 but that those rights were not ‘as egalitarian in practice as they 
                                                 
9 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman note that ‘the scope of a ‘theory of citizenship’ is potentially 
limitless – almost every problem in political philosophy involves relations among citizens or between 
citizens and the state’ (Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent 
Work on Citizenship Theory (1994) 104 Ethics 352, page 353). 
10 Rainer Bauböck identifies three answers to the question ‘what does it mean to be a citizen?’: ‘First, 
it means the opposite of being a subject, i.e. a relation towards the state and its authorities in which 
people enjoy basic rights. Second, it means also that people exercise control over governments 
directly or indirectly by participating in political deliberation…Third, it means that people are equals 
as members of an inclusive polity’ (Rainer Bauböck, Transnational citizenship: membership and rights 
in international migration (Edward Elgar 1994), page vii). Kostakopoulou notes that ‘liberal 
citizenship is essentially a status bestowed on those who are presumed to be full and equal members 
of the community’ (Kostakopoulou (2008), page 22). 
11 Marshall (1950), pages 10-11. Marshall broadly characterises ‘civic rights’ as secured during the 
18th century, political rights during the 19th century, and social rights during the 20th century. The 
descriptive merit and context-specific evolution of citizenship that Marshall presents have been 
subject to criticism. 
12 Ibid, page 18. Marshall suggested that civil rights were realised in the eighteenth century through 
the establishment of the rule of law and the defence in the courts of individual liberty against 
Parliament. They were further developed through the principle of ‘individual economic freedom’, 
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professed to be in principle’,13 as class prejudice and inequalities of wealth prevented 
the realisation of the equality that they offered.14 The crux of Marshall’s argument 
lay in his assertion that the twentieth century marked a ‘big advance in social rights, 
and this involved significant changes in the egalitarian principle as expressed in 
citizenship’.15 During this period, he argued, social rights were incorporated into the 
status of citizenship, granting ‘an absolute right to a certain standard of civilisation 
which is conditional only on the discharge of general duties of citizenship’.16  
Social rights, Marshall suggested, did not necessarily achieve economic 
equality. The facilitation of economic equality was not however the central objective 
of social rights – what was important was not the equalisation of income, but the 
equalisation of status: 
 
‘What matters is that there is a general enrichment of the concrete 
substance of civilised life, a general reduction of risk and insecurity, 
an equalisation between the more and the less fortunate at all 
levels…Equalisation is not so much between classes as between 
individuals within a population which is now treated for this purpose 
as though it were one class. Equality of status is more important 
than equality of income’.17 
 
And this, indeed, was Marshall’s central thesis: the equality demanded by 
citizenship and promised by civic and democratic rights is realised through the 
removal of barriers to social justice. When social justice is guaranteed through social 
                                                                                                                                          
championed by the courts through application of the Common Law and cemented in the abolition 
legislative restrictions upon the ability of an individual to choose his occupation.  Political citizenship 
followed throughout the nineteenth century, though its universality was not completely realised until 
1918. 
13 Ibid, page 35 
14 ‘In the latter part of the nineteenth century’, Marshall argued, ‘a growing interest in equality as a 
principle of social justice and an appreciation of the fact that the formal recognition of an equal 
capacity for rights was not enough’. Such interest was generated by advances in social integration, 
marked by the ‘diminishing gap between skilled and unskilled labour’, by the compression of the 
scale of disposable incomes through direct taxation, and through the increased availability of material 
good through mass manufacture (ibid, page 46). 
15 Marshall located the original source of social rights in England in membership of local communities 
and functional associations, which were later replaced by a system of wage regulation and the 
Elizabethan Poor Law. By the beginning of the 20th Century, Marshall argued, social rights had 
become divorced from the status of citizenship. The claims of those in need of assistance were treated 
‘not as an integral part of the rights of the citizen, but as an alternative to them – as claims which 
could be met only if the claimants ceased to be citizens in any true sense of the word’. By accepting 
social assistance, an individual ‘forfeited in practice the civil right of personal liberty’, and 
surrendered any political rights that he might have (ibid, page 24). 
16 Ibid, page 43 
17 Ibid, page 56 
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rights that allow all to share in a universal guarantee of security, and to participate in 
a ‘common culture and common experience’ independently of wealth or social class, 
the persistence of economic divergences does not run contrary to the basic human 
equality required of citizenship.18  
 
Marshall’s work has had a pervasive influence on the field of modern 
citizenship scholarship. This influence is identifiable not only in the many studies of 
‘social citizenship’ that it has engendered, but also in the uptake by scholars of 
Marshall’s basic classification: citizenship is an egalitarian principle that requires 
equality of membership, and that equality is ultimately secured through the conferral 
of civic, political and social rights.19 Citizenship rights assume a central placing in 
citizenship theory as the substantive benefit of membership,20 with many scholars 
including them within a multifaceted definition of citizenship: Linda Bosniak, for 
example, explores citizenship in terms of ‘legal status’, ‘rights’, ‘political activity’ 
and ‘collective identity’,21 whilst Bloemraad et al explain that ‘[c]itizenship 
encompasses legal status, rights, participation, and belonging’.22 Joppke works 
within a framework that distinguishes between citizenship as ‘status, rights and 
identity’, whilst Cohen favours a tripartite division of status, political participation 
and identity.23 Antje Wiener and Richard Bellamy conceive of citizenship in terms of 
rights, (access to) participation and belonging,24 whilst Engin F Isin proposes a 
                                                 
18 Similarly, Bauböck identifies as an aspect of citizenship that ‘[t]here may be large inequalities and 
wide cleavages in society but each citizen is counted as one and only one and all citizens are counted 
together’ (Bauböck (1994), page vii). 
19 It is not my intention to claim that Marshall’s work is the origin of a rights-based theory of liberal 
citizenship, nor that all scholars who recognise the centrality of rights in a theory of citizenship would 
necessarily agree with Marshall’s analysis. The foregoing examination of Marshall’s thesis on social 
citizenship is intended by way of insight into the basic equality demanded of citizenship, and the 
realisation of that equality both through democratic participation and social rights. 
20 Bauböck draws a distinction between ‘nominal’ citizenship in the form of a legal status devoid of 
any particular content, and ‘substantial’ citizenship, which is ‘the particular nature of the relation 
itself’ (ibid, page 23). 
21 Bosnaik (2000), page 455 
22 Irene Bloemraad, Anna Korteweg and Gökçe Yurdakul, Citizenship and Immigration: 
Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State (2008) 34 Annual Review of 
Sociology 153, page 153 
23 Christian Joppke, Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity (2007) 11 Citizenship 
Studies 37; Jean L Cohen, Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos 
(1999) 14 International Sociology 245 
24 Antje Wiener, Making Sense of the New Geography of Citizenship: Fragmented Citizenship in the 
European Union (1997) 26 Theory and Society 529, page 534. Richard Bellamy identifies three 
‘lineages’ of citizenship: ‘rights, belonging and participation’ (Richard Bellamy, Dario Castiglione 
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distinct conception of citizenship that focuses upon a delineation between citizenship 
‘practices’ and rights and obligations.25  
These classifications of citizenship illustrate clearly that rights (and the 
equality of membership that they secure) are commonly identified as an intrinsic 
element of citizenship. They also identify two other aspects of citizenship – status 
and identity – that provide insight into a related issue with which citizenship theory 
must grapple: to whom do the right of equal membership, and the substantive 
benefits associated with it, attach? 
 
 The nation-state as the orthodox frame of equal membership  1.2.
The orthodox context in which the equality of modern citizenship is understood is 
that of the nation-state.26 Christian Joppke explains that the ‘nation-state’ is a ‘dual 
concept’ encompassing both sovereignty in the form of a ‘monopolization of 
legitimate violence’, and ‘a collective identity’ with ‘a democratic pretension to 
rule’.27 The first aspect – that of State sovereignty – arose in the wake of the ‘Thirty 
Years War’ out of the Peace of Westphalia, a treaty widely recognised as heralding 
the foundation of the modern political state system.28 State sovereignty facilitates 
                                                                                                                                          
and Emilio Santoro, Lineages of European Citizenship: Rights, Belonging and Participation in Eleven 
Nation-States (Palgrave Macmillan 2004)). 
25 He thus argues that ‘[c]itizenship can be defined as both a set of practices (cultural, symbolic, and 
economic) and a bundle of rights and obligations (legal, political, and social) that define a 
membership in a polity’ (Engin F. Isin, Citizenship, class and the global city (1999) 3 Citizenship 
Studies 267, page 267). 
26 Bosnaik notes that ‘the assertion that citizenship is necessarily a national enterprise finds much 
support in conventional understanding, both popular and scholarly’, and that ‘there can be little 
question that the nation-state is the predominant community of political membership in the 
contemporary world’ (Bosnaik (2000), pages 448-449).  
27 Christian Joppke, ‘Immigration Challenges the Nation-State’ in Christian Joppke (ed), Challenge to 
the Nation-State, Immigration in Western Europe and the United States (OUP 1998), page 8. Joppke 
notes that ‘[t]he two concepts have different origins, stateness being rooted in the geopolitical 
transformation of Europe after the Peace of Westphalia and receiving its apotheosis under 
absolutism, nationness being rooted in the cultural transformation brought about by Protestantism, 
the rise of vernaculars, and the Enlightenment’ (ibid,, page 8). 
28 Charles Tilly notes that ‘[p]erhaps the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), at the close of the Thirty Years 
War, first made it clear that all of Europe was to be divided into distinct and sovereign states whose 
boundaries were defined by international agreement’ (Charles Tilly, Formation of the National States 
in Western Europe (Princeton University Press 1975), page 45). See also John H. Herz, Rise and 
Demise of The Territorial State (1957) 9 World Politics 473, page 477; Paul Hirst and Grahame 
Thompson, Globalisation and the future of the nation state (1995) 24 Economy and Society 408, page 
410; Walter C. Opello Jr and Stephen J. Rosow, The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical 
Introduction to Contemporary Politics (2nd edn, Lynne Rienner Publishers 2004), page 12. 
Characteristics of Statehood are set out in Article 1 of the ‘Montevideo Convention’, which 
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citizenship as a legal status, whereby individuals are assigned into (traditionally 
mutually exclusive)29 groups of state memberships.30 
The second aspect – that of nationhood – followed in the 18th Century with 
the rise of nationalism31 as an ideal, shaped largely by a resurgence of political 
philosophy in the Enlightenment that recognised the right of self-determination 
attaching to a self-aware32 nation of peoples, bound together by a shared cultural 
identity.33 The primacy afforded to individual freedom by liberal political theory 
                                                                                                                                          
establishes that ‘The State as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) the capacity 
to enter into relations with other states’ (Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933, League 
of Nations Treaty Series, No. 3802, Vol. 165, page 19). 
29 As a result of the link between nation and state, dual nationality was long considered to be a 
contradiction of the singular loyalty owed by the individual to the State responsible for his protection; 
a position that is reflected in the statement within the preamble to The Hague Convention on Certain 
Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws ‘that it is in the general interest of the 
international community to secure that all its members should recognise that every person should 
have a nationality and should have one nationality only’ (Hague Convention on Certain Questions 
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law 1930, League of Nations Treaty Series, No. 4137, Vol. 
179, page 89). Feldblum argues that ‘Multiple nationality has traditionally been discouraged and 
banned by states. Nevertheless, the incidence of dual nationality in western Europe has continued to 
rise…The emergent fluidity of memberships—local, national, and transnational—has meant that 
citizenries are less defined by one state border or identity. Dual nationality breaks with the logic and 
practice of national state citizenship’ (Miriam Feldblum, ‘Reconfiguring Citizenship in Western 
Europe’ in Christian Joppke (ed), Challenge to the Nation-State, Immigration in Western Europe and 
the United States (OUP 1998), page 236). 
30 Bauböck notes that ‘legal scholars describe citizenship as a relation between a state and its 
members in which persons are assigned a legal status’ (Bauböck (1994), page 23).  
31 ‘A nationalist argument is a political doctrine built upon three basic assertions: a) There exists a 
nation with an explicit and peculiar character b) The interests and values of this nation take priority 
over all other interests and values c) The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually 
requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty’ (John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State 
(Manchester University Press 1982), page 3).  
32 Keating explains that ‘Nations are to be distinguished from ethnicities or mere cultural groups on 
one hand or regions on the other partly by their self-consciousness of being a nation, partly by 
objective characteristics’ (M Keating, Plurinational Democracy in a Post-Sovereign Order (2002) 53 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 351, page 357). Similarly, David Miller notes that ‘national 
communities are constituted by belief: nations exist when their members recognize one another as 
compatriots, and believe that they share characteristics of the relevant kind’ (David Miller, On 
Nationality (OUP 1997), page 22). 
33 Hastings argues that a common ethnicity, which he defines as those people ‘with a shared cultural 
identity and spoken language’, constitutes ‘the major distinguishing element in all pre-national 
societies’ (Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism 
(CUP 1997), page 3). See also Anthony Smith, who identifies the ‘ethnic basis of national identity’, 
and identifies an ethnic group as ‘a type of cultural collectivity, one that emphasises the role of myths 
of descent and historical memories, and is recognised by one or more cultural differences like 
religion, customs, language or institutions’(Anthony D Smith, National Identity (Penguin Books 
1991), page 20). See also Anthony D Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Blackwell 1986). The 




played a crucial role in the resurrection of modern citizenship,34 and the fingerprint 
of John Locke’s ‘natural rights’ philosophy is evidenced in both the Bill of Rights 
1689 and the US Constitution of 1788.35 The birth of the nation-state redefined the 
populace ‘from subjects of monarchs to citizens of states’, and secured ‘an emerging 
overlap between the state and the nation as the principal definer of citizenship’.36 As 
Rogers Brubaker notes in his seminal work on citizenship and nationhood: 
 
‘The development of the modern institution of national citizenship is 
intimately bound up with the development of the modern nation-
state. The French Revolution marked a crucial moment in both…As 
a bourgeois revolution, it created a general membership status 
based on equality based on equality before the law. As a democratic 
revolution it revived the classical conception of active political 
citizenship but transformed it from a special into what was, in 
principle if not yet in practice, a general status. As a national 
revolution, it sharpened boundaries – and antagonisms – between 
the members of different nation-states. And as a state-strengthening 
revolution, it ‘immediatized’ and codified state membership. 
National citizenship as we know it bears the stamp of all these 
developments’.37 
 
The development of the nation-state prompted a resurgence of citizenship in 
the form of a national endeavour, operating not only across state territory but 
encompassing a unified nation of peoples. In Brubaker’s terms, the state as a 
‘territorial organization’ was united with citizenship as a nationally-bounded 
‘membership organization’.38 The development of citizenship within the context of 
the nation-state thus links together the multiple aspects of citizenship, engendering a 
                                                 
34 Kostakopoulou notes that the ideas behind the Enlightenment literature on the social contract and 
political reform ‘‘caught on’ and galvanised the democratic revolutionary thought of the late 
eighteenth century’ (Kostakopoulou (2008), pages 23-24). 
35 Donald Doernberg argues that ‘the Constitution, as well as the Declaration of Independence, is 
traceable to Locke's natural rights philosophy’ (Donald L.  Doernberg, "We the People": John Locke, 
Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action (1985) 73 California 
Law Review 52, page 67).  
36 Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal, Limits of citizenship: migrants and postnational membership in Europe 
(University of Chicago Press 1994), page 16. Jürgen Habermas has also noted that ‘the complex and 
long-running processes of the “invention of the nation”…played the role of a catalyst in the 
transformation of the early modern state into a democratic republic. Popular national self-
consciousness provided the cultural background against which “subjects” could become politically 
active “citizens”’ (Jürgen Habermas, The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of 
Sovereignty and Citizenship (1998) 10 Public Culture 397, 402). 
37 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Harvard University Press 
1992), page 49 
38 Ibid, pages xi, 21-23, 63, 71-72 
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‘national’ model of membership in which rights (and the equality of membership that 
they secure) attach to the formal status of nationality as an expression of shared 
national identity.  
 
 Contestation of the nation 1.3.
The culturally-homogeneous population upon which a national model of membership 
is predicated has been subject to contestation. Globalisation and increased (and 
adapted) migratory flows have resulted in the de-coupling of aspects of citizenship 
that grew concomitantly in the nation-state, such that national membership 
organisations no longer coincide with the territorial organisation of state frameworks. 
As JL Cohen explains: 
 
‘Three distinct components of the citizenship principle have been 
identified in the literature: a political principle of democracy, a 
juridical status of legal personhood and a form of membership and 
political identity. The modern paradigm of citizenship was based 
on the assumption that these components would neatly map onto 
one another on the terrain of the democratic welfare state. 
Globalization, new forms of transnational migration, the partial 
disaggregation of state sovereignty and the development of human 
rights regimes have rendered this model anachronistic’.39 
 
The increasing heterogeneity of state populations problematizes the national 
model of membership, creating a fissure between the equality and freedom of the 
individual demanded of liberal citizenship, and the exclusion and marginalisation of 
those individuals who do not possess formal citizenship, or who do not participate in 
the common national identity.40 Much of modern citizenship scholarship can be 
understood in terms of an endeavour to reconfigure the boundaries of equal 
membership in order to better meet the demands of liberal citizenship, and is 
                                                 
39 Cohen (1999), page 245 
40 This contestation lies at the heart of Bauböck’s theory of transnational citizenship, in which he 
argues that the answers that liberal democratic theory gives to the question ‘what does it mean to be a 
citizen?’ challenge the answers given to the question ‘what does it mean to be a citizen of a certain 
state’? Bauböck thus uses the term ‘transnational citizenship’ to denote ‘a clash between normative 
principles of liberal democracy and current forms of exclusion from citizenship at the level of nation-
states’ (Bauböck (1994), pages viii and 20). See also Kostakopolou, who argues towards a revised 
institutional design of citizenship on the basis that ‘citizenship as national membership has 
exclusionary effects which undermine the normative ideals of democratic participation and equality’ 
(Kostakopoulou (2008), page 100). 
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expressed in a variety of models of membership that draw a differing balance in the 
relationship between rights, status and identity.  
 
Civic Nationalism (rights are allocated on the basis of status, as indicative 
of a common national identity grounded other than in ethnicity) 
Not all scholars who have observed the implicit tension between national 
membership and culturally heterogeneous societies have reached the conclusion that 
national citizenship is necessarily problematic from a liberal perspective. David 
Miller in his work ‘On Nationality’ has attempted to reconcile national membership 
with the demands of liberal citizenship. In doing so, he rejects the assumption that 
‘that a nation must be understood as an ethnically homogeneous community’,41 
arguing that national identity is demarcated by a community ‘constituted by shared 
belief and mutual commitment’, and ‘marked off from other communities by its 
distinct public culture’.42  
Miller then defends the importance of this national identity on the grounds 
that nations are ‘ethical communities’ that give rise to particular and distinct 
obligations between members. The loyalty fostered by these mutual relations, Miller 
argues, is necessary to sustain the re-distributive functions of the state.43 Political co-
operation alone, in the absence of such particular loyalties, relies on rational self-
interest and is thus incapable of supporting more than minimal state functions. Miller 
thus argues that ‘the ethics of nationality is plausible, resting as it does on well 
established facts about human identity and human motivation’.44 
                                                 
41 Miller (1997), page 21 
42 These are two of five constitutive elements by which Miller characterises national identity: ‘These 
five elements together—a community (1) constituted by shared belief and mutual commitment, (2) 
extended in history, (3) active in character, (4) connected to a particular territory, and (5) marked off 
from other communities by its distinct public culture—serve to distinguish nationality from other 
collective sources of personal identity’ (ibid, page 27).  
43 Miller argues that ‘there are strong ethical reasons for making the bounds of nationality and the 
bounds of the state coincide. Where this obtains, obligations of nationality are strengthened by being 
given expression in a formal scheme of political co‐operation; and the scheme of co‐operation can be 
based on loose rather than strict reciprocity, meaning that redistributive elements can be built in 
which go beyond what the rational self‐interest of each participant would dictate’ (Miller (1997), 
page 73). 
44 Ibid, page 80 
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 Three primary consequences flow from Miller’s defence of nationality. First, 
he argues that it is ethically legitimate to limit the positive obligations imposed upon 
the state in respect of non-nationals:  
 
‘if we take nationality seriously, then we must also accept that 
positive obligations to protect basic rights (e.g. to relieve hunger) 
fall in the first place on co‐nationals, so that outsiders would have 
strong obligations in this respect only where it was strictly 
impossible for the rights to be protected within the national 
community. If bad policies or vested interests in nation A mean that 
some of its citizens go needy, then, if nation C decides that its own 
welfare requirements mean that it cannot afford to give much (or 
anything) to the needy in A, it has not directly violated their rights; 
at most, it has permitted them to be violated, and in the 
circumstances this may be justifiable’.45 
 
Secondly, Miller embraces the right of self-government of national-
minorities, arguing that ‘where a nation is politically autonomous, it is able to 
implement a scheme of social justice; it can protect and foster its common culture; 
and its members are to a greater or lesser extent able collectively to determine its 
common destiny’.46 Thirdly, Miller rejects the grant of group differentiated rights for 
ethnic minorities which, he argues, both ‘overlooks the need and desire on the part of 
ethnic minorities to belong as full members to the national community’, and ‘makes 
unrealistic demands upon members of the majority group.’47 Miller thus presents the 
argument that ‘states may legitimately take steps to ensure that the members of 
different ethnic groups are inducted into national traditions and ways of thinking’.48  
Central to Miller’s attempt to reconcile nationalism and liberalism is his 
distinction between national identity and ethnicity. This approach aligns Miller with 
                                                 
45 Ibid, page 79 
46 Ibid, page 98. Miller further argues that ‘national self‐determination does not entail state 
sovereignty, and is consistent with recognizing international obligations, including duties of justice. It 
licences secession only in cases where the claims of the would‐be secessionists cannot be met by 
institutions of partial self‐determination (e.g. devolved government)’ (ibid, page 81). 
47 Ibid, page 139. On the latter point, Miller elaborates: ‘In the absence of a shared identity, [the 
majority group] are being asked to extend equal respect and treatment to groups with whom they have 
nothing in common beyond the fact of cohabitation in the same political society.’ 
48 Ibid, page 142. For this purpose he considers the French example to be instructive: ‘Since the 
Revolution at least, French ideas of nationality and citizenship have been open and inclusive: anyone 
might become a French national who resided on French soil and displayed attachment to French 
values. But along with this in the nineteenth century went a deliberate policy of ‘making Frenchmen’ 
out of the various communities living on French soil. The two main instruments were compulsory 
education in public schools and military service’ (ibid, page 143). 
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other theorists who make such distinctions as between a ‘Kulturnation’ and 
‘Staatsnation’ (Friedrich Meinecke),49 between ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ nationalism 
(Hans Kohn),50 or between ‘ethnic’ and ‘bureaucratic’ nationalism (Anthony 
Smith).51 Michael Keating explains these distinctions as gravitating around a 
fundamental difference in approach: whereas ethnic nationalism ‘sees membership of 
the national community as a given, or ascriptive’, ‘civic nationalism’ ‘sees 
individuals constituting themselves as a collective’.52 Civic nationalism mitigates the 
problems encountered by an ethnic national model of membership by making the 
boundaries of the national collective sufficiently permeable so as to admit persons by 
naturalisation, thereby enabling theorists such as Miller to defend the virtues of 
national identity from a liberal perspective.53 
 
Postnational citizenship (rights extend beyond status, marginalising 
national identity in favour of universal principles of personhood that attach to 
systems of global governance) 
Whereas Miller defends the importance of national identity and argues that closed 
(but permeable) national memberships are compatible with liberal citizenship, a 
diametrically-opposed model of membership identifies the waning significance that 
national identity plays in the allocation of membership benefits in globalised 
societies. Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal’s theory of ‘postnational’ citizenship argues that 
membership is legitimated by the international community on the basis of universal 
rights rather than by the nation-state on the basis of national belonging, evidence for 
which she draws from the inclusion of resident aliens within society as social, 
                                                 
49 Friedrich Meinecke, Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat: Studien zur Genesis des deutschen 
Nationalstaates (R. Oldenbourg 1922) 
50 Hans Kohn, The idea of nationalism: a study in its origins and background (Macmillan Co 1945) 
51 Anthony D Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Martin Robertson and Co. 1979), page 
169; see also the distinction made by Hans Kohn between ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ nationalism (supra, 
n.50).  
52 M Keating, Nations Against the State: The New Politics of nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and 
Scotland (Palgrave 2001), page 4. Brubaker criticises the ‘Manichean myth’ of the civic/ethnic 
categorisation of nationalism, arguing that the dichotomy is ‘over-burdened’ and intended to fulfil 
both analytical and normative functions (Rogers Brubaker, ‘The Manichean Myth: Re-thinking the 
distinction between 'civic' and 'ethnic' naitonalism’ in Hanspeter Kreisl and others (eds), Nation and 
National Identity: the European Experience in Perspective (Rüegger 1999)). 
53 See also a liberal theory of nationalism advanced by Yael Tamir (Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism 
(Princeton University Press 1993)). 
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political and economic actors.54 Soysal identifies two developments in global 
governance as responsible for this shift: ‘the emergence of transnational political 
structures’, and ‘the emergence of universalistic rules and conceptions regarding the 
rights of the individual, which are formalized and legitimated by a multitude of 
international codes and laws’.55 With regards to the former, Soysal pointed to 
organisations such as NATO, the European Union and the United Nations as the 
source of ‘transnational market and security arrangements’ that ‘constrain the host 
states from dispensing with their migrant populations at will’.56 Previously within 
the ‘exclusive preserve of the nation-state’, the areas of regulatory competence 
assumed by these bodies had ‘become legitimate concerns of international discourse 
and action’.57 The ‘de-nationalisation’ of citizenship has been witnessed also by 
other theorists: Saskia Sassen, for example, has observed it in the grant ‘by national 
states, of a whole range of ‘rights’ to foreign actors, largely and especially, 
economic actors – foreign firms, foreign investors, international markets, and 
foreign business people’.58 
 
‘Transnational’ and ‘a-national’ citizenship (rights extend beyond status, 
reflecting multiple and overlapping memberships in territorially-bounded 
polities) 
Postnational theories of citizenship have been criticised for the extent to which they 
under-estimate the continued significance of national identity, and ‘draw a wrong 
dualism between nation-states and individual rights’.59 Specifically, critics argue that 
viewing human rights as an ‘external imperative’ underestimates the extent to which 
the ‘global is embedded and filtered through the national’,60 with such rights 
constituting ‘an inherent feature of nation-states qua liberal-constitutional state’.61  
                                                 
54 Soysal (1994), page 140 
55 Ibid, pages 144-45 
56 Ibid, page 144 
57 Ibid, page 144 
58 Saskia Sassen, The Need to Distinguish Denationalized and Postnational (2000) 7 Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies 575, page 581 
59 Joppke (1998), page 26 
60 Saskia Sassen, ‘Towards Post-National and Denationalized Citizenship’ in Engin F Isin and Bryan 
S Turner (eds), Handbook of citizenship studies (SAGE 2002) 
61 Joppke (1998), page 26. Similar criticism was equally advanced by Linda Bosnaik, who argues that 
‘the often-substantial membership rights that aliens enjoy are not grounded in the human rights 
regime at all, but in the national system itself’ (Bosnaik Citizenship Denationalized (2000), page 460). 
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 Other reconfigurations of membership have sought to tread a mid-path 
between the bounded national societies advocated by Miller, and the form of global 
citizenship envisaged by Soysal. Rainer Bauböck’s theory of ‘transnational 
citizenship’ progresses ‘beyond the dichotomy of, on the one hand, internal rights of 
citizenship in closed societies where individuals live a complete life…and, on the 
other hand, human rights which serve as standard of justice in the international 
community of states’.62 This membership model reconceptualises citizenship in such 
a way as retains the significance of both the state system and national membership 
groupings, but which argues towards adapted mechanisms for the allocation of 
nominal and substantial citizenship in the face of the ‘complex map of overlapping 
memberships’ that ensue from globalising societies.63 Specifically, Bauböck argues 
that transnational citizenship advocates towards the optional naturalisation of persons 
who have resided within a territory for a minimum period,64 and for the extension of 
rights to resident aliens.65 Unlike theories of ‘postnational’ or ‘global’ citizenship, 
Bauböck’s transnational citizenship does ‘not adopt a radically cosmopolitan 
perspective for which a global state is the target’.66 Rather, he argues that 
transnational aspects of citizenship ‘bridge these cleaves [between populations and 
territories] rather than level them out’,67 creating societies in which the allocation of 
rights ‘reach beyond nation-states’.68  
                                                                                                                                          
Sassen points to the use of human rights instruments in national courts as ‘instances of 
denationalization in so far as the mechanisms are internal to the national state’(Sassen Towards Post-
National and Denationalized Citizenship (2000), page 288) 
62 Bauböck (1994), page viii 
63 Bauböck argues that a ‘comprehensive concept of citizenship which contains individual as well as 
collective rights, civil and political as well as social rights can only be institutionalized within 
communities bounded both territorially and in terms of membership’ (ibid, page 19). 
64 Ibid. pages 152-166. Ruth Rubio-Marín presents a similar suggestion, though she argues that ‘after 
a certain residence period, permanent residents ought to be automatically and unconditionally 
recognized as citizens of the state’ (Ruth Rubio-Marín, Immigration as a Democratic Challenge 
(Cambridge University Press 2000), page 20). 
65 Ibid, page 331 
66 Bauböck (1994), page viii. Elsewhere, Bauböck argues that ‘[i]f we theorize migrant 
transnationalism as a challenge to the nation-state system itself, we are likely to exaggerate its scope 
and to misunderstand its real significance’ (Rainer Bauböck, Towards a Political Theory of Migrant 
Transnationalism (2003) 37 International Migration Review 700, page 701). Rather, ‘[a] 
comprehensive concept of citizenship which contains individual as well as collective rights, civil and 
political as well as social rights can only be institutionalized within communities bounded both 
territorially and in terms of membership’ (Bauböck (1994), page 19). 
67 Ibid, page 3 
68 Ibid, page 19 
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A more radical approach to navigating between closed societies and the 
global state is advanced by Dora Kostakopoulou, who suggests a revised institutional 
framework in which ‘domicile’, rather than nationality, serves to delineate 
membership organisations. Arguing that citizenship ought to be understood as a 
‘network good’ with low excludability, Kostakopoulou searches for a revised 
framework capable of reflecting the multiple active connections that individuals have 
with a political community, and the webs of interactions of which they are a part.69 
She suggests three forms of ‘domicile’ (by which she refers to an individual’s 
permanent home) through which membership may be acquired: domicile of birth, 
granted automatically through birth within the territorial jurisdiction of a given state; 
domicile of choice, acquired through application upon satisfying both the fact and 
intention of permanent residence; and domicile of association, acquired by virtue of a 
relationship of legal dependency.70 Kostakopoulou suggests that the status of 
domicile would facilitate the maintenance of plural attachments,71 would protect 
long-standing residents against expulsion, and would entitle residents to apply for 
citizenship after two or three years of residence.72 
 
Differentiated citizenships (rights are differentiated in order to protect 
minority cultures: common national identity accommodates alternative 
identity groupings) 
All models of membership that have sought either to defend or to realign national 
membership have struggled with the issue of how to accommodate multiplicious 
identities within the umbrella of a common membership. Two related but often 
distinguished challenges are posed by non-territorially located cultures and social 
groups that seek protection within an existing constitutional framework, and by 
territorially located national minorities that assert a right of self-determination.73  
                                                 
69 Kostakopoulou (2008), page 108 
70 Ibid, pages 120-122 
71 Ibid, page 131 
72 Ibid, page 141 
73 Miller, for example, accepts the right of self-determination asserted by territorially-located national 
minorities, whilst rejecting the claim of differentiated rights for minority cultures (Miller (1997)). 
Similarly, Will Kymlicka draws a distinction between ‘‘national minorities’ (in multination states) 
and ‘ethnic groups’ (in polyethnic states)’ (Will Kymlicka, Multicultural citizenship : a liberal theory 
of minority rights (Clarendon Press 1995), page 6). Whilst the former expresses a ‘societal culture’ 
that warrants protection through the differentiation of rights, the latter does not (ibid, page 101). 





Addressing the first of these issues, theorists have put forward several justifications 
for group-differentiated rights for minority cultures or social groups. Whereas some 
have identified the need for special rights to prevent oppression of social groups 
(Young),74 others have argued for the protection of minority cultures as a means by 
which to maximise an individual’s context of choice and to support self-identity 
(Kymlicka),75 or as a means by which to challenge perspectives and to create a 
climate in which different cultures can engage in a mutually beneficial dialogue 
(Parekh).76 
In her theory on differentiated citizenship, Iris Marion Young argued that 
‘social groups’ play an important role in influencing an individual’s choices:  
‘People necessarily and properly consider public issues in terms influenced by their 
situated experience and perception of social relations. Different social groups have 
different needs, cultures, histories, experiences, and perceptions of social relations 
which influence their interpretation of the meaning and consequences of policy 
proposals and influence the form of their political reasoning’77 
Young observes that a ‘strict adherence to a principle of equal treatment 
tends to perpetuate oppression or disadvantage’ of social groups,78 as a result of 
which she makes two primary suggestions. First, she argues towards group 
                                                                                                                                          
controversial’), age groups, social classes, ethnic and ‘racial’ minorities and women (Bauböck (1994), 
page 270), whilst Ferran Requejo distinguishes between four kinds of cultural pluralism: ‘those which 
defend a ‘single issue’ (feminism, sexual minorities, etc.), those of a nationalist nature; those 
representing immigrants, and those which defend the rights of indigenous peoples’ (Ferran Requejo, 
Cultural Pluralism, nationalism and federalism: A revision of democratic citizenship in plurinational 
states (1999) 35 European Journal of Political Research 255, page 256). Such distinction is not, 
however, universally considered helpful: Iris Marion Young criticises Kymlicka’s distinction between 
national minorities and ethnic groups as ‘unnecessarily dichotomous , claiming that ‘Kymlicka’s 
desire to develop two mutually exclusive categories of cultural minorities is misguided…it is far better 
to think of cultural minorities in a continuum’ (Iris Marion Young, A Multicultural Continuum: A 
Critique of Will Kymlicka’s Ethnic-Nation Dichotomy (1997) 4 Constellations 48, page 50). 
74 Iris Marion Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship 
(1989) 99 Ethics 250 
75 Kymlicka (1995) 
76 Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Macmillan 
Press 2000) 
77 Young (1989), page 257. She defines ‘social groups’ as ‘an affinity with other persons by which 
they identify with one another, and by which other people identify them’ (ibid, page 259). 
78 Ibid, page 251 
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representation as a means by which to guard against exploitation, marginalization, 
powerlessness and cultural imperialism.79 Secondly, Young argues that universal law 
and policy is biased in favour of privileged groups – whose experience sets the 
‘norm’ – and further disadvantages oppressed groups. ‘This’, she argues, ‘implies 
that instead of always formulating rights and rules in universal terms that are blind 
to difference, some groups sometimes deserve special rights’.80 
Whereas Young advocated towards differentiated rights for a broad range of 
social groups in order to guard against oppression, Will Kymlicka has advanced a 
theory of ‘multicultural citizenship’ in which he argues towards the protection of 
‘societal cultures’ through the grant of minority rights.81 Societal cultures, he argues, 
are ‘important to an individual’s freedom’,82 as the play a role ‘in enabling 
meaningful individual choice and in supporting self-identity…Cultural membership 
provides us with an intelligible context of choice, and a secure sense of identity and 
belonging, that we call upon in confronting questions about personal values and 
projects.’83  
A pervasive criticism levied against Kymlicka’s theory lies in the extent to 
which his concept of ‘societal culture’ perpetuates a monolithic understanding of 
culture that replicates the homogeneous ideals of nationhood. Joseph Carens 
highlights this to be the ‘greatest irony’ of Kymlicka’s model, arguing that his 
characterisation of ‘societal structure’ as ‘more or less institutionally complete’ 
invokes the ‘old logic of the nation-state’.84 Carens thus suggests that by focussing 
upon the transmission of a common culture, Kymlicka draws away from the problem 
                                                 
79 Young argued that ‘a democratic public, however that is constituted, should provide mechanisms 
for the effective representation and recognition of the distinct voices and perspectives of those of its 
constituent groups that are oppressed or disadvantaged within it’ (ibid, page 261). 
80 Ibid, page 269 
81 Kymlicka defines ‘societal culture’ as ‘a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways 
of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, 
and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres’ (ibid, page 76). 
82 Kymlicka (1995), page 80 
83 Ibid Bhikhu Parekh presents a similar argument, by which he suggests that cultural diversity ‘is 
desirable for society as a whole and represents a valuable collective asset’; ‘since each culture is 
inherently limited, a dialogue between them is mutually beneficial’ (Parekh (2000), pages 196 and 
337). 
84 ‘The deepest problem – and the greatest irony – of Kymlicka’s concept of societal culture is that it 
is much better suited to a monocultural conception of citizenship than to a multicultural one. This is 
not surprising if one considers how heavily Kymlicka’s concept of societal culture rests upon 
Gellner’s discussion of nationalism’ (Jospeh Carens, Culture, Citizenship, and Community: A 
Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness (OUP 2000), page 65). See also Kostakopoulou 
(2008), page 61. 
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of multiculturalism understood as the persistence of cultural differences within a 
given state: ‘the concept of societal culture obscures rather than illuminates the 
distinctive questions that national minorities raise’.85  
 
Plurinational Citizenship 
Kymlicka’s theory of multicultural citizenship has also been criticised for the way in 
which it deals with national minorities: Christian Joppke has argued that the 
‘levelling function’ of multiculturalism trivialises the state-seeking ambition of 
national minorities who reject being seen as ‘just a minority among other minorities’ 
in a multicultural society.86 Many theorists would, however, reject Joppke’s 
assumption that the differentiated rights claimed by national minorities need 
necessarily amount to statehood. Turning their attention to the issue of what 
differentiated rights for national minorities may require, several studies have 
observed that sub-state nationalist movements have moved away from singular ends 
of state-sovereignty. Several scholars have thus noted that ‘many nationality 
movements do not want a state on traditional lines at all, but seek other expressions 
of self-determination’,87 and that ‘self-determination need not necessarily result in 
independent statehood’.88 Michael Keating argues that ‘there is not much historical 
support’ for the view ‘that a territory given a special status, particularly if this is 
accompanied by recognition of its national identity, will not be content with the 
status of devolution but will press for further concessions and ultimately for 
                                                 
85 Carens (2000), page 66. Bhikhu Parekh criticises Kymlicka’s notion of societal culture on the 
grounds that is gives an essentialist and reified account of society, overlooking that ‘cultural 
boundaries are often porous and permeable…in which each culture both absorbs the influences of 
and defines itself in relation to others’ (Bhikhu Parekh, Dilemmas of a Multicultural Theory of 
Citizenship (1997) 4 Constellations 54, page 61) 
86 Christian Joppke, Multicultural Citizenship: A Critique (2001) 42 European Journal of Sociology 
431, page 435. Carens expresses concern that the concept of societal culture may weaken the claim of 
smaller, more vulnerable national minorities that do not meet the standard of the societal culture that 
Kymlicka defines (Carens (2000), pages 56 and 61). 
87 M Keating, Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era (Oxford 
University Press 2004), page 8). Rather, such movements seek ‘other expressions of self-
determination. The extraordinary persistence of the idea that nationality entails claims to statehood 
shows what a grip the idea of statehood has on the modernist imagination, a grip only gradually 
being prised loose with the transformation and demystification of the state in late modernity’. 
88 Rainer Bauböck, Paradoxes of self-determination and the right to self-government (IWE - Working 
Paper Series, 2004), page 12 
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independence’,89 whilst Stephen Tierney challenges the ‘common myth’ that the 
dominant nationalist voices within territories such as Catalonia, Quebec, and 
Scotland are in fact ‘separatist’ ones.’90  
 Such arguments centre around a model of ‘national pluralism’, in which it is 
observed that an individual may self-identify with one or more distinct national 
groups. The ‘Moreno Question’, developed as a means by which to measure national 
pluralism in Spain and the UK, has asked respondents in Scotland and Catalonia 
whether they regard themselves as:91 
 
1. Catalan/Scottish, not Spanish/British 
2. More Catalan/Scottish than Spanish/British 
3. Equally Catalan/Scottish and Spanish/British 
4. More Spanish/British than Catalan/Scottish 
5. Spanish/British, not Catalan/Scottish 
6. Don’t Know 
 
Results of the survey found that 53% of respondents in Scotland identified 
themselves within categories 1-3, thus displaying some form of ‘duality’, with 19% 
of respondents considering themselves to be equally Scottish and British.92 These 
findings lent empirical weight to the normative claim made by theorists such as 
Michael Keating, who argued towards a need ‘to recognize national identities as 
                                                 
89 Michael Keating, What's wrong with asymmetrical government? (1998) 8 Regional and Federal 
Studies 195, page 212 
90 Rather, Tierney notes that ‘sub-state national societies are, with their new visions of what 
sovereignty can and does mean, presenting very complex claims to greater autonomy and enhanced 
recognition within the State, while at the same time attempting to negotiate some measure of discrete 
personality within the international institutions to which the State belongs; these aspirations therefore 
represent a deeply ambivalent strategy of operating more effectively inside, and when the opportunity 
avails itself and is attractive, partly beyond, the nation-State’ (Stephen Tierney, Reframing 
Sovereignty? Sub-State National Societies and Contemporary Challenges to the Nation-State (2005) 
54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 161, page 163). 
91 The ‘Moreno Question’ was developed by Luis Moreno during his doctoral studies (Luis Moreno, 
Decentralization in Britain and Spain: The cases of Scotland and Catalonia (Ph.D. thesis, University 
of Edinburgh, National Library of Scotland 1986)) 




plural rather than singular’, explaining that ‘[i]n plurinationalism, the very concept 
of nationality is plural and takes on different meanings in different contexts’.93  
In this context, limited claims of self-determination that fall short of state 
sovereignty are not the result of a political deadlock arising from the ‘paradox of 
self-determination’,94 but rather present a solution in which the constituent nations 
(the parts and the whole) may achieve full expression of their multiplicious identity. 
Benoît Pelletier thus argues with regard to Canada that constitutional asymmetry is a 
‘powerful tool to help all Canadians meet their aspirations’ of differing visions of 
Canada.95 Requejo argues that such reconceptualization should be considered ‘not 
just as an inconvenient fact that must be borne as stoically as possible’, but rather 
that it constitutes ‘a normative and institutional refinement of liberal democracies in 
plurinational societies means seeing national pluralism as a value worth 
protecting’.96  
 
 Contestation of the state 1.4.
Reoccurring themes of discourse can be isolated from these membership models, all 
of which struggle to bridge the gap between national membership and the equality 
demanded of liberal citizenship. They all consider the respective importance that 
ought to be placed upon a shared civic status and common culture as the bases upon 
which membership rights are allocated. Three main points of enquiry can be 
identified within these discourses: ‘what obligations do liberal states owe towards 
resident non-nationals?’; ‘what obligations do liberal states owe towards minority 
cultures?’, and ‘what obligations do liberal states owe towards national minorities 
                                                 
93 Keating (2002), pages 351 and 361 
94 This paradox refers to the tension between ‘national minority self-government and the territorial 
integrity of a multinational state’ (Bauböck (2004), page 1). See also Susanna Mancini, who seeks to 
identify a procedural model for democratic secession within a constitutional framework (Susanna 
Mancini, Rethinking the boundaries of democratic secession: liberalism, nationalism, and the right of 
minorities to self-determination (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 553). This issue 
has been the subject of judicial deliberation in the case of Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 
S.C.R.217. 
95 Benoît Pelletier, ‘Asymmetrical Federalism: A Win-Win Forumla!’ Asymmetry Series 2005 (17) 
<http://www.queensu.ca/iigr/working/asymmetricfederalism.html> accessed 7 August 2010 
96 Ferran Requejo, ‘Federalism and the Quality of Democracy in Plurinational Contexts: Present 
Shortcomings and Possible Improvements’ Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops: 
'Centres and Peripheries in a Changing World', Grenoble April 2001, 
<http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/grenoble/ws4/requejo.pdf> accessed 
1 September 2010, page 8 
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asserting claims of self-determination?’ Reconfigurations of equal membership that 
have recently grown to dominate citizenship scholarship are thus primarily 
concerned with challenges to the nation as the legitimating frame of equal 
membership, whilst assuming the continued primacy of the state as the predominant 
provider of the rights that form the substantive benefit of membership. They examine 
the role of formal status and national identity in securing rights, whilst adopting the 
perspective that allocation of those rights are a function of the state.97  
Plurinational models of citizenship have, of course, envisaged revised 
constitutional structures as a means by which to accommodate the right to self-
government asserted by national minorities. In doing so they illustrate the way in 
which reconfigurations of national identity may contest the dominance of the state 
framework, and how the state may protect national minorities. Such analysis has, 
however, stopped short of considering the flip-side to this question: how does 
citizenship operate within a non-state framework, once claims to self-determination 
have been accommodated within devolved structures? Whilst an emerging body of 
literature is devoted to the basis upon which such structures are formed and 
legitimated, little consideration has been given to the way in which membership is 
defined within that constitutional landscape, or how polities re-define and establish 
bounds of membership once operational. Of those mentioned above, Soysal’s 
‘postnational’ model of membership comes closest to unpicking the consequences 
for citizenship of the re-allocation of membership competences away from the State. 
Yet even this model is limited in that respect: Soysal herself recognises a ‘dialectic 
tension’ between what she perceives to be the external influence of human rights 
regimes and the realisation of postnational citizenship within the continued 
framework of sovereign states,98 with regards to which she notes that, 
‘[i]ncongruously, inasmuch as the ascription and codification of rights move beyond 
national frames of reference, post-national rights remain organized at the national 
                                                 
97 Kostakopoulou, for example, specifically notes that ‘a-national citizenship is not envisaged to affect 
either the recognition of states in the international arena or their central role. Nor does it threaten to 
usurp their competence to determine the beneficiaries of citizenship’ (Kostakopoulou (2008), page 
127). 
98 The ‘postnational’ theory of membership that Soysal presented has received criticism from those 
who refute Soysal’s characterisation of international human rights regimes as external limitations of 
sovereignty, and who argue that the protection of individual rights form an inherent part of the rule of 
law as expressed in the modern nation-state (see further at nn.59-61). 
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level. The nation-state is still the repository of educational, welfare and public health 
functions and the regulator of social distribution’.99  
 
 Examining social citizenship in two asymmetric constitutions 1.5.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the boundaries of social citizenship in non-
state polities. It examines how non-state polities engage in the same act of balancing 
rights, status and identity to allocate the benefits of membership within their control 
when legislative competence is transferred to polities above and below the state, and 
how the resulting models of polity membership at which they arrive interact across 
the interdependent polities.  
 
Constitutional Asymmetry 
The constitutional structures under examination in this study are referred to as 
‘asymmetric constitutions’. This term is used to identify to a constitutional structure 
that consists of ‘nested’ polities (in which both the whole and the parts are distinct 
territorially-bounded political communities), and in which legislative competence is 
allocated differentially across the constituent polities of the structure. Such structures 
have multiple dimensions. On a domestic level, they result from accommodation of 
national minority claims to self-governance in plurination states.100 From a broader 
perspective, the European Union can in its entirety be conceived in terms of a 
constitutional asymmetry by reason of the ‘variable geometry’ of EU law across 
Member States,101 and from the perspective of a plurination-state EU governance 
adds an additional ‘layer’ to the asymmetry experienced within the domestic 
framework. 
The adjective ‘asymmetric’ within this label refers to variation across the 
constitutional structure, and is adopted from Charles Tarlton’s exposition of 
symmetry in federal relationships as relating to ‘the level of conformity and 
                                                 
99 Soysal (1994), pages 8 and 157 
100 See text, above, at n.86 
101 Variable geometry results from the ability of the UK, Ireland and Denmark to ‘opt in’ or ‘opt out’ 
of certain EU laws. 
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commonality in the relations of each separate political unit of the system to both the 
system as a whole and to the other component units’.102  
Asymmetry can exist in two forms. De facto asymmetry may manifest in 
differences in the ‘underlying social, cultural and political realities of the polity in 
question’,103 and may also arise from diverging legal and policy choices made within 
a symmetrical constitutional framework. De iure asymmetry, by contrast, may be 
understood as that asymmetry that is proscribed within the constitutional framework, 
and which is enshrined within law.104 Such asymmetry may manifest in the varying 
scope of competences enjoyed by given polities, or even in the very framework 
within which those competences are acquired. 
Constitutional asymmetry presents a helpful characterisation of the 
constitutional structures under examination for purpose of this analysis, allowing a 
frame within which to analyse both the allocation of constitutional competences, and 
the underlying social and political divergences within which those competences are 
contextualised.105 Ferran Requejo identifies two dimensions to which the asymmetry 
in federations refers, both ‘to the degree of heterogeneity that exists in the relations 
between each member state and the federation, and between the member states 
                                                 
102 Charles Tarlton, Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation 
(1965) 27 The Journal of Politics 861, page 867. Tarlton argued that traditional approaches to 
federalism had hitherto afforded insufficient recognition to the fact that the ‘federalism’ of any system 
‘is likely to be variegated and disparate among all the essential units’. Such implicit classification of 
a system as ‘federal as a whole’, he argued, led necessarily to an ‘important distortion’ of any 
exposition of federalism. The symmetry of any given system was for Tarlton an indicator of its 
suitability for a federal constitution: whether a state can function harmoniously within a federal 
constitution is a result of the level of symmetry within it. ‘The higher the level of symmetry,’ he 
argued, ‘…the greater the likelihood that federalism would be a suitable form of governmental 
organisation. On the other hand, if the system is highly asymmetrical in its components, then a 
harmonious federal system is unlikely to develop’ (page 872). 
103 Ibid, page 866.  Tarlton adopts a ‘socio-cultural’ approach towards federalism advanced by 
William Livingston, who considers that ‘the essence of federalism lies not in the institutional or 
constitutional structure but in the society itself’ (William Livingston, A Note on the Nature of 
Federalism (1952) Political Science Quarterly 81, page 84, and Tarlton (1965), page 868). 
Summarising this approach Tarlton recognises an ‘over-emphasis on legalistic concerns by pointing 
out that the institutional facade may or may not accurately express the social, cultural, and political 
realities of the society being studied.’ 
104 The distinction between de facto and de iure asymmetry was developed by Robert Agranoff 
(Agranoff R (ed), Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States (Nomos 1999); see also 
Agranoff R, 'Federal Asymmetry and Intergovernmental Relations in Spain' Asymmetry Series 2005 
(17) <www.queensu.ca/iigr/working/asymmetricfederalism/Agranoff2006.pdf> accessed 7 August 
2010). Divergences in laws enacted within a symmetrical distribution of competences are 
characterised in the text above as de facto asymmetries, though other scholars may consider them by 




themselves’.106 We might characterise these two directions of asymmetry in terms of 
‘vertical asymmetry’ – operating between the sub-state unit and the state, or between 
the state and the EU – or ‘horizontal asymmetry’, operating between sub-state units 
or between Member States of the EU.107 To this we might add a third label of 
‘diagonal’ asymmetry, referring to the relationship between sub-state polities and the 
European Union, or between sub-state units and non-devolved territories that are 
governed by central organs of state.108 
The study examines how the boundaries of equal membership are determined 
across this web of constitutional relations. For this purpose it examines the allocation 
of membership in the constituent polities of the UK and Spain, as two asymmetric 
constitutions within the broader asymmetrical framework of the European Union. At 
a sub-state level, the study focuses primarily upon Scotland and Catalonia, though 
draws reference to other sub-state polities by way of contextual comparison. The 
study does not employ a strict comparativst approach between the UK and Spain, and 
nor are the observations noted within these case studies claimed to be extrapolable 
across all asymmetric constitutions. Rather, the study draws upon the context-
specific experience of particular constitutional structures as a means by which to 
interpret the process of membership definition within nested polities. Its objective is 
to probe the complexities of these constitutional relationships and their significance 
for membership definition in order to provide a conceptual framework within which 
these experiences can be illuminated, rather than to furnish a comprehensive 
normative theory within which these tensions might be mitigated. The methodology 
                                                 
106 Requejo (1999), page 270  
107 See Robert Agranoff (ed), (1999) Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States 
(Nomos), page 17 
108 The only nation within the United Kingdom that does not possess devolved authority is England.  
Two consequences flow from this observation.  
First, the electorate in devolved regions have a disproportionate influence over ‘State’ policy that 
applies only within the non-devolved territory. For example, Members of the UK Parliament returned 
from Scottish constituencies are entitled to vote upon Bills presented to the UK Parliament that affect 
only England.  By contrast, Members of the UK Parliament have no influence over devolved matters 
that affect only Scotland.  This not only means that ‘English’ Members of Parliament cannot influence 
matters in Scotland, but also gives rise to the paradoxical situation whereby Scottish Members of the 
UK Parliament have no influence over certain matters that affect Scotland, though they can vote upon 
Bills that effect only England. This dichotomy was first raised as an issue before the House of 
Commons by Tam Dayel MP, and has since attracted much analysis in literature as ‘The West Lothian 
Question’. Secondly, diagonal asymmetry poses the risk of assimilating the interests of non-devolved 
territories with ‘State’ interests. This is of particular concern when there is only one non-devolved 
territory, such as is the case in the United Kingdom, around which State-level political discourse 
becomes centred.  
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draws from Kim Lane Scheppele’s approach of ‘constitutional ethnography’, which 
‘looks to the logics of particular contexts as a way of illuminating complex 
interrelationships among political, legal, historical, social, economic and cultural 
elements.’109 Constitutional ethnography has been harnessed as a methodology in a 
variety of socio-legal studies of citizenship,110 which have identified that a 
contextual approach ‘is essential to bring out the essential contestedness of 
citizenship, which may be a formal legal/institutional concept in one respect, but 
which is equally a multivalent and controversial concept’.111 
 
Polity membership defined through the grant of social citizenship rights 
The study examines membership boundaries constructed through the grant of social, 
rather than political (or civic) rights. The reason for this is twofold: first, it is in the 
allocation of social citizenship rights that devolution to sub-state polities has most 
salience. The ability to pursue differential policy lies at the heart of devolved 
constitutional structures, and the greater the divergence in policy that ensues, the 
more contentious becomes the exercise of that competence. Secondly, the capacity of 
non-state polities to define the boundaries of equal membership by extending or 
withdrawing citizenship rights is limited to the allocation of social rights. Political 
membership of Scotland, for example, is not a product of a decision taken within the 
competence of the Scottish polity but rather is a decision taken by central organs of 
state. The purpose of this study is to progress beyond an examination of 
differentiated rights granted by the state, to consider how non-state polities engage in 
decisions that delineate the boundaries of their equal membership. It is in the 
                                                 
109 Scheppele (2004), page 390. Scheppele further explains that ‘The goal of constitutional 
ethnography is to better understand how constitutional systems operate by identifying the mechanisms 
through which governance is accomplished and the strategies through which governance is attempted, 
experienced, resisted and revised, taken in historical depth and cultural context’ (ibid, page 391); and 
that ‘constitutional ethnography is the study of the central legal elements of polities using methods 
that are capable of recovering the lived detail of the politico-legal landscape (ibid, page 395). 
110 see Jo Shaw, The Transformation of Citizenship in the European Union (Cambridge University 
Press 2007), pages 16 and 83; Eldar Sarajlić, Conceptualising citizenship regime(s) in post-Dayton 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (2012) 16 Citizenship Studies, page 368; Jo Shaw and Igor Štiks, ‘The 
Europeanisation of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia: an introduction’ 
CITSEE Working Paper 2010/1 (2010) 
<http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/file_download/series/178_theeuropeanisationofcitizenshipinthesuccessorsta
tesoftheformeryugoslaviaanintrod.pdf> accessed 28 March 2013 (pages 10-11) 
111 Shaw and Štiks (2010), page 9 
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allocation of social citizenship rights that fall within devolved competences that such 
decisions are evidenced. 
It ought to be acknowledged that polity membership defined through the 
grant of social rights is of a different nature to polity membership defined through 
the grant of political rights, and that the national model of membership described 
above may resonate differently across the two.112 There may be people excluded 
from the franchise because they lack formal status (and the loyalty and commitment 
that it is assumed to indicate), to whom social rights are extended on the basis of 
social justice or humanitarian grounds. Conversely, there may be non-resident 
nationals who retain political membership in the polity of which they are formal 
members, who do not receive the benefit of social citizenship rights.113 
Acknowledgment of these differences does not undermine the presumption that 
social citizenship rights have traditionally been linked with a national model of 
membership,114 but simply necessitates a clear identification of the limits of the 
study: observations drawn from the study of social citizenship rights cannot be 
extrapolated to political membership.  
Social citizenship has also never been exclusively unitary in nature across 
state territory in the same way as might be claimed of political membership of the 
state, or of nominal citizenship. Differentiated social citizenship at the sub-state level 
has long been evidenced in those states with established federal constitutions, where 
federal units have often retained significant competences in the field of social rights. 
Yet despite being an established feature of certain modern states, little scholarly 
                                                 
112 Bauböck, for example, notes that ‘[social rights of citizenship] are different from civic and political 
ones, because the notion of need is strongly present as a background justification and cannot be 
eliminated as long as social rights are differentiated according to particular needs’ (Bauböck (1994), 
page 219). 
113 On the external dimension of political participation see Rainer Bauböck, Stakeholder Citizenship 
and Transnational Political Participation: A Normative Evaluation of External Voting (2007) 75 
Fordham Law Review 2393 
114 On the contrary, Bauböck notes that ‘[o]nce moral commands of mutual aid that aim at 
establishing obligations to satisfy the existential ‘needs of strangers’…have been satisfied, social 
rights ought to be oriented towards enabling citizens in different situations of need to recognize each 
other as free agents in civil society and as equal members of the polity’ (Bauböck (1994), pages 219-
220). See also Miller’s claim that ‘if we take nationality seriously, then we must also accept that 
positive obligations to protect basic rights (e.g. to relieve hunger) fall in the first place on co‐
nationals, so that outsiders would have strong obligations in this respect only where it was strictly 
impossible for the rights to be protected within the national community’ (see above, at n.45). Keating 
has also noted the ‘strong assumption in the social welfare literature that the modern welfare state 
rests upon a unified territorial nation-state’ (Michael Keating, Social citizenship, solidarity and 
welfare in regionalized and plurinational states (2009) 13 Citizenship studies 501, page 501). 
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attention has been paid to how differentiated sub-state social citizenships challenge 
the paradigm model of national membership. 
Such contestation is evidenced in established federal constitutions, 
notwithstanding that social citizenship was never fully nationalised, when the nation-
state has continued to play an important function in guaranteeing social rights: a core 
of re-distributive functions often remain within the competence of the State,115 and a 
shared state-wide national identity is commonly accredited with sustaining the 
provision of social goods and services even where those goods and services are 
organised by federal units.116 
It is, however, in those states without a continuous federal history, in which 
the devolution of competences to sub-state legislatures and the differentiated social 
citizenship that ensue are relatively recent events, that such contestation is likely to 
be most salient. It is in these structures that the link between social citizenship and 
national membership has been strongest and most consistent, and is therefore 
subjected to the greatest challenge when faced with a transition to differentiated 
social citizenship. In the UK and Spain, which form the focus of this study, 
devolution has taken place within the last forty years following significant periods of 
state unity. 
Whilst an emerging (and still relatively discrete) body of literature in the field 
of territorial politics has begun to examine the decentralisation of welfare within 
devolved states,117 the focus of such studies is limited primarily to diverging policy 
trajectories and their implications for nation-building. None has considered how non-
state polities define the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion within their respective 
competences, how these boundaries interact across the constitutional structure, and 
the new challenges that they present to the definition of equal membership outwith 
the nation-state.  
 
 
                                                 
115 In Germany, for example, public welfare is a matter that falls under the concurrent legislative 
powers of the Federation and the Länder (Grundgesetz Article 73(2)). 
116 See further at n.114, above. 
117 See e.g. Scott Greer (ed), (2009) Devolution and social citizenship in the UK (The Policy Press); 
Nicola McEwen and Luis Moreno (eds), (2005) The Territorial Politics of Welfare (Routledge); 
Keating (2009); Scott Greer, Territorial Politics and Health Policy: UK Health Policy in Comparative 
Perspective (Manchester University Press 2009). 
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Structure of the study 
The following study selects two social citizenship rights through which to examine 
the boundaries of polity membership: receipt of minimum income allowances,118 and 
fee regulation for publically-subsidised services of higher education and prescription 
charges.119 These social rights are used within the study as ‘lenses’ through which to 
examine the exercise of polity competences to determine the boundaries of equal 
membership, and the interaction of those boundaries across the constitutional 
asymmetry.  
Minimum income allowances were selected as a means by which to probe the 
State/EU dimension of the constitutional asymmetry for two reasons. First, social 
security regulation remains primarily a centralised competence. It therefore provides 
a means by which to isolate and to examine in detail the effect of EU competences 
upon a singular polity, foreshadowing consideration in chapter four of the way in 
which these competences interact with those of sub-state polities. Secondly, of those 
social security benefits provided by the state, minimum income allowances can most 
properly be characterised as a ‘citizenship right’: they are provided to members so as 
to secure ‘a general enrichment of the concrete substance of civilised life, a general 
reduction of risk and insecurity, an equalisation between the more and the less 
fortunate at all levels’,120 and as non-contributory benefits are not the product of a 
right ‘bought’ by insurance contributions. Differential fee imposition has been 
selected as a means by which to probe the interaction of state, sub-state and EU 
competences as, unlike more diffuse policy differentiation, differential fee imposition 
is directly comparable across polities and translates clearly in terms of ‘advantage’ of 
‘disadvantage’. It is for this reason that such policies are frequently harnessed in 
public imagination and attract the highest degree of political salience. 
                                                 
118 For a definition of minimum income allowances, see below at n.330. 
119 I adopt for this purpose Marshall’s definition of a social right as a right to a ‘modicum of economic 
welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a 
civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society’ (see n.11, above), and Bauböck’s 
definition that ‘a right is a resource provided by social institutions which protects and legitimates the 
existence, the needs and interests, or the actions of the bearer of the right. The emphasis on 
institutions is meant to refute the idea that rights can be ‘natural’ in the sense of being attributes of 
individuals in a state of nature’(Bauböck (1994), page 209). 
120Marshall (1950), page 56. See also above at n.17. 
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 The case studies of membership definition in chapters three and four are 
preceded in chapter two by a contextual examination of the regulatory framework 
determinative of membership competences across the two constitutional 
asymmetries. Its discussion on sub-state nationalism and European identity expands 
upon and contextualises the contestation of national identity that has been introduced 
earlier within this chapter, and the classification of competences developed within 
the chapter both serves as a means by which to unpick the regulatory framework 
within which membership allocation operates and provides necessary background for 






2. Membership competences across two asymmetric 
constitutions 
 Types of membership competence: provision, allocation, and 2.1.
control of access to social goods and services 
The discussion in chapter one has claimed that citizenship is a principle of equal 
membership, ultimately secured through a bundle of civic, political and social rights 
that form the substantive benefit of membership. In the traditional national model of 
membership in which citizenship is tied to the nation-state, these rights are provided 
by the state and are allocated to nationals on the basis of a common identity.121  
The objective of this chapter is to map the re-location of competences 
determinative of social membership across the constituent polities of two asymmetric 
constitutions. For this purpose, the chapter is structured around an examination of 
three types of ‘membership competence’: the competence to provide social goods 
and services,122 the competence to allocate social goods and services, and the 
competence to control access to social goods and services. The competence to 
provide social goods and services is comprised of a legislative competence to 
determine the level of provision available, and an administrative responsibility to 
deliver it. The competence to allocate social goods and services refers to the 
legislative competence of a polity to stipulate a certain class of persons who are 
entitled to receive the benefit of those goods and services, and thereby the power to 
include or exclude a given individual. The competence to control access to social 
goods and services refers to a polity’s legislative competence to precondition an 
individual’s admission to that class of eligible persons, through control over such 
‘gateway’ conditions as nationality and residence.  
Exercise of these three forms of membership competence collectively 
determine whether an individual is able to benefit from measures that secure a 
‘general enrichment of the concrete substance of civilised life, a general reduction of 
risk and insecurity, [and] an equalisation between the more and the less fortunate at 
all levels’,123 and thus whether they receive the substantive benefit of the ‘social 
                                                 
121 A status, which, in turn, is an expression of participation in a common national identity. 
122 The terms ‘social good’ and ‘social service’ are used to refer to a broad range of goods and services 
provided by a polity that secure the ‘social element’ of citizenship. 
123 Marshall (1950), page 56 
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element’ of citizenship. The following pages examine the re-location of these three 
types of membership competence to non-state polities across the two asymmetric 
constitutions under examination. Section 2.2 explores the competence of non-state 
polities to provide social goods and services (encompassing both a legislative 
competence to determine the level of provision available, and an administrative 
responsibility to deliver it). This type of competence is enjoyed by the sub-state 
polities of Scotland and Catalonia, but not by the European Union. The section opens 
with a contextual discussion of the nationalist and functionalist claims upon which 
devolution is predicated, before examining in greater depth the constitutional 
framework within which that autonomy is realised and the scope of competence 
enjoyed by the Scottish Parliament and Catalan Generalitat to pursue a distinct social 
policy.  
Section 2.3 considers the competence to allocate social goods and services. In 
Scotland and Catalonia this competence is co-vested with the competence to provide 
social goods and services, in a general transfer of legislative competence that allows 
the sub-state legislature both to determine the level of welfare provided and to 
specify the persons to whom it is available. The section focuses upon allocation 
under EU law of those social goods and services that are provided by state and sub-
state polities, by way of a requirement placed on those polities to secure equality of 
treatment for certain persons, and considers the jurisdictional limits to the 
requirement of equal treatment in the form of the ‘wholly internal principle’. The 
section contextualises these competences within a discussion of the construction of a 
common European identity as a means by which to foster enhanced economic and 
social integration. Finally, section 2.4 examines the competence to control access to 
social goods and services, through the conferral of nationality, EU Citizenship, and 
rights of residence. It focuses upon the interdependence of state and EU competences 
in this area. 
 
 Competence to provide social goods and services  2.2.
 
The competence of a polity to provide  goods and services determinative of social 
membership is encompassed both of a legislative competence to regulate the level of 
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support available, and of an administrative responsibility for its delivery. This form 
of membership competence, traditionally the preserve of the state, has been devolved 
in certain policy areas to sub-state legislatures in Scotland and Catalonia. The 
European Union does not enjoy this form of membership competence: European 
institutions are not responsible for the delivery of social welfare, and neither does 
European Law regulate the level of welfare provided by state or sub-state polities.  
 
2.2.1. Contextualising the competence of sub-state polities to provide social 
goods and services: Scottish and Catalan nationalist claims to 
autonomy 
One of the central objectives of the devolution of competences to sub-state 
legislatures in the UK and Spain is to equip a sub-state membership grouping with 
the competences necessary to pursue a distinct social policy. This objective is driven 
primarily by claims to autonomy asserted by self-conscious nation of peoples that 
share in a common ethnicity, culture and language,124 which are expressions of de 
facto ‘vertical’ asymmetries between the constituent unit and the state as a whole.125 
Such nationalist claims to autonomy (which consider self-determination to be 
desirable in and of itself, as a right that attaches to nationhood),126 are further 
supplemented by functionalist claims to autonomy that invoke the practical benefits 
of enabling the polity to cater for the distinct social and economic needs of that 
nation. Functionalist and nationalist claims to autonomy are interdependent: 
functionalist claims necessarily operate within the confines of existing political and 
identity groupings, whilst the culture and identity constitutive of nationhood are 
reinforced by distinct functional requirements particular to that unit.127 Both 
nationalist and functionalist claims to autonomy have been a driving force in the 
devolution to Scotland and Catalonia of the competence to provide goods. 
 
 
                                                 
124 See above at n.33. 
125 See above at nn.103 - 108. 
126 Claims to autonomy need not necessarily amount to the pursuit of independence; see above at n.87. 
127 Parks and Elcock warn that ‘functional regionalization may not succeed where an appropriate 
functional region cannot be defined without outraging established popular loyalties. Regionalism may 
also fail if it lack the cultural factors needed to stimulate the popular support for the creation of 
regional institutions’ (Judith Parks and Howard Elcock, Why Do Regions Demand Autonomy? (2000) 
10 Regional and Federal Studies 87, page 98).  
43 
 
Nationalist claims to autonomy: shared language and culture  
The self-conscious nationhood that generates claims to autonomy is founded in a 
common (and often distinct) language and culture. Language, in particular, plays an 
important role in shaping the national identity that lies at the heart of claims to 
autonomy in Catalonia. The ‘centrality of language’ to the Catalan nation was 
recognised by the Catalan Cultural Committee in 1924, which stated that ‘[o]ur 
language, the expression of our people, which can never be given up... is the spiritual 
foundation of our existence’.128  
The significance of the Catalan language in the nationalist agenda has been 
borne out in progressive legislative reform since the Constitution of 1978 afforded 
recognition to the six ‘co-official’ languages of Spain.129 In accordance with the 
recognition of Catalan as an official language of Catalonia in the Catalan Statute of 
Autonomy 1979, the Law of Linguistic Normalisation, enacted by the Catalan 
Parliament in 1983, stipulates that all school-age children are required to learn both 
Castilian and Catalan.130 Legislative reforms of 1997 introduced obligatory 
knowledge of Catalan for public sector workers, making command of the Catalan 
                                                 
128 Catalan Cultural Committee 1942, cited in Goldie Shabad and Richard Gunther, Language, 
Nationalism, and Political Conflict in Spain (1982) 14 Comparative Politics 443, page 446. See also 
Encarnación, who highlights that ‘the central cleavage and basis for claims of ethnic distinctiveness 
and nationalism in Spain is language rather than religion’ (Omar G Encarnación, Democracy and 
Federalism in Spain (2004) 15 Mediterranean Quarterly 58, page 66), and Elisa Roller, who claims 
that ‘[a]lthough it has been argued that language is an artificial creation employed to symbolize 
national identity, in Catalan nationalist discourse language is employed as an inherent feature of 
national differentiation’ (Elisa Roller, The 1997 Llei del Catalá: A Pandora's Box in Catalonia? 
(2001) 11 Regional and Federal Studies 39, page 40). 
129 Article 3 of the Spanish Constitution 1978 provides that:  
‘(1) Castilian is the official Spanish language of the State. All Spaniards have the duty to know it and 
the right to use it. 
(2) The other Spanish languages shall also be official in the respective Self-governing Communities in 
accordance with their Statutes. 
(3) The richness of the different linguistic modalities of Spain is a cultural heritage which shall be 
specially respected and protected.’ Languages which have gained official recognition, in addition to 
Castilian, are Eskudai (in the Basque region), Catalan, Valencian (a dialect of Catalan) Galician and 
Aranese. Prior to the 1978 Constitution, under Franco’s regime, the use of Catalan in public spheres 
was prohibited. This was part of Franco’s wider prohibition on the display of national identities, 
which extended to a prohibition on the display of national symbol such as flags, and even Catalonia’s 
‘national’ dance, la Sardana. Encarnación explains that these policies ‘corresponded to the myth 
sustained by the Franco regime that Spain’s multiple nationalities were at the root of the nation’s 
proclivity toward anarchy and separatist violence’ (Encarnación (2004); see also Shabad and Gunther 
(1982)). 
130 Llei 7/1983, de 18 d'abril de normalització lingüística a Catalunya. See Roller (2001), page 44. 
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language a condition of admission to the civil service.131 This law proved highly 
contentious, prompting some political elites to question the constitutionality of 
effectually extending the ‘obligation’ under Article 3 of the Constitution for persons 
to know Castilian, to include also an obligation to know Catalan.132  
The intention to secure Catalan as the preferential language of public 
administration was later made explicit through reform of the Catalan Statute of 
Autonomy in 2006, which provided that ‘Catalan is the official language of 
Catalonia, together with Castilian, the official language of the Spanish State. All 
persons have the right to use the two official languages and citizens of Catalonia 
have the right and the duty to know them’.133 The Statute further provided that 
‘Catalan is the language of normal and preferential use in Public Administration 
bodies’.134 These provisions, unlike their forerunners of 1997, did not escape review 
by the Constitutional Court. In a plenary sitting in February 2010 the Court declared 
the elevation of Catalan to equal status with the Castilian language to be 
unconstitutional, breaching the obligations set out in Article 3 of the Constitution.135 
The decision of the Court did not, however, require alternation of the corpus of the 
Catalan linguistic model, and Catalan continued to be a compulsory subject in 
                                                 
131 Llei 1/1998, de 7 de gener, de política lingüística. See Roller (2001), page 46. 
132 The Convivencia Cívica Catalana, a platform formed from a coalition of the Partit dels Socialistes 
and Partido Popular, presented an official complaint regarding Llei 1/1998 to the Spanish 
Ombudsman. Despite the fact that the Constitutional Tribunal had already ruled upon and declared 
unconstitutional parts of a Basque language law requiring all new civil servants to know and use 
Eskudai, the Ombudsman refused to refer the issue for determination of the constitutionality of the 
law. SeeBasic Law 10/1982 for the Standardization of the Use of Euskara; Iñaki Lasagabaster, ‘The 
Legal Status of Euskara in the French and Spanish Constitutional Systems’ in Gloria Totoricagüena 
and Iñigo Urrutia (eds), The Legal Status of the Basque Language Today: One Language, Three 
Administrations, Seven Different Geographies and a Diaspora (Eusko Ikaskuntza 2008), page 128; 
and Robert Agranoff, ‘Federal Asymmetry and Intergovernmental Relations in Spain’ Asymmetry 
Series 2005 (17), page 6). 
133Catalan Statute of Autonomy 2006, Article 6.2 
134 Ibid, Article 6.1 
135 Constitutional Court Judgment No. 31/2010, of June 28. The Constitutional Tribunal invalidated a 
total of fourteen Articles of the revised Statute of Autonomy, and provided an interpretative reading 
for another twenty seven (Nationalism Studies, ‘The Indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation’ (2010)  
<http://nationalismstudies.wordpress.com/2010/07/14/the-indissoluble-unity-of-the-spanish-nation/> 
accessed 14 July 2010). Amongst those provisions declared unconstitutional were the characterisation 
under the Statute of Catalonia as a ‘nation’, the declaration that Catalan is the preferential language, 
the existence of the Catalan Justice Council and the limitations imposed on the principle of solidarity 
which make it conditional upon reciprocal efforts by other Autonomous Communities (Catalan News 
Agency, ‘The Spanish Constitutional Court shortens the current Catalan Statute of Autonomy’ (28 
June 2010) <http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/the-spanish-constitutional-court-
shortens-the-current-catalan-statute-of-autonom> accessed 14 August 2010). 
45 
 
schools.136 The most recent recognition of co-official language rights of national 
minorities in Spain has been affected by the entitlement of members of parliament to 
debate in the Senate in five co-official languages, a right that has drawn criticism on 
the grounds of its costly implementation.137 
 
Image 1: A placard reading 'Catalonia is not Spain', a popular slogan of the Catalan 
independence movement, is seen amidst Catalan flags in front of the iconic Gaudi 
house in a pro-independence rally of 2010. The scene is demonstrative of the self-
awareness of the Catalan nation that is encouraged by distinct culture138 
 
The national salience of a distinct language in Scotland is, in relation to 
Catalonia, comparatively low. Pressure for official recognition of Gaelic began in the 
mid 1990’s, propelled by the Gaelic development organisation Comunn na 
Gàidhlig.139 It wasn’t however until 2005, following a revival of interest in Gaelic 
language protection at the time of the 2003 Scottish Parliamentary elections, that the 
language gained official statutory recognition. The Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act 
                                                 
136 Ibid 
137 The Guardian, ‘Lost in translation? Spanish senators allowed to debate in five languages’ (19 
January 2011) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/19/translation-spanish-senators-five-
languages> accessed 10 July 2011 
138 Image downloaded from <http://www.flickr.com/photos/7455207@N05/4780884677/> (accessed 
15 February 2013).  
139 Wilson McLeod, Securing the Status of Gaelic? Implementing the Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act 
2005 (2006) 57 Scottish Affairs 19, page 20 
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2005 stated as its purpose the establishment of ‘a body having functions exercisable 
with a view to securing the status of the Gaelic language as an official language of 
Scotland commanding equal respect to the English language’.140 This body - Bòrd 
na Gàidhlig – is under the Act responsible for formulating a national Gaelic language 
plan, a non-binding strategic plan for the development of the Gaelic language. 
The extent to which the Act secures statutory protection of the Gaelic language is 
heavily limited by the vague wording of the statute. Wilson McLeod notes that ‘[t]he 
phrase ‘equal respect’ has no clearly recognised meaning and was chosen precisely 
to avoid any suggestion that Gaelic would have equal validity or parity of esteem 
with English, or that the Act might be construed as imposing a general duty to 
institutionalise Gaelic-English bilingualism’.141 The limited significance of Gaelic 
language policy within Scottish nationalism contrasts starkly with the Welsh 
nationalist agenda, in which differential language policy has assumed much greater 
importance.142 The Welsh Language Act of 1993 – accredited with igniting the 
campaign for equivalent recognition of the Gaelic language – succeeded in securing 
institutional parity for the Welsh language where the Scots Act would later fail.143 
Cultural heritage also plays an important part in shaping the national 
identities upon which devolution is predicated. Distinct forms of art, literature, 
music, dance, food and costume all contribute to self-conscious nationhood of 
Scotland and Catalonia. The Modernisme movement in Catalonia during the late 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century is linked with the pursuit of a distinct 
Catalan national identity, and some of the most iconic symbols of Catalan identity 
                                                 
140 Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act 2005 
141 McLeod (2006), page 23 
142 Whereas the focus of this section has thus far been upon the ‘vertical’ asymmetries that distinguish 
the sub-state unit from the state as a whole, the differing salience of distinct language policy in 
Scotland and Wales is demonstrative of a ‘horizontal’ asymmetry between constituent sub-state units 
(see n.108, above). 
143 Section 5 of the Welsh Language Act 1993 requires notified public bodies to prepare a scheme 
specifying the measures it proposes to take to give effect, ‘so far as is both appropriate in the 
circumstances and reasonably practicable, to the principle that in the conduct of public business and 
the administration of justice in Wales the English and Welsh languages should be treated on a basis of 
equality’ (Welsh Language Act 1993 s.5(2)). Details of the Welsh Language Scheme were recently 
updated by the Welsh Language (Wales) Measure 2011. Implementation of a bilingual system in the 
UK has not, however, occurred without problem, as highlighted by the public embarrassment of 
Swansea Council when a road sign reading ‘No entry for heavy good vehicles. Residential site only’ 
appeared with the Welsh language translation ‘I am not in the office at the moment. Send any work to 
be translated’ (BBC News, ‘E-mail error ends up on road sign’ (31 October 2008) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7702913.stm> accessed 31 October 2008). 
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emerged throughout this period. In turn, nationalism is in some instances accredited 
with a ‘re-discovery’ of shared cultural practices: the tartan kilt – now an iconic 
representation of Scottish identity – was in fact reclaimed into modern scots culture 
in 1882 prior to the visit of King George IV to Edinburgh. 
The existence of a common identity is necessary but not sufficient to 
establish nationhood and the claim for autonomy that it entails. The differentiation 
between a nation and mere ethnic and cultural groups arises out of the self-
consciousness of the collective: Adrian Hastings argues that a ‘nation is a far more 
self-conscious community than an ethnicity’,144 whilst Keating suggests that 
‘[n]ations are to be distinguished from ethnicities or mere cultural groups on one 
hand or regions on the other partly by their self-consciousness of being a nation’.145 
The self-consciousness of a nation may ensue from historic autonomy, and Rainer 
Bauböck argues that ‘legitimate self-determination claims are always derivative from 
prior claims to self-government’.146 This is true of claims to self-determination of 
both Scotland and Catalonia. 
The self-consciousness of the peoples – and of their assertion of a right to 
self-governance – that is constitutive of nationhood is driven and shaped by political 
actors. The claims arising out of sub-state units cannot be fully understood in 
isolation from the function of political elites in shaping demands for autonomy and in 
mobilising public support for the agendas that they set: the claims to autonomy that 
inform constitutional asymmetry are not simple revelations of collective will, 
developed in a political vacuum, but rather are the product of the actors and political 
discourse within which they exist. The primacy of this relationship has led Ernest 
Gellner to argue that ‘it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other 
way around’,147 a stance that rejects the antecedent dormancy of nations in favour of 




                                                 
144 Hastings (1997), page 3 
145 Keating (2002), page 357 
146 Bauböck (2004), page 19 
147 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Blackwell 1983), pages 55-56 
48 
 
Functionalist claims to autonomy 
Nationalist claims to autonomy that arise out of a shared language and culture are 
supplemented and reinforced by functionalist claims that note the practical benefit of 
autonomy in light of the distinct needs of the nation. Disparities in regional wealth 
are a primary contributor to functional demands of self-governance.148 Angustias 
Hombrado Martos identifies this correlation as operating in two directions: the ‘over-
development argument’, in which ‘economically dynamic regions will try and avoid 
exploitation by a relatively poor centre’, and the ‘under-development argument’, 
whereby units placed in a position of relative depravation by the process of 
differential industrialisation ‘rebel’ against the central organs of state.149 Such claims 
are manifestations both of ‘vertical’ de facto asymmetry (between the relative wealth 
of the sub-state unit and the state as a whole) and of ‘horizontal’ de facto asymmetry 
(between constituent units that draw greater of lesser benefit from the re-distributive 
mechanisms of the state). 
Functional demands for autonomy in Scotland and Catalonia are indicative of 
both of the correlations that Martos describes. Scottish claims to autonomy gravitate 
around the associated economic advantages of independence and the increased public 
expenditure that it would facilitate. The Scottish National Party thus claims that with 
independence Scotland will ‘have the economic levers to create new jobs and take 
full advantage of [its] second, green energy windfall’,150 enabling an independent 
                                                 
148 Economic divergences are harnessed by political elites in support of claims to autonomy. Goldie 
Shabad and Richard Gunther highlight the ‘crucial role’ of political elites ‘in translating latent social 
conflict (as reflected in objectively definable social cleavages) into manifest or overt political 
conflict’, a function that ‘is often performed by placing issues related to social cleavages on a 
governmental policy-making agenda, which raises the salience of those cleavages and provides an 
incentive for competing groups to mobilize resources in an effort to secure for themselves favourable 
policy outcomes’ (Shabad and Gunther (1982), page 456). The motivation of political elites in 
determining these agendas is often analysed as a function of utility maximisation, such that in 
bargaining with central government political elites ‘will use the ethnic or economic features of the 
group to shape autonomy demands if – and only if – it gets them private gains’ (Angustias Hombrado 
Martos, Rethinking Autonomy Demands in Asymmetrically Devolved Countries (Paper presented at 
the 60th PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 30 March - 1 April, 2001), page 7). Similarly, Michael 
Keating has noted that demands to autonomy motivated by a desire to ‘catch up’ with the level of 
autonomy acquired by other sub-state units arguably represent ‘a power game for political elites 
rather than a desire for more autonomy on the part of provincial electorates’ (Keating (1998), pages 
206-207) 
149 Martos (2001), pages 5 - 6 
150 Scottish National Party, Scottish National Party Manifesto 2011 (2011), page 28 
<http://manifesto.votesnp.com/independence> accessed 11 July 2011 
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Scotland to pursue such policies as enhanced State pensions and universal free 
childcare, in addition to continuing to protect the budget of the Scottish National 
Health Service and provide free higher education. 
The relative wealth of Scotland, and the economic viability of its 
independence, turns largely upon the claim Scotland asserts over North Sea Oil and, 
more recently, in harvesting alternative energy sources for which the topography of 
Scotland is uniquely suited.151 The Scottish National Party slogan of the 1970’s, ‘It’s 
Scotland’s Oil’, asserts that large revenues would accrue to an independent Scottish 
Government from ownership of North Sea oil, with the result that Scotland would 
‘tend to be in chronic surplus to a quite embarrassing degree and its currency would 
become the hardest in Europe, with the exception perhaps of the Norwegian 
kroner’.152 The veracity of these claims has more recently been called into question, 
with official figures indicating a £9 billion deficit in the year 2009-2010 even after 
inclusion of revenues from Scotland’s geographical share of North Sea oil.153  
                                                 
151 Tidal power, for example, is resource of growing importance to the Scottish economy. The 
Pentland Firth, a stretch of sea between Orkney and mainland Scotland, has been labelled by First 
Minister Alex Salmond as ‘the Saudi Arabia of marine energy’, and Scottish waters are considered 
capable of producing 25% of Europe’s tidal energy (BBC News, ‘Project Aims to Harvest Sea Power’ 
(29 September 2008) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/highlands_and_islands/7638242.stm> 
accessed 13 July 2011). 
152 G McCrone, (1974) The Economics of Nationalism Re-examined’, 'McCrone Report' 
Commissioned by the Conservative Party (1974), page 8 
<http://www.oilofscotland.org/mccronereport.pdf> accessed 12 July 2011. Division of the Continental 
Shelf under international law allocates an Exclusive Economic Zone to the UK as a sovereign entity. 
Domestic law, however, apportions a part of that zone to fall within the jurisdiction of Scots law Civil 
Jurisdiction (Offshore Activities) Order 1987 s.1(2), allowing the Scottish Nationalist party to claim 
that ‘[m]ore than 90 per cent of the UK’s oil revenues come from the Scottish sector of the 
Continental Shelf. So it really is Scotland’s oil’ (Scottish National Party, ‘Independence - The 
Benefits’ (2011)  <http://www.snp.org/node/240> accessed 12 July 2011). The figure of 90% was 
based upon a study that modelled the allocation of Scottish waters according to the median line 
between Scotland and England (Alexander G. Kemp and Linda Stephen, (2008) The Hypothetical 
Scottish Shares of Revenues and Expenditures from the UK Continental Shelf 2000 – 2013 
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/133434/0061924.pdf> accessed 12 July 2011). The 
determination of Scottish territorial waters in the event of secession will however be a complex 
process, such that Keating warns that it ‘is likely that a ruling would have to be obtained from the 
International Court of Justice or from an agreed arbiter’ (Michael Keating, The Independence of 
Scotland: Self-government and the Shifting Politics of Union (OUP 2009), page 86). Moreover, 
valuation and the division of assets and the issue of compensation is likely to prove contentious. 
153 The Guardian, ‘Study Undermines Economic Case for Scottish Independence, Opponents Claim’ 
(22 June 2011) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/jun/22/new-study-undermines-economic-
independence-scotland> accessed 12 July 2011. See also the Calman Commission on Scottish 
Devolution which notes that ‘[e]ven if a geographical share of North Sea revenues is attributed to 
Scotland, the fiscal balance largely remains in deficit, albeit at a lower level’ (Commission on 
Scottish Devolution, (2009) Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the United Kingdom in the 21st 
Century<http://www.commissiononscottishdevolution.org.uk/uploads/2009-06-12-csd-final-report-
2009fbookmarked.pdf> accessed 17 June 2009, page 74). 
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‘Under development’ economic claims have also manifested in Spain, with 
Martos observing that claims to increased autonomy by Andalucían political elites 
have utilised statistics in order to show that the economic policy of the central 
government ‘favoured the development of other regions at their expense’.154 César 
Colino also notes that a decline of the relative economic strength of Catalonia during 
the 1990’s and 2000s was attributed by some regional political elites to the central 
government’s investment in Madrid at Catalonia’s expense, thus ‘causing resentment 
among Catalan parties and adding to pressures for devolution’.155 
Catalonia remains, however, one of the most economically developed regions 
of Spain, constituting a ‘region of 7.5m inhabitants that contributes 19 per cent to 
Spain’s gross domestic product’.156 The relative economic strength of Catalonia has 
initiated ‘over-development’ arguments along the lines suggested by Martos. Colino 
describes consistent objection of Catalan nationalist elites towards ‘what they 
perceive as a negative balance between their region’s contribution and its receipts 
from central government’,157 whilst Ramon Tremosa I Balcells notes that the 
‘widening gap between taxes the central government…collects each year in 
Catalonia and the monies Catalonia receives from the central government’ is widely 
recognised as a ‘source of capital outflow’ that has become known as the ‘Catalan 
fiscal deficit with the Spanish State’.158 Studies have estimated this deficit at between 
7 and 9% of Catalan GDP over the years 1999-2001.159 
                                                 
154 Martos (2001), page 8 
155 César Colino, The Spanish model of devolution and regional governance: evolution, motivations 
and effects on policy making (2008) 36 Policy & Politics 573, page 579 
156 Financial Times, ‘Catalonia in plea for funding’ (2 June 2008) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2c4cae32-30ce-11dd-bc93-000077b07658.html#axzz1S05ZFQxO> 
accessed 11 July 2011 (see also Martos (2001)). Highlighting the pervasiveness of economic 
asymmetry in Spain, Robert Agranoff points out that seven of the Autonomous Communities are 
‘considerably above the country average and four considerably below’ (Agranoff (2005), page 5). 
157 Colino (2008), page 579 
158 Ramon Tremosa I Balcells, The Catalan Funding Mechanism, 
<http://www.ciu.cat/media/39164.pdf> accessed 11 June 2011, page 5 
159 Jordi Pons-i-Novell and Ramon Tremosa-i-Balcells, Macroeconomic effects of Catalan fiscal 
deficit with the Spanish state (2002–2010) (2005) 37 Applied Economics 1455, page 1457. Funding of 
the Autonomous Communities falls within two schemes, the ‘foral’ regime applying to Basque 
Country and Navarre and the ‘common’ regime applying to all other Autonomous Communities.The 
foral regimes raise taxes locally and pay a negotiated sum to central government, whilst the other 15 
Autonomous Communities have limited tax raising powers (see Agranoff (2005), page 4, and Teresa 
Garcia-Milà and Therese J. McGuire, Fiscal Decentralization in Spain: An Asymmetric Transition to 
Democracy (2002) <http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/866.pdf> accessed 14 July 
2011, page 5). The principles of sufficiency and solidarity are cornerstones of the Autonomous 
Community financial model, enshrined in s.158 of the Spanish Constitution in the form of a guarantee 
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Image 2: SNP Campaign leaflet’s asserting claim to independence based on Scottish 
ownership of North Sea oil. The depiction of Conservative Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher as a blood-sucking vampire is indicative of a divergence in political cultures 




Reform initiatives have sought to increase the fiscal autonomy of 
Communities through increasing the proportion of centrally collected taxes that are 
ceded to the Autonomous Communities from which they are raised, thereby reducing 
the deficit experienced by wealthy Communities such as Catalonia. Josep Colomer 
notes that in ‘the mid 1990’s, the Catalans raised the issue of obtaining a fixed 
proportion of income taxes as the basis for the autonomy funding, effectively 
                                                                                                                                          
to a minimum level of public service provision and by way of an inter-territorial compensation fund 
(Departamento de Economía y Conocimiento - Generalitat de Catalunya Sources of Financing (2011) 
<http://www20.gencat.cat/portal/site/economia/menuitem.6135b456613b7f9af813ae92b0c0e1a0/?vgn
extoid=31b776b26721d210VgnVCM2000009b0c1e0aRCRD&vgnextchannel=31b776b26721d210Vg
nVCM2000009b0c1e0aRCRD&vgnextfmt=default&newLang=en_GB> accessed 12 July 2011; 
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda - Gobierno de España Autonomous Community Funding: 
Financing System (2011) <http://www.meh.es/en-
GB/Areas%20Tematicas/Financiacion%20Autonomica/Paginas/Regimen%20comun.aspx> accessed 
13 July 2011 
160 Downloaded from the Scottish Political Archive hosted by the University of Stirling 
<http://www.flickr.com/photos/scottishpoliticalarchive/6794780155/sizes/l/in/photostream/> and 
<http://www.flickr.com/photos/scottishpoliticalarchive/8067324539/sizes/l/in/photostream/> 
(accessed 16 Feb 2013) 
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increasing the share of autonomously collected resources.’161 A bilateral agreement 
between the Catalan government and the central organs of State initially set the 
proportion of ceded income taxes at 15%, a level that was later extended to 30% and 
applied to all Autonomous Communities.162 The most recent reform of the 
Autonomous Community financing system was set in motion by the Catalan Statute 
of Autonomy in 2006,163 following which the Law on the Financing of the 
Autonomous Communities was amended so as to provided that 50% of income taxes 
are ceded to the Autonomous Communities.164  
Claims to enhanced autonomy arise also from the diverging socio-economic 
concerns that operate within them. The distribution of population in Scotland in 
particular necessitates diverging policy implementation, with the large percentages of 
inhabitants of remote and rural areas constituting distinct challenges to housing 
allocation and the provision of emergency response. Such challenges are often 
invoked in order to justify the higher spend-per-head in Scotland,165 and the Scottish 
Liberal Democrat Steel Commission recommended proposed fiscal decentralisation 
on needs-based equalisation formula with indicators to take into account factors 
                                                 
161  Josep M Colomer, The Spanish 'State of Autonomies': Non-Institutional Federalism (1998) 21 
West European Politics 40, page 48 
162 Ibid, page 48 
163 The eighth additional provision of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy 2006 provided that the ‘first 
Government bill on cession of taxes to be passed after the entry into force of this Estatut 
shall…provide for cession of 50% of revenues from tax on personal income. The ceded revenue from 
personal income tax corresponding to taxable persons whose normal residence is in Catalonia is 
considered to be produced in the territory of the autonomous community of Catalonia.’ 
164 Organic Law 3/2009 of 18 of December on the modification of Organic Law 8/1980 of the 22 of 
September on Financing of Autonomous Communities (2009) amending (1980), Organic Law 8/1980 
of 22 September on Financing of Autonomous Communities. A second initiative introduced by the 
2006 Catalan Statute of Autonomy in order to reduce the fiscal deficit (whilst complying with the 
fundamental principle of solidarity) was through the creation of a national infrastructure investment 
programme. The third additional provision of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy provided that ‘[w]ith 
the exception of the Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund, State investment in infrastructure in 
Catalonia shall be equal to the relative participation of Catalonia’s gross domestic product in the 
gross domestic product of the State for a period of seven years’. Negotiations with central government 
to implement this provision caused much controversy, with an agreement finally being reached in 
2008 whereby ‘Catalonia would receive a portion of territorialised infrastructure investment from the 
Spanish government over the 2007-2013 period equivalent to at least its proportional contribution to 
national GDP’(Alfons Garcia Martinez, (2009) Catalonia’s fiscal balance after the deployment of the 
2006 Statute of Autonomy Paradigmes: economia productiva i coneixement 
<http://www.raco.cat/index.php/Paradigmes/article/viewFile/225493/306836> accessed 12 July 2011, 
page 242). 
165 The Calman Commission on Scottish Devolution note that some ‘draw attention to factors – such 
as high levels of urban deprivation and large rural areas with highly dispersed populations and 
services – which argue for higher relative spending levels in Scotland justified by need’ (Commission 
on Scottish Devolution (2009), page 73). 
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including geography, rurality and distance from markets.166 The decline of traditional 
industries within ‘rust-belt’ regions and the consequential need for strategies for 
industrial regeneration in particular have generated claims of enhanced autonomy in 
Scotland,167 and the Scottish National Party has invoked independence as a means by 
which to allow for the establishment of ‘a distinct population strategy, addressing 
the demographic and skills challenges that face the nation’.168  
The failure of state-wide policy to cater to the specific needs of the sub-state 
demographic not only gives rise to functionalist claims to autonomy, but serves also 
to engender a distinct political culture that reifies the shared identity constitutive of 
nationhood.169 Refusal of government subsidy to the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders 
consortium in 1971 contributed to the resurgence of Scottish claims to autonomy 
throughout the 1970’s, and political cleavages across the UK continued throughout 
the 1980’s and 1990’s with the failure of the Conservative Party, under the 
premiership of Margaret Thatcher, to respond to the particular social and economic 
interests of the Scots voters.170  
 
2.2.2. Frameworks of devolution in the UK and Spain 
Claims to autonomy asserted by Scotland and Catalonia have been accommodated 
through the devolution of competences to sub-state legislatures within their 
respective constitutional frameworks, allowing for the pursuit of distinct social 
policies within devolved matters. Scotland and Catalonia are not the only sub-state 
national groups to assert claims to autonomy within these states: in the UK, 
competence has also been devolved to sub-state legislatures in Wales and Northern 
                                                 
166 The Steel Commission, Moving to Federalism - A New Settlement for Scotland (2006) 
<http://www.scotlibdems.org.uk/files/steelcommission.pdf> accessed 18 July 2010, page 104 
167 Parks and Elcock (2000), page 97. Keating however contests the claim that economic hardship 
gives rise to increase demands of autonomy, claiming that ‘when Scotland is doing relatively well, 
ideas of nationalism or home rule thrive, while when it is doing badly Scots tend to cleave to the 
Union’ (Keating The Independence of Scotland: Self-government and the Shifting Politics of Union 
(2009), page 33). 
168 The Scottish Government, Your Scotland, Your Voice: A National Conversation (2009) 
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/293639/0090721.pdf> accessed 21 July 2010, page  22 
169 Parks and Elcock (2000), page 97 
170 Withdrawal by the Scottish nationalists of their support for James Callaghan’s minority Labour 
government in 1979 triggered the general election in which Margaret Thatcher became Prime 
Minister, a move that Callaghan famously likened to ‘turkeys voting for Christmas’.  
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Ireland, and Catalonia is one of 17 Autonomous Communities (and two Autonomous 
Cities) that have been granted a degree of legislative autonomy from the Spanish 
state.  
 
Image 3: Promotional material published by campaign group 'YES to an Independent 
Scotland', invoking a divergence in political cultures between Scotland and the UK as a 
whole in support of a claim to self-governance171 
 
In both the UK and Spain, legislative competence is devolved differentially 
across the constituent sub-state polities, resulting in horizontal de iure asymmetries 
between the constituent units.172 The degree of asymmetry that manifests between 
those polities at any given point in time is determined by the scheme within which 
sub-state units acquire competence, and differences in frameworks of competence 
acquisition themselves contribute an additional layer of horizontal asymmetry. In the 
UK, the devolution of competence to sub-state legislatures has taken place through 
individual Acts of the UK Parliament that operate in isolation from one another.173 
Each Act stipulates a different mechanism through which the respective competences 
                                                 
171 YES to an independent Scotland, (2013)  <http://www.facebook.com/SaorAlbaGuBrath> accessed 
9 Jan 2013 
172 See nn. 104 -108, above. 
173 Scotland Act 1998; Government of Wales Act 1998; Northern Ireland Act 1998 (and subsequently 
the Government of Wales Act 2006 and Scotland Act 2012). 
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of each sub-national unit are defined, and devolves a different extent of competences 
to each sub-state legislature.174 
By contrast, the devolution of competence to Autonomous Communities in 
Spain takes place within a single open-ended scheme established by the Constitution, 
which identifies three paths by which the autonomy of a community may be 
recognised. The first path to autonomy is a fast and simplified process that applies to 
the ‘historic nationalities’ of Spain, which are those that that had previously been 
governed by Statutes of Autonomy in the Second Spanish Republic.175 The second is 
contained within section 143 of the Constitution, which provides that ‘bordering 
provinces with common historic, cultural and economic characteristics, insular 
territories and provinces with historic regional status may accede to self-government 
                                                 
174 The Government of Wales Act 1998 created the National Assembly for Wales, a body corporate 
with competence to exercise, on behalf of the Crown, functions transferred to it from the Westminster 
Parliament. The Act conferred competence only to make subordinate legislation – a function 
otherwise exercisable by Ministers of the Crown – within specified areas. The extent of that 
competence was not defined in the Act by reference to subject matter, as was the case in the Scotland 
Act 1998, but rather the Act provided that ministerial functions would be transferred to the Assembly 
by an Order in Council approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament. The Government of 
Wales Act 2006 allowed the National assembly to assume upon request the power to make primary 
legislation – known as ‘Measures of the National Assembly for Wales’ – within certain specified 
fields.  On 5 May 2011, following a referendum in which a majority of the electorate voted ‘yes’ to 
the referendum question ‘Do you want the Assembly now to be able to make laws on all matters in the 
20 subject areas it has powers for?, the National Assembly assumed competence to enact ‘Acts of the 
Assembly’ in all matters specified in Part 1 of Schedule 7 of the 2006 Act (The Government of Wales 
Act 2006 (Commencement of Assembly Act Provisions, Transitional and Saving Provisions and 
Modifications) Order 2011).  
Legislative competence was devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly under the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998, following approval of the Good Friday Agreement. Devolved competences are 
defined within the Northern Ireland Act by reference to three categories of matters: transferred, 
excepted and reserved matters. Excepted matters are listed in Schedule 2 of the Act. A provision that 
deals solely with an excepted matter is outwith the legislative competence of the Assembly. The 
Assembly may however legislate on an excepted matter when that provision is ancillary to other 
provisions that deal with reserved or transferred matters, and the Secretary of State has given consent 
to the Bill. Reserved matters are listed in Schedule 3 of the Act. The Assembly may legislate in these 
areas with the consent of the Secretary of State. Any matter that is neither an excepted nor a reserved 
matter is a transferred matter and falls within the Assembly’s legislative competence. Where the 
Secretary of State considers that a reserved matter should become a transferred matter, or vice versa, 
s/he may, after the Assembly has passed a resolution with cross-community support, lay before 
Parliament an Order in Council effecting the necessary change. 
175 Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia (Daniele Conversi, The Smooth Transition:  Spain's 
1978 Constitution and the Nationalities Question (2002) 4 National Identities 223, page 228; Spanish 
Constitution s.148 and transitional provisions). Catalonia became an autonomous community under 
the fast route for historic nationalities, and its first Statute of Autonomy was approved in 1979. The 
text of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy ‘was accepted by the Assembly of Members of Parliament on 
16 December 1978, was discussed and approved by the constitutional commission of the Spanish 
Parliament on 13 August 1979, and was approved by referendum on 25 October of the same year. On 
18 December 1979, the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia was sanctioned by King Juan Carlos I’ 
(Generalitat de Catalunya, The restoration of the Government of Catalonia, 1977-1980 (2013) 
<http://www.gencat.cat/generalitat/eng/guia/antecedents/antecedents18.htm> accessed 5 March 2012). 
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and form Self-governing Communities’.176 The third route to autonomy is achieved 
by authorisation by the Cortes Generales by way of Organic Act.177 All autonomous 
communities were established through these mechanisms within a four-year period 
between 1979 and 1983. The mechanism through which an Autonomous Community 
may acquire competences that are not designated by the Constitution as within the 
exclusive competence of the State is determined by its historical status,178 within a 
scheme that envisages – though not without controversy – the eventual symmetry of 
competence allocation to autonomous communities.179  
Key areas of asymmetry between the competences devolved to sub-state 
legislatures in the UK relate to fiscal matters. Under the Scotland Act 1998, the 
Scottish Parliament has competence to vary the basic rate of income tax set by the 
                                                 
176 Under this route to autonomy the right to initiate the process lies with all the provincial councils 
concerned, or with the consent of two-thirds of the municipalities, constituting a majority of the 
electorate of the province.  Communities granted autonomy under the category of bordering provinces 
with common historic, cultural and economic characteristics include Aragon, Castilla y León, Castile-
La Mancha, Extremadura and the Valencian Community. The Canary Islands and the Balearic Islands 
gained autonomy under this provision as insular territories with historic regional status, whilst 
Cantabria, Asturias, La Rioja, the Regions of Murcia and Navarra fulfilled the criteria of single 
provinces with historic regional status. 
177 This route to autonomy applies to territory not exceeding that of a province which does not possess 
historical regional status, and is exercised by the Cortes Generales in the sake of ‘national interest’.  
The Community of Madrid was established as an Autonomous Community by the Cortes Generales 
under this provision. 
178 The three historic nationalities were able to immediately assume competence over all matters not 
reserved to the State.  Other Autonomous Communities were subject to a scheme of progressive 
allocation of competences, outlined in s148 of the Constitution. Such Autonomous Communities were 
able immediately assume competences over such matters as the organisation of the institutions of self-
government, changes in municipal boundaries within the territory, and the promotion of economic 
development of the autonomous community within the objectives set by national economic policy. 
After a period of five years, matters not reserved to the State could be assumed by Autonomous 
Communities as stipulated in their Statutes of Autonomy. Andalucía acquired competences under an 
‘exceptional route’ which dispensed with the scheme of progressive allocation of competences when 
the initiative is ratified in a referendum by the overall majority of electors in each province (section 
151 of the Constitution). It was agreed in the Autonomous Pact of 1981 that the exceptional route 
would be limited to Andalucia. Any matters that are not reserved to the State and are not claimed by 
an autonomous community as within its jurisdiction fall within State jurisdiction.  The Autonomous 
Pact of 1992 raised the ceiling of those competences that could be acquired under the ‘slow route’ of 
competence acquisition. 
179 This objective is popularly referred to as ‘Café para todos’ (coffee for all). Autonomous 
Communities have, however, resisted the convergence of symmetrical arrangements and the 
controversial Law on the Harmonisation of the Autonomy Process, which attempted to introduce 
heterogeneity within the autonomous process, was declared largely unconstitutional by the 
Constitutional Court in 1983. Significant parts of LOAPA that were declared unconstitutional 
included the possibility for the Cortes to overturn parliamentary laws or decisions of Autonomous 
Communities. Several harmonization provisions applying to the fourteen Autonomous Communities 
that did not acquire autonomy through the fast process did, however, survive. These provisions 
provided for ‘uniform election dates, limits on the size of regional governments, regional supervision 
of provincial governments, transfer of civil servants to the regions, and harmonization of financing for 
the “common regime”’ (Agranoff (2005), page 10). 
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Westminster Parliament by up to 3 pence in the pound (the Scottish Variable 
Rate).180 The tax-varying provisions under the 1998 Act were replaced under the 
Scotland Act 2012 with a power to levy an additional Scottish rate of income tax, 
securing a 10% income tax reduction for Scottish taxpayers and devolving 
correlative tax raising powers to the Scottish Parliament.181 By contrast, Wales and 
Northern Ireland have no power to vary or raise taxes, and are funded primarily by 
block grant determined according to the Barnett formula.182 None of the sub-state 
legislatures in the UK has competence in the matters of constitutional issues, 
registration of political parties, defence, nationality or immigration, whilst they all 
have some competence in the fields of education, health, transport and economic 
development (though the precise degree of these competences varies). Differences 
between the competences acquired by subnational units in the UK were most 
pronounced between 1998 and 2006, during which time the Welsh Assembly had 
powers only to enact subordinate legislation, and between 2002 and 2007, when the 
Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended. 
Asymmetry also exists between the competences acquired by the sub-state 
legislatures in Spain. All autonomous communities have now assumed competences 
in areas not reserved to state, with main remaining differences primarily being the 
distinct tax regimes that are in place in Navarre and the Basque Region, and the 
competences of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Navarre over otherwise central 
powers, including their regional police force.183 Catalonia, the Basque, Galicia and 
Andalucía all received the largest transfers of jurisdiction in the shortest period of 
time, and some of the slower-route Communities did not receive certain powers until 
                                                 
180 Fiscal, economic and monetary policy is a reserved matter under Schedule 5, Part II, Head A, with 
the result that the Scottish Parliament had no competence to raise taxes other than at a local level (i.e. 
to determine the Council Tax rate to cover the cost of the provision of local services). This tax-varying 
power has never been used by the Scottish Parliament. Scottish variable rate 
181 These provisions replaced the tax varying power stipulated in Part 4 of the 1998 Act. They entered 
into force two months after the legislation was passed, but – according to their own terms – will take 
effect in respect of a tax year to be stipulated by order of the Treasury. It is currently anticipated that 
the Scottish income tax rate will apply from 6 April 2016 (the beginning of the 2016-17 tax year). 
These changes follow recommendations made by the Calman Commission on Scottish devolution, 
which suggested that, in order to improve the financial accountability of the Scottish Parliament, a 
proportion of the funding currently allocated by block grant be substituted for devolved tax 
revenue(Commission on Scottish Devolution (2009), pages 103-105). 
182 The Holtham Commission was established to investigate alternative mechanisms of funding to the 
National Assembly, but its recommendations have yet to be implemented. 
183 Agranoff (2005), pages 4-5 
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over twenty years after the four rapid-route Communities. Before the reforms of 
2002 in which the last Autonomous Communities gained competence in the areas of 
education, health and social services, competences were unequally distributed 
amongst the Communities, with the four fast-route Communities possessing the 
largest sphere of autonomy.  
 
2.2.3. Devolution to Scottish Parliament and Catalan Generalitat of the 
competence to provide social goods and services 
The competence of the Scottish Parliament and the Catalan Generalitat to determine 
social policy is not comprehensive, but rather is limited to those matters that fall 
within their devolved competences. The legislative competence of the Scottish 
Parliament is negatively defined in the Scotland Act 1998, which created (or rather 
re-instated) the Scottish Parliament, and devolved to it a general legislative 
competence that was subject only to those limitations stipulated within the Act.184 
The majority of restrictions on the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament 
are in the form of matters that are ‘reserved’ to the UK Parliament, but the Act also 
stipulates that it is outwith the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament to 
enact legislation that is incompatible with the European Convention on Human 
Rights or with European Union law, or that seeks to modify stipulated ‘protected 
provisions’.185 The result of any attempt by the Scottish Parliament to legislate 
within these areas is such that the Act is not law.  
The legislative competence devolved to the Scottish Parliament is not by law 
an exclusive competence: the Act stipulates that the UK Parliament retains the right 
to legislate for Scotland within areas that have been allocated within the competence 
                                                 
184 Scotland Act 1998 s.54. The Act also effected a general transfer of ministerial functions from 
Ministers of the Crown to Scottish ministers in areas of devolved competences (s.53). The 
administrative competence of the Scottish administration is defined by reference to legislative 
competences: an administrative act is outwith the competence of the Scottish administration if it 
would be outwith the competence of the Scottish Parliament. 
185 This is also subject to other constraints: s.29(2) states that ‘A provision is outside that competence 
so far as any of the following paragraphs apply: (a) it would form part of the law of a country or 
territory other than Scotland, or confer or remove functions exercisable otherwise than in or as 
regards Scotland, (b) it relates to reserved matters, (c) it is in breach of the restrictions in Schedule 4, 
(d) it is incompatible with any of the Convention rights or with Community law, (e) it would remove 
the Lord Advocate from his position as head of the systems of criminal prosecution and investigation 
of deaths in Scotland.’ Protected provisions (under Schedule 4) include the Act of Union, the 
European Communities Act, and the Human Rights Act. 
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of the Scottish Parliament,186 with the result that all devolved competences are, 
strictly speaking, shared competences. This constitutes a vertical de iure asymmetry 
between the relative competences enjoyed by the constituent unit and the State: 
whereas the exclusive legislative competence of the UK Parliament is protected by 
law,187 the competences enjoyed by the Scottish Parliament may be subject to 
encroachment by the UK Parliament. In practice, the UK Parliament is bound by a 
constitutional convention that prohibits it from legislating in devolved matters 
without first obtaining the consent of the Scottish Parliament.188 
The scope of legislative competences that the Catalan Generalitat is able to 
acquire is negatively defined by the Spanish Constitution, which stipulates certain 
matters over which the State holds exclusive competence, and which states that 
‘[m]atters not expressly assigned to the State by virtue of the present Constitution 
may fall under the jurisdiction of the Autonomous Communities by virtue of their 
respective Statutes [of Autonomy]’.189 In line with this provision, the Catalan Statute 
of Autonomy identifies those areas that are not reserved to the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the state under the Constitution in which it has assumed power. The competences 
acquired by the Generalitat are designated as either ‘exclusive powers’, in which 
‘legislative power, regulatory power and the executive function correspond fully to 
the Generalitat’, or ‘shared powers’, in which ‘legislative power, regulatory power 
and the executive function are the responsibility of the Generalitat, within the 
                                                 
186 Scotland Act s.29 
187 See text at nn.185-186, above. 
188 The ‘Sewel Convention’ is contained in s.14 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the 
UK Government and the executive authorities of all devolved nations. The agreement states that: ‘The 
United Kingdom Parliament retains authority to legislate on any issue, whether devolved or not. It is 
ultimately for Parliament to decide what use to make of that power. However, the UK Government 
will proceed in accordance with the convention that the UK Parliament would not normally legislate 
with regard to devolved matters except with the agreement of the devolved legislature. The devolved 
administrations will be responsible for seeking such agreement as may be required for this purpose on 
an approach from the UK Government’ In the event that the UK Government and the Scottish 
Executive agree that Westminster ought to legislate on a devolved matter, a motion (known as a 
‘Sewel Motion’) is put to the Scottish Parliament to this effect. The frequency of use of Sewel 
Motions had led to criticism, with ‘considerable disagreement as to whether this procedure is simply 
an efficient device in the management of interparliamentary relations, or an instance of Westminster 
encroaching upon the Scottish Parliament’s autonomy’ (Stephen Tierney, Giving with one hand: 
Scottish devolution within a unitary state (2007) 5 International Journal of Constitutional Law 730, 
page 11).  
189 Article 149 of the Spanish Constitution 
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framework of the basic conditions established by the State as principles or lowest 
common legislative denominators in rules of legal rank’.190 
Under these respective schemes of devolution, both the Scottish Parliament 
and the Catalan Generalitat have acquired legislative competence to approve a 
distinct social policy agenda in (amongst other matters) the fields of healthcare, 
education, housing and social care. Unlike in Catalonia, where reinstatement of the 
Generalitat followed a period of homogeneity of Spanish regulation under General 
Franco, differentiation of social policy in Scotland pre-dated the devolution of 
legislative competence under the 1998 Act. A substantial degree of differentiation in 
social policy can therefore be traced back prior to devolution.191 Many of those 
legislative competences acquired by the Scottish Parliament to regulate social policy 
are thus administered by the Scottish Government within an institutional framework 
that was already well established by the time those competences were acquired.  
Healthcare is a matter that is devolved to the Scottish Parliament, subject to 
certain very specific reservations in such fields as embryology and 
xenotransplantation.192 Healthcare provision in Scotland is administered through the 
Scottish NHS; a body that pre-dates legislative devolution. Whilst the ‘bases and 
general coordination of health matters’ is a competence that is in Spain reserved 
exclusively to the State by the Constitution, the Catalan Generalitat has assumed 
control over the delivery and organisation of healthcare provision.193 Delivery of 
healthcare is thus regulated primarily at the level of the Autonomous Community, 
                                                 
190 Article 110 and 11 Catalan Statute of Autonomy 
191 Devolution of legislative competence to Scotland was preceded by the devolution of certain 
administrative functions to the Scottish Office, a dedicated department of the UK government created 
in 1885 and headed by the Secretary of State for Scotland. The Scottish Office assumed responsibility 
in such areas such as health, education, justice, agriculture, fisheries and farming, in which fields it 
pursued a distinct legislative agenda within the UK Parliament. Administrative devolution arguably 
precedes the creation of the Scottish Office, and can be traced back to the various administrative 
boards that emerged in Edinburgh in the nineteenth century (James Mitchell, Governing Scotland: The 
Invention of Administrative Devolution (Palgrave Macmillan 2003), page 12). Many of thedivergences 
that can currently be identified in subnational policy took place within asymmetrical governance 
structures that pre-date legislative devolution, and are a product of the devolution of administrative 
functions to the Scottish Office. Administrative devolution through the Scottish Office was however 
achieved within the confines of the UK polity: the Secretary of State for Scotland is accountable to a 
UK-wide demos, and legislation emanating from the Scottish Office was enacted by the UK 
legislature. 
192 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 5, Part II, Head J (‘Health and Medicines’) 
193 Catalan Statute of Autonomy, Article 162 
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and is in Catalonia organised by the agency ‘CatSalut’ which purchases health 
services from independent contractors. 
 Education is a matter that is devolved in full to the Scottish Parliament, there 
being no general or specific reservations stipulated in the Scotland Act. The Catalan 
Generalitat has assumed both exclusive and shared powers over the provision of non-
university education, which include the power of organisation over the education 
sector and establishment of syllabuses.194 The Spanish Constitution reserves to the 
Spanish state the ‘regulation of the conditions relative to the obtaining, issuing and 
standardisation of academic degrees and professional qualifications and basic rules 
for the development of Article 27 of the Constitution [the right to education]’, but the 
Catalan Generalitat enjoys a wide range of competences over the regulation and 
provision of higher education, including the power to create public universities and 
to authorise private universities, and the power to manage state funds for university 
education.195 Scotland and Catalonia both also enjoy exclusive competence over 
housing and social care. 
 Not all areas of social policy are devolved to sub-state legislatures: in both 
the UK and Spain social security (as the primary re-distributive basis of welfare 
provision) remains within the competence of central organs of state. The Scottish 
Parliament has no legislative competence over ‘social security schemes’, defined in 
the Act as ‘[s]chemes supported from central or local funds which provide assistance 
for social security purposes to or in respect of individuals by way of benefits’, which 
are specifically reserved to the UK Parliament.196 The Spanish State also has 
exclusive competence over the ‘basic legislation and financial system of the Social 
Security’, though unlike in the UK social security is implemented by the 
Autonomous Communities. As is further indicated in chapter three, Autonomous 
                                                 
194 Catalan Statute of Autonomy, Article 131(3) 
195 Catalan Statute of Autonomy, Article 172 
196 Section F1, Schedule 5, Part II of the Scotland Act 1998. Benefits for this purpose include 
pensions, allowances, grants, loans and any other form of financial assistance, with ‘financial 
assistance’ including the provision of assistance to those who qualify by reason of old age, 
survivorship, disability, sickness, incapacity, injury, unemployment, maternity or the care of children 
or others needing care; or those who qualify by reason of low income. under  
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Communities in Spain have also assumed competence over supplementary welfare 
and support allowances.197  
 
 Whereas sub-state legislatures have assumed competence over the provision 
of certain areas of social policy, the funds to support policies enacted in these fields 
are provided by centrally-collected taxes. The Scottish Executive is funded primarily 
through block grant from the UK State, which is calculated according to the 
controversial ‘Barnett formula’.198 With entry into force of the Scottish-rate income 
tax in 2016 income from the block grant will be supplemented with devolved tax 
revenues, thus increasing the financial accountability of the Scottish Parliament and 
reducing the extent to which the cost of devolved policies is borne across all 
constituent units of the UK.  
The forthcoming Scottish-rate income tax follows a similar model to that 
which is in place in Spain, where Autonomous Communities have competence over 
50% of income tax, which they can vary within stipulated limits. This tax is centrally 
collected and ceded to Autonomous Communities from the Spanish State. 
Mechanisms of levelling and solidarity apply to the financial resources of the Catalan 
Generalitat, with the funds available to an Autonomous Community adjusted 
according to indicators pertaining to population and fiscal capacity: Communities 
with a fiscal capacity that is lower than that which is required to fund essential public 
services receive a transfer from central funds, whereas Communities with a higher 
fiscal capacity contribute funds for re-distribution across other Communities.199  
                                                 
197 Under Article 166 of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, the Generalitat has assumed exclusive 
competence over the ‘Regulation and organisation of…social service technical benefits and payments 
designed as welfare allowances or to supplement other public benefit support systems.’  
198 The formula ‘provides that, where comparable, changes to programmes in England result in 
equivalent changes in the budgets of the devolved administrations calculated on the basis of 
population shares’ (Timothy Edmonds, The Barnett Formula (2001) 
<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2001/rp01-108.pdf> accessed 10 
August 2010, page 3). Application of the formula is widely criticised on the basis that it protects an 
average higher spend per-head for the Scottish bloc, though economic analysts have responded that a 
strict application of the formula would lead to a convergence of the average spend, in a process known 
as the ‘Barnett squeeze’ (David Bell, The Barnett Formula (2001) 
<http://www.economics.stir.ac.uk/People/staff/Bell/Barnett%20Formula.pdf> accessed 7 August 
2010). 
199 Generalitat de Catalunya, Sources of financing (2012) 
<http://www20.gencat.cat/portal/site/economia/menuitem.6135b456613b7f9af813ae92b0c0e1a0/?vgn
extoid=31b776b26721d210VgnVCM2000009b0c1e0aRCRD&vgnextchannel=31b776b26721d210Vg




Regional claims to autonomy that are founded upon a shared national identity have 
been accommodated within asymmetric constitutional structures through the 
devolution of competence over certain areas of social policy to sub-state legislatures. 
Devolution of competence to provide social goods in some areas but not in others 
reinforces the nesting of social membership of both the state and the sub-state polity, 
as the sum of social rights that an individual receives is not determined by either one 
or the other, but rather the two collectively: an individual falls within the 
‘membership organisation’ of sub-state unit for purpose of devolved matters such as 
education and healthcare, and within that of the state for reserved issues such as 
social security provision. That devolved social policies are largely financed from 
centrally collected funds preserves the re-distributive functions of the state, but in 
turn fuels claims for increased autonomy on the basis of the ‘under-‘ and ‘over-
development’ arguments that such redistribution generates. 
 
 Competence to allocate social goods and services 2.3.
The competence of sub-state and state legislatures in the UK and Spain to provide 
social goods and services is co-vested with the competence of those polities to 
include or exclude persons from receipt of those goods or services: the Scottish 
Parliament, for example, may legislate both to determine the level of financial 
support available to students pursuing higher education, and stipulate who is entitled 
to receive the benefit of the goods that it provides. The competence of state and sub-
state legislatures to allocate social goods and services is not, however, one that falls 
within their exclusive competence, but rather it is one that is shared with the 
European Union. As a result of EU competence to secure free movement of persons 
and equality of citizens, state and sub-state polities must extend the benefit of the 
goods that they provide to certain EU Citizens and third country nationals under the 
same terms as they do to their own nationals. The scope of this principle of equal 
treatment is further examined in context-specific case studies in chapters three and 




Whereas the devolution of competences to sub-national legislatures is 
predicated upon the assertion of nationalist claims to autonomy by a self-aware 
nation with a distinct culture and language, the transfer of legislative competence to 
the European Union has been driven by the functional benefits of increased 
economic and social integration. Substantial discussion (by both academics and 
policy-makers) has focussed upon the need for a common ‘European identity’ to 
generate the social solidarity required to support and sustain the process of enhanced 
European integration. Klaus Welle, the secretary general of the European Parliament, 
has argued that ‘[i]f we want to build a lasting union of solidarity we also need to 
invest in European identity’.200 The development of a common European identity has 
been pursued largely through the creation and subsequent development of a formal 
status of ‘European Citizenship’.201  
The roots of European Citizenship as an agenda distinct from the free-
movement of persons throughout the common market trace back to the early 1970’s, 
when a new focus on strengthening European identity emerged from the wake of the 
collapse of the Bretton woods system of monetary management.202 The 1973 
Copenhagen summit of Heads of State of the newly enlarged Union considered the 
issue of European identity as a means by which to ‘achieve a better definition of their 
relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they 
occupy in world affairs’.203 Assuming the task of ‘reviewing the common heritage, 
interests and special obligations of the Nine [Member States]’, the resulting 
declaration drew attention to shared ‘attitudes to life, based on a determination to 
                                                 
200 EU Observer, ‘We need to invest in a European Identity’ (30 March 2012) 
<http://euobserver.com/political/115759> accessed 14 Feb 2013. This objective has loomed large on 
the political agenda, and 2013 has been designated as the ‘European year of citizens’.  
201 See ‘
 
Annex 1: Background and development of European Citizenship, 1957 - 2011’ (page 123) for a time-
line of the relevant policy documents and legislation instrumental in the development of European 
Citizenship. The information in the timeline was sourced primarily from Commission reports on 
Citizenship (see references below) and from Antje Wiener, ‘From Special to Specialized Rights – The 
Politics of Citizenship and Identity in the European Union’ in Michael Hanagan and Charles Tilly 
(eds), Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring States (Rowman & Littlefield 1999). 
202 Wiener (1999), page 205 
203 Declaration on European Identity (Copenhagen, 14 December 1973) Bulletin of the European 
Communities 1973 
<http://www.cvce.eu/obj/Declaration_on_European_Identity_Copenhagen_14_December_1973-en-
02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32.html> accessed 9 April 2012 
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build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual’ that were 
considered to be one of several ‘fundamental elements’ of European identity.204 
Discussions on European identity assumed the more concrete form of a 
citizenship agenda when discussed by the Heads of Government at the 1974 Paris 
summit. Following a proposal by the Italian Delegation to study the necessary 
conditions and feasible timetable for the grant of European Citizenship,205 the Heads 
of Government resolved to instruct a working party to consider the grant of ‘special 
rights as members of the Community’ for the citizens of the Member States.206 
Despite continued political pressure by the European Parliament,207 process on 
realisation of these rights stalled due to a lack of consensus in Council, with 
successive draft resolutions rejected by reason of the political and legal difficulties 
they raised within the Member States.208  
The quest towards enhanced European identity once again drew attention at 
the Fontainebleau European Council Summit in April 1984. Under the heading of ‘a 
people’s Europe’, the European Council conclusions considered it ‘essential that the 
Community should respond to the expectations of the people of Europe by adopting 
measures to strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for its citizens 
and for the rest of the world’.209 The European Council identified four areas of action 
towards these ends; the creation of a single European passport, a single document for 
                                                 
204 Ibid 
205European Commission, Towards a citizens’ Europe: Commission report on special rights (1975), 
page 28 
206 Point 11 of the final communiqué of the Paris summit stated that ‘Another working party will be 
instructed to study the conditions and the timing under which the citizens of the nine Member States 
could be given special rights as members of the Community’ (Paris communiqué (December 1974) 
Bulletin of the European Communities 
<http://www.cvce.eu/obj/Final_communique_of_the_Paris_Summit_9_and_10_December_1974-en-
2acd8532-b271-49ed-bf63-bd8131180d6b.html> accessed 10 April 2012). 
207 In December 1977 the European Parliament adopted a resolution acknowledging the importance to 
the development of the European Community ‘of strengthening ties of solidarity among its citizens by 
granting special rights falling within the category of civil and political rights’, and requesting the 
Commission to ‘draw up proposals relating to special rights’ (OJ C 299, 12.12.1977, p.26). The 
Resolution adopted the recommendations of the Scelba report. 
208 Commission report in voting rights in local elections (1986) Bull EC supplement 7/86, page 12. 
The report notes that discussions ‘revealed so many problems that, despite the best efforts of a number 
of Presidencies, the matter was left in abeyance’. 




the free movement of goods, the removal of internal frontiers and a system of 
equivalence for university diplomas.  
 
Image 4: ‘Entropa’ artwork, subtitled ‘Stereotypes are barriers to be demolished’210  
 
Although the issue of special rights was addressed neither by the European 
Council conclusions on ‘a people’s Europe’ nor in the Commission communication 
to the Council on the subject, the ad hoc committee established to examine the issues 
raised at Fontainebleau indicated its intention to ‘report on wider issues’, including 
‘the possibilities…for strengthening the special rights of citizens, in particular voting 
rights’.211 The Adonnino report on ‘A People’s Europe’ put the issue of special 
rights for Member State nationals firmly back on the agenda, recommending a 
uniform electoral procedure for elections to the European parliament, strengthening 
of the citizen’s right of petition and consideration of the need for a parliamentary 
                                                 
210 Entropa <http://c278424.r24.cf1.rackcdn.com/Insight_Catlin_Entropa.jpg > accessed 5 March 
2013.  The artwork was installed at the headquarters of the Council of Ministers in Brussels to 
celebrate Czech Republic’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2009. The 
controversial sculpture caricatured the distinct cultural stereotypes attaching to Member States, 
representing France as on strike, the Netherlands as minarets emerging from the sea, and Poland with 
priests erecting the rainbow flag symbolic of gay rights. The UK was notable by its absence (top left), 
in reference to British Euroscepticism. The artwork illustrates the absence of a uniform European 
culture or identity across all Member States. 
211 Pietro Adonnino Report (1985) Bull EC supplement 7/85, page 7 
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ombudsman as a means by which to ‘increase the citizen’s involvement in and 
understanding of the political process in the Community institutions’.212 In regard to 
citizens’ participation in the political process in Member States, the report 
recommended that the Community institutions and Member States ‘pursue in more 
depth the discussions begun previously on voting rights and eventually eligibility in 
local elections for citizens from other Member States under the same conditions as 
for citizens of the host country, subject to a certain period of prior residence in the 
host country’.213 Other relevant recommendations of the report include a generalised 
right of residence in another Member State214 and co-operation in regard to consular 
representation for Member State nationals travelling outwith the Community.215 
The recommendations of the Adonnino report were addressed by the 
European Parliament in 1985 in a resolution on a people’s Europe, which called upon 
the Commission to investigate the grant of local voting rights to Member State 
nationals resident in a second Member State. The report submitted by the 
Commission concluded that ‘an initiative on voting rights in local elections in the 
Member State of residence is a logical consequence of the desire to create ‘a 
People’s Europe’. The political and legal difficulties do not justify abandoning this 
idea which could demonstrate to the man in the street that the Community is relevant 
and give voters identical rights irrespective of their place of residence’.216 Such 
objectives however ought not, the report considered, to be pursued by the 
Commission in the absence of demonstrable political commitment by the European 
Parliament, a commitment soon provided by a resolution on voting rights in local 
elections for Community nationals residing in a Member State other than their own 
in 1987.217 The resolution called upon the Commission to draft a proposal for a 
Council Directive on the issue of voting in local elections for Community nationals 
in their Member State of residence.218 Progress however stalled once more, as 
                                                 
212 Ibid, page 19 
213 Ibid, page 20 
214 Ibid, page 14. This had been the subject of a draft proposal by the Commission for a Directive in 
1979 (COM (79)215 final; OJ C 207, p.14), but no agreement could be reached on whether a 
requirement of sufficient resources provided sufficient safeguard against an individual becoming an 
unreasonable burden on a host country. 
215 Ibid, page 21 
216 Ibid, page 44 
217 OJ C 13, 18.1.1988, p. 33 
218 COM(88) 371 final; OJ C 246, 20.9.88, page 3 
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discussions on the draft Directive were suspended in light of the forthcoming 
Intergovernmental conference on political union. 
The journey towards European Citizenship rights gained a renewed impetus 
in the 1990’s amidst preparations for the strengthening of political union. 
Discussions on European citizenship were during this period heavily influenced by a 
series of submissions made by the Spanish delegation,219 which advocated toward 
the creation of a ‘citizenship of the European Political Union as ‘the personal and 
indivisible status of nationals of the Member States’’ to which special rights would 
attach.220 The creation of such a status would, the memorandum argued, constitute a 
‘qualitative leap which will, inter alia, make the Community citizen who is at present 
little more than a ‘privileged alien’ into a citizen of the European Union’.221  
Political pressure upon the Member States to realise this goal was maintained 
following the IGC on political union by a European Parliament resolution on Union 
citizenship, and the subsequent ‘Bindi’ report on Union Citizenship published in 
1991 by the European Parliamentary Committee on Institutional Affairs. The status 
of European citizenship was included in the draft Maastricht Treaty discussed at the 
Maastricht European Council of December 1991, later signed on the 7th of February 
1992. Upon entering into force on the 1st November 1993 the Treaty on European 
Union conferred upon nationals of Member States the status of European 
Citizenship, and granted to them the to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal 
elections in the Member State in which he resides, the right to vote and to stand as a 
candidate in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which they 
reside, the right to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any 
Member State in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which 
they are nationals is not represented, the right to petition the European Parliament, 
and the right to apply to the Ombudsman. 
 
                                                 
219 Wiener (1999), page 12 
220 Second Spanish Memorandum on citizenship, ‘The road to European citizenship’ 24 September 
1990, re-published in Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds), (1992) The Intergovernmental 
Conference on Political Union: Institutional Reforms, New Policies and International Identity of the 




Despite initial scepticism as to the ‘added value’ of European citizenship over 
and above the free movement rights predicated upon an internal market, the new 
status of European Citizenship was soon given teeth by the European Court of 
Justice. Early citizenship case law such as Martínez Sala and Grzelczyk indicated that 
the new citizenship provisions provided a source of rights that was unfettered by its 
free-market roots, and the Court quickly established that ‘EU citizenship is destined 
to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’.222 European 
Citizenship has since been used consistently by the Court in hard cases as a tool for 
furthering European integration in line with its teleological approach,223 and has 
given rise to some concern as to whether or not its Treaty basis can sustain the 
weight afforded to it by the Court.224 
Whilst European citizenship has been invested by the Court with much more 
legal weight than was anticipated by many, its success in achieving the political goal 
of fostering a common European identity capable of driving the process of European 
integration from the roots upwards has been less certain. The public at large have 
demonstrated a lack of cognisance of the citizenship rights that were intended to 
foster a sense of European identity: a Eurobarmoter survey in 2010 found that 
‘[a]lthough the majority (79%) of EU citizens claim familiarity with the term “citizen 
of the European Union”, only 43% say they know its meaning and less than one-
third (32%) of respondents from the 27 EU countries consider themselves well 
informed about their rights as citizens of the European Union.’225 A perception in 
the European institutions that European citizenship is missing its political mark has 
led to the designation of 2013 as the ‘European Year of Citizens’, and a subsequent 
drive to publicise the rights that attach to European Citizenship. 
Transfer of competence to the European Union thus exhibits a different 
relationship to ‘membership organisations’ predicated upon a shared identity than is 
seen in the devolution of competences to sub-state legislatures. Whereas competence 
                                                 
222 Case C-184/99, Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, 
[2001] ECR I-061930 at para. 31 
223 See e.g. Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform [2008] ECR I-06241; Case C-480/08, Maria Teixeira v London Borough of Lambeth and 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] ECR I-01107; Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz 
Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) [2011] ECR I-01177 
224 Lansbergen (2012) 
225 Flash Eurobarometer No.294, Analytical Report 
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is devolved to sub-state legislatures in order to accommodate claims for self-
determination that arise out of a shared national identity, the causality is reversed at 
the EU level: transfer of competence to the EU under Citizenship provisions serve 
the purpose of constructing a common European identity capable of sustaining a 
quest for enhanced economic integration. 
 
Image 5: Case law of the European Court of Justice has given weight to the principle 
of European Citizenship that seemed uncertain at its inception.226 
 
 
2.3.1. Jurisdictional boundaries of equal membership: the wholly internal 
principle 
Competence of the European Union to allocate social goods and services is 
circumscribed: EU jurisdiction is bounded by the ‘wholly internal principle’, with the 
result that the rights afforded to EU Citizens will only become operational when 
there is a ‘sufficient link’ with EU law, triggered predominantly by a cross-border 
                                                 
226 Image taken from Dora Kostakopoulou, The Evolution of European Union Citizenship (2008) 7 
European Political Science 285 (online version <http://www.palgrave-
journals.com/eps/journal/v7/n3/full/eps200824a.html> accessed 15 Feb 2013) 
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situation.227 The ‘wholly internal principle’ that limits the scope of EU law to cross-
border situations has long been considered determinative of the jurisdiction of Union 
law. First elaborated by the European Court of Justice (CJEU) in a trio of cases in 
1970’s – Knoors, Auer and Saunders228 – the principle dictates that ‘[t]he provisions 
of the Treaty on freedom of movement for workers cannot…be applied to situations 
which are wholly internal to a Member State, in other words, where there is no 
factor connecting them to any of the situations envisaged by Community law.’229 The 
rationale underlying this statement identifies the limits of Union competence as 
confined to the pursuit of an internal market. Rights derived by individuals under the 
Treaties are limited by the scope of this function; they exist to protect against 
obstacles to exercise of the four fundamental freedoms and can therefore be triggered 
only upon movement between Member States. The continued application of the 
wholly internal principle to European citizenship was affirmed by the Court in 
Uecker and Jacquet, in which it was noted that ‘citizenship of the Union, established 
by Article 8 of the EC Treaty, is not intended to extend the scope ratione materiae of 
the Treaty also to internal situations which have no link with Community law.’230 
Application of the principle to European citizenship has been criticised on the 
grounds that it results in ‘reverse discrimination’ against static EU citizens, an 
objection that has gathered momentum in step with the increasingly more substantial 
content of rights acquired by migrant citizens.231 That static EU citizens are 
                                                 
227 For certain rights – for example, the right to vote in European Parliament elections, and the right to 
petition the Ombudsman – the Treaty provisions itself provide the required link with EU law, with the 
result that no cross-border movement is necessary before these rights become operational. 
228 Case 151/78, Knoors v Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken, [179] ECR 399; Case 136/78, 
Ministère Public v Auer, [1971] ECR 437; Case 175/78, The Queen v Vera Ann Saunders [1979] ECR 
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Mislav Mataija, (2009) Internal Situations in Community Law: An Uncertain Safeguard of 
Competences within the Internal Market Columbia Public Law Research 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1375663> accessed 21 March 2011. 
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EU citizens, where there exists a substantial gap between static EU citizens whose family members 
are subject to application of national immigration laws at the point of entry into the Union, and 
migrant EU citizens whose family members derive a right of residency under EU law that can be 
limited only on grounds of public security (Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v. 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, [2008] ECR I-6241). The magnitude of the potential 
‘reverse discrimination’ was presented to the Court in this case as grounds to decline the extension of 
rights, though this argument was rejected by the Court (Metock para. 76); see Anja Lansbergen, 
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prevented by application of the internal principle from accessing more favourable 
rights available under EU law to migrant EU citizens in comparable situations is 
arguably not only unjustified and inequitable, but is also potentially itself a 
contravention of Union law. This argument rests upon the claim that ‘reverse 
discrimination’ is a form of discrimination on the grounds of nationality contrary to 
Art. 18 TFEU, or otherwise more generally in contravention of the principle of 
equality of EU citizens as set out in Art. 9 TEU.232  
Successive arguments presented to the Court in respect of the implications of 
‘reverse discrimination’ have been summarily dismissed, in favour of retaining a 
clear jurisdictional boundary that preserves the sovereignty of Member States in 
matters considered to fall outwith the objectives of the Treaties. In Metock, the Court 
dismissed arguments regarding reverse discrimination with the statement that ‘[a]ny 
difference in treatment between those Union citizens and those who have exercised 
their right of freedom of movement, as regards the entry and residence of their family 
members, does not…fall within the scope of Community law’.233  
As will be seen in the case studies to follow, reverse discrimination assumes 
even greater significance in the context of constitutional asymmetry. Whereas the 
crossing of state boundaries suffices to bring an individual within the jurisdictional 
membership bounds of EU Citizenship, the crossing of internal, sub-state boundaries 
by those who have not otherwise exercised a right of free movement throughout the 
Union does not.234 This leads to the ‘paradoxical’ situation in which a Member State 
                                                                                                                                          
Metock, implementation of the Citizens' Rights Directive and lessons for EU citizenship (2009) 31 
Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 285. 
232 Dr Alina Tryfonidou thus argues that the ‘reverse discrimination which emerges as a result of the 
limited scope of application of the citizenship provisions is, also, likely to be found to amount to a 
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situation’(Alina Tryfonidou, ‘Purely Internal Situations and Reverse Discrimination In a Citizens' 
Europe: Time to “Reverse” Reverse Discrimination?’ in Peter G  Xuereb (ed), Issues in Social Policy: 
A New Agenda - A Public Dialogue Document (European Research and Documentation 
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233 Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform [2008] ECR I-6241 at para. 77  
234 Case C-212/06, Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v Flemish 
Government [2008] ECR I-01683 (see further at n.504). By contrast, an internal frontier is sufficient 
to trigger EU law provisions securing the free movement of goods: in Carbonati  the Court followed 
AG Maduro’s Opinion and held that ‘Article 14(2) EC defines the internal market as 'an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured', 
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is entitled under EU law to erect barriers to the free movement of persons within its 
borders, but must abolish them for persons moving across state bounds.  
The jurisdictional bounds of EU citizenship thus allow for the persistence of a 
fundamental divergence between the respective objectives of devolution and 
European integration: whereas the former facilitates the construction of boundaries 
below the state, the objective of the latter is to open up boundaries between states. 
This tension reflects a broader disconnect between the process of regionalisation and 
European integration. Jo Hunt notes that the European Union, founded on a system 
of intergovernmental treaties between states, ‘privileges the voice of the central state 
and has traditionally acknowledged very little opportunity for the involvement of 
sub-national regions in its governance processes, even where those regions exercise 
extensive, perhaps exclusive power in a given policy field’.235  
 
Summary 
The EU holds no competence to provide social goods or services, or to determine the 
level of provision of such goods and services, such as is enjoyed by both state and 
sub-state polities. That is not, however, to say that the EU has no competence to 
determine the boundaries of social membership. On the contrary, the right of equality 
derived by certain persons under EU law – both as a product of social security co-
ordination to facilitate free movement, and latterly one that attaches directly to the 
status of European Citizen – conditions the ability of state and sub-state polities to 
exclude persons from receipt of the benefits that they provide. 
The right of equality that serves to allocate the benefit of social membership 
attaches primarily to European Citizens, and generates derivative rights for their 
family members.236 The status of EU Citizenship is not, however, sufficient to 
guarantee an individual the benefit of a right of equality. Application of the wholly 
internal principle carves out a privileged set of persons within the boundaries of EU 
Citizenship: whereas migrant EU Citizens and their family members are entitled to 
                                                                                                                                          
without drawing any distinction between inter-State frontiers and frontiers within a State’ (Case C-
72/03, Carbonati Apuani Srl v Comune di Carrara, [2004] E.C.R. I-08027 at para. 23). 
235 Jo Hunt, Devolution and differentiation: regional variation in EU law (2010) 30 Legal Studies 
421, page 245 
236 Rights of equality are now enjoyed also by other third-country nationals in their own right – see 
further text below at n.401. 
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enjoy a right of residence in a Member State and equal treatment with nationals of 
that State, ‘static’ EU Citizens and their family members derive no such rights under 
EU law. The wholly internal principle thus enforces a second boundary of EU 
membership which is not the product of a conscious decision taken within the 
competence of the EU to extend or withdraw the right of equality to certain persons 
(as is the case for third-country nationals being excluded from its scope), but rather is 
indicative of the jurisdictional limits of the polity itself.  
 
 Competence to control access to social goods and services 2.4.
Thus far two forms of membership competence have been identified: the competence 
to provide social goods and services, which has traditionally been enjoyed by the 
state but which has been devolved to sub-state legislatures in accommodation of their 
claims to self-determination, and the competence to allocate those goods and 
services, which in addition is enjoyed by the European Union by way of the right to 
equal treatment that it confers (primarily) upon EU Citizens and their family 
members. A third form of membership competence can be identified in the 
competence of a polity to determine the scope of persons eligible to access those 
goods and services that are provided by the state or sub-state polity, through the 
opening or closing of ‘gateways’ to social citizenship.  
As is further explored in the case studies to follow, there exist three primary 
gateways through which a person is admitted into the class of persons eligible to 
receive the benefit of social rights: residence within the territory of the polity 
conferring the rights (which is encompassed both of a physical presence and a right 
of residence), and the statuses of nationality and European Citizenship. Of these 
gateways, nationality remains the dominant criteria: acquisition of EU Citizenship 
(and the rights that flow therefrom) is dependent upon Member State nationality, as 








2.4.1. Interdependency of European Citizenship and nationality 
European Citizenship has since its inception in the Treaty of Maastricht been 
determined by reference to Member State nationality. As inserted in 1992 by the 
Treaty of Maastricht, Article 8(1) EC stated that ‘[e]very person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.’237 The Declaration of 
the Intergovernmental Conference on Nationality of a Member State, annexed to the 
Treaty of Maastricht, further stated that ‘wherever in the Treaty establishing the 
European Community reference is made to nationals of the Member States, the 
question whether an individual possesses the nationality of a Member State shall be 
settled solely by reference to the national law of the Member State concerned.’238  
The Declaration is indicative of the concern of the Member States to ensure 
that the embryonic status of European citizenship remained firmly subordinate to 
national laws on citizenship acquisition and loss, as had been envisaged by the 
Spanish delegation memorandum that informed the drafting of the citizenship 
provisions.239 This concern was addressed explicitly in the 1997 amendments to the 
Treaty, which added to the former Art 8(a) EC the statement that ‘Citizenship of the 
Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship’.240 The wording of this 
provision has since changed slightly, with the current Art. 20 TFEU stating that 
‘[e]very person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the 
Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national 
citizenship’.241  
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The principles as defined in the Treaties thus appear clear-cut: European 
Citizenship is automatically acquired and lost in conjunction with the nationality 
upon which it is dependent and to which it is subordinate. Case law of the CJEU in 
the 1990s initially affirmed the position that national law was authoritative in 
determining an individual’s status as national of a Member State for the purpose of 
Union law. In Micheletti the Court considered that ‘[u]nder international law, it is 
for each Member State, having due regard to Community law, to lay down the 
conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality’.242 In Kaur it was argued 
before the Court that the principle enunciated in Micheletti – and specifically the 
proviso contained therein of ‘having due regard to Community law’ – requires a 
Member State to define the concept of a national in accordance with the fundamental 
rights that form an integral part of Community law. The argument held little weight 
with the Court, which dismissed the application of EU law by pointing to the 1972 
Declaration on Nationality as determinative for the purpose of ‘determining the 
scope of the Treaty ratione personae’. Adoption of the amended 1982 Declaration, 
the Court held, ‘did not have the effect of depriving any person who did not satisfy 
the definition of a national of the United Kingdom of rights to which that person 
might be entitled under Community law. The consequence was rather that such rights 
never arose in the first place for such a person.’243 
The principle that European Citizenship is subordinated to nationality has 
however been brought into question by the CJEU in Rottman.244 In that case the 
Court indicated that Member States must have due regard to the status of European 
Citizenship in determining matters of nationality, such that a decision by a national 
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fundamental freedoms provided for in the Treaty’. 
243 Case C-192/99, The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte: Manjit Kaur 
[2001] ECR I-1237 (para. 25) 
244 Case C-135/08, Janko Rottman v Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-01449 
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court to withdraw nationality which results in the loss of Union citizenship is subject 
to a proportionality requirement under Union law. Once acquired, Union citizenship 
thus curtails the sovereignty of Member States to determine issues of nationality, 
leading some commentators to note that the relationship of Union citizenship 
dependent upon national citizenship has been reversed: as d'Oliveira argues, ‘the 
nationality law of the member states becomes dependent on the fortunes of Union 
citizenship’.245 That the Court seems to allow to the national courts a wide margin of 
discretion in determining the proportionality of such withdrawal in light of legitimate 
aims pursued may offer cold comfort for the Member States who have sought 
through declarations to guard their sovereignty in this area.246  
Rottman by no means settles the debate surrounding the nature of the 
relationship between Member State nationality and European Citizenship. 
Specifically, it leaves uncertain the issue of whether Union law enforces a similar 
proportionality requirement in respect of the acquisition (rather than the loss) of 
nationality in a Member State. The reasoning in Kaur, distinguished in Rottman on 
those grounds, would suggest that the acquisition of nationality falls outwith the 
scope of Union law. Several commentators have however noted that this distinction 
is hard to maintain,247 and the Court appears to consider the acquisition of nationality 
to fall within the boundaries of Union law where the individual concerned had 
previously held and had been deprived of Member State nationality.248 The 
                                                 
245 H.U. Jessurun D'Oliveira, Decoupling Nationality and Union Citizenship (2011) 7 European 
Constitutional Law Review 138, page 141. D’Oliveira notes at page 149: ‘the dependent variable of 
Union citizenship is evolving in the Court’s case-law towards a position in which Union citizenship as 
an independent variable dictates whether loss (or acquisition) of nationality may occur’. See also 
Gareth T. Davies, ‘The entirely conventional supremacy of Union citizenship and rights’ in Jo Shaw 
(ed), Has the European Court of Justice Challenged Member State Sovereignty in Nationality Law? 
(EUI 2011) <http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/RSCAS_2011_62.pdf> accessed 7 June 2012  
246 D'Oliveira (2011) notes that ‘The distinction that the Court makes between the member states’ 
right to shape their own nationality law on the one hand, insofar as these are not bound to EU norms, 
and the application of that law, which must be done with regard to EU law, is an artificial one. One 
cannot underscore member states’ autonomy to organise their own nationality law and at the same 
time grant Union law influence or something like indirect influence on this reserved domain’ (ibid, 
pages 147-148). 
247 De Groot thus argues that ‘[e]ven though the Court differentiated between the situation in Rottman 
and that in Kaur…it appears rather ill-founded to assume that situations in which the granting of 
Union citizenship is at stake do not fall within the scope of Union law’ (G René  de Groot and Anja 
Seling, The Consequences of the Rottmann Judgment on Member State Autonomy - The European 
Court of Justice's Avant-Gardism in Nationality Matters (2011) 7 European Constitutional Law 
Review 150, pages 154 and 157)  
248 In Rottmann the Court noted that the principles enunciated in the judgment for this reason apply 
equally to Austria, as the Member State of original nationality, as they do to Germany as the Member 
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continued ambiguity of this issue, combined with an apparent willingness of the 
Court to embrace Union citizenship as the ‘independent variable’,249 has led some 
commentators to speculate as to whether the future may hold the de-coupling of 
Union Citizenship from Member State nationality.250 
 
The principle that European Citizenship is derived from national citizenship 
is in the Spanish context quite straightforward to apply: all those with Spanish 
nationality also acquire European Citizenship. Applying the same principles to the 
UK context is, however, slightly more difficult in light of the fractured status of 
British nationality. The British Nationality Act 1981 provides for six types of 
nationality: British Citizens, British Overseas Territories Citizens, British Protected 
Persons, British Subjects, British Overseas Citizens and British Nationals (Overseas). 
British Citizenship and British Overseas Territories Citizenship are the two operative 
forms of nationality, with the other four categories largely directed towards 
individuals who were in receipt of other statuses prior to commencement of the Act. 
British Citizenship is the formal status associated with membership of the United 
Kingdom (constituted of England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Crown 
dependencies of the Channel Islands and Isle of Man), whilst British Overseas 
Territories Citizenship is the formal status associated with membership of British 
Overseas Territories.  
The fragmentation of British nationality and the questions that it raises for the 
acquisition of European Citizenship are further enhanced by the differentiated 
constitutional status of British Overseas territories and Crown dependencies within 
the framework of the European Union. The British Overseas Territory of Gibraltar is 
bound by the Treaties (TEU and TFEU) as a territory for which UK is responsible for 
external relations,251 but is subject to exemptions from CAP and from certain 
turnover taxes, and remains outwith the Customs Union.252 The Sovereign Base 
Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus (also British Overseas Territories) are in 
                                                                                                                                          
State of naturalisation (Case C-135/08, Janko Rottman v Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-01449, paras. 
60-61). 
249 D'Oliveira (2011), page 149 
250 Ibid 
251 Art 355(3) TFEU, OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, page 198; Declaration 55 TFEU, OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, page 
356 
252 Art 28 Act of Accession 1972, OJ L 73, 27.3.1972, page 20 
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contrast bound by the Treaties only to extent that they achieve customs union.253 All 
other British Overseas Territories (listed in Annex II TFEU) benefit from ‘special 
arrangements of association’ under the Treaties,254 but are not parties to the Treaties 
nor are they bound by their provisions. The status of the British Crown Dependencies 
of the Isle of Man and Channel Islands is similar within the EU framework to that of 
the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia: the Treaties apply within the 
territory only to the extent that they achieve customs union.255 
The relationship between the fragmented forms of British nationality and EU 
Citizenship remains governed by the 1982 Declaration on Nationality.256 That 
Declaration states that British nationals are for the purposes of EU law to be 
understood as referring to British citizens, British subjects with the right of abode 
(who are thus exempt from UK immigration control) and British [Overseas] 
Territories citizens who acquire their citizenship from a connection with Gibraltar. 
The outcome of this Declaration is that those individuals who acquire British 
Citizenship by virtue of their relation to British Crown dependencies of Isle of Man 
and Channel Islands are EU citizens, notwithstanding that those territories are bound 
by the Treaties only to the extent that they achieve customs union. By contrast, those 
who acquire British Overseas Citizenship by connection with the Sovereign Base 
Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, which have a comparable constitutional status within 
the EU framework, are excluded from EU Citizenship.257 In further contrast, those 
who acquire British Overseas Citizenship by virtue of their relationship to Gibraltar, 
                                                 
253 Art 355(5)(b) TFEU, OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, page 198; Protocol 3 Accession of Cyprus Treaty, OJ L 
236, 29.3.2003, page 940 
254 Art 198 TFEU, OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, page 137; Art 355(2) TFEU, OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, page 197; 
Council Decision of 27 November 2001 on the association of the OCTs with the European 
Community (2001/822/EC), OJ L 314, 30.11.2001, pages 1–77 
255 Art 355(5)(c) TFEU, OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, page 198; Protocol 3 UK Accession Treaty 1972, OJ L 
73, 27.3.1972, page 164 
256 The 1982 Declaration references the EC Treaty. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
and the subsequent recasting of the citizenship provisions in the TFEU, in addition to the change of 
name effected by the Overseas Territories Act 2002, the 1982 Declaration is to be read in light of 
Declaration 63 TFEU which states that ‘[i]n respect of the Treaties and the Treaty establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community, and in any of the acts deriving from those Treaties or continued 
in force by those Treaties, the United Kingdom reiterates the Declaration it made on 31 December 
1982 on the definition of the term ‘nationals’ with the exception that the reference to ‘British 
Dependent Territories Citizens’ shall be read as meaning ‘British overseas territories citizens’’ (OJ C 
115, 9.5.2008, page 358). 
257 The Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia are part of the customs union, but do not 
participate in provisions on free movement of persons. Formal members are British Overseas 
Territories Citizens but not EU Citizens (Declaration on definition of United Kingdom "nationals" for 
European Community purposes, as amended by Declaration 63 TFEU, ibid.). 
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a territory outwith the customs union, are EU Citizens. The British example, then, 
illustrates a constitutional landscape in which differentiation between types of British 
nationals under national law – which is carried into the acquisition of European 
Citizenship through operation of the Declaration on Nationality – create 
incongruities between members of territorial communities from a European 
Constitutional perspective: members of territories that have a comparable 
constitutional status in the framework of the European Union do not acquire the 
status of European Citizen on an equal basis. 
  
Significance of the coupling between Member State nationality and EU 
Citizenship 
That the status of European Citizenship is ultimately tied to Member State nationality 
means that Member States may curtail the rights acquired by EU Citizens through 
conditioning the receipt of EU Citizenship to which those rights attach. This 
possibility was both recognised by and cautioned against by AG Sharpston in her 
Opinion on the controversial case of Ruiz Zambrano: 
 
 ‘if particular rules on the acquisition of its nationality are – or 
appear to be – liable to lead to ‘unmanageable’ results, it is open to 
the Member State concerned to amend them so as to address the 
problem…In so saying, I am not encouraging the Member States to 
be xenophobic or to batten down the hatches and turn the European 
Union into ‘Fortress Europe’. That would indeed be a retrograde 
and reprehensible step – and one, moreover, that would be in clear 
contradiction to stated policy objectives. I am merely recalling that 
the rules on acquisition of nationality are the Member States’ 
exclusive province’258 
 
 Some Member States have over recent years exercised this opportunity, 
restricting the acquisition of nationality at birth with the intention of conditioning the 
rights received under EU law. Before Ruiz Zambrano had been determined by the 
CJEU, the Belgian Nationality Code had been amended so that the situation giving 
rise to the action before the referring Court would no longer be possible.259 Reactive 
                                                 
258 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national 
de l’emploi (ONEm) [2011] ECR I-01177, Opinion of Advocate General, at para. 115 
259 The Code was amended so as to prevent a child born in Belgium to non-Belgian nationals from 
acquiring Belgian nationality ‘if, by appropriate administrative action instituted with the diplomatic or 
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definition of nationality laws has also been witnessed in Ireland, where the Irish 
Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 was amended in 2004 following the decision in 
Chen so as to ensure that ‘a person born in the island of Ireland to Irish shall not be 
entitled to be an Irish citizen unless a parent of that person has, during the period of 
4 years immediately preceding the person’s birth, been resident in the island of 
Ireland for a period of not less than 3 years or periods the aggregate of which is not 
less than 3 years’.260  
The extent to which Member States are able to restrict their laws on jus soli in 
order to condition access to EU Citizenship is, however, subject to condition. A duty 
under international law to prevent statelessness means that Member States are unable 
to restrict jus soli where no other nationality can be acquired at birth. As noted 
above, following the decision in Rottmann the extent to which Member States can 
regulate the acquisition and loss of nationality is subject also to a proportionality 
requirement in light of the status of Union citizenship. Advocate General Sharpston 
in her Opinion added a caveat to this effect, highlighting that ‘Member States – 
having themselves created the concept of ‘citizenship of the Union’ – cannot exercise 
the same unfettered power in respect of the consequences, under EU law, of the 
Union citizenship that comes with the grant of the nationality of a Member State.’261  
 
2.4.2. Control of residence 
The chapter thus far has noted EU competence to allocate social goods and services 
(to be explored further in the case studies to follow), and has highlighted the 
conditioned competence that the EU holds over the acquisition and loss of EU 
Citizenship as a ‘gateway’ to social membership. Another form of membership 
competence enjoyed by the EU is the competence to control access to social 
                                                                                                                                          
consular authorities of the country of nationality of the child’s parent(s), the child’s legal 
representative(s) can obtain a different nationality for it.’ (Law of 27 December 2006, see Case C-
34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) [2011] ECR I-01177, Opinion 
of Advocate General, at para. 17) 
260 Inserted by Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004 s(4), following a decision of the CJEU in 
Case C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2004] ECR I-09925. 
261 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) [2011] ECR I-01177, 
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membership through conferral of a right of residence in a second Membership State, 
to which the right of equality attaches.  
The European Union enjoys two forms of competence that fetter the 
competence of a Member State to control residence within its territory (and thus the 
group of persons eligible to receive social rights). One is a facilitative regime 
intended to realise the objective of free movement as an integral part of a single 
market, and applies to EU citizens and their family members. The other is a common 
immigration policy that applies to third-country nationals, developed both as a 
necessary corollary to the abolition of internal borders within the Schengen Area and 
as part of a wider pursuit of an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’. These two 
forms of immigration control differ not only as to their purpose but also as to their 
territorial application: as a fundamental part of the common market, the right of 
residence for Union citizens and their family members binds all Member States. By 
contrast, provisions facilitating a common European immigration and asylum system 
for (non-privileged) third-country nationals under Title V TFEU – previously 
outwith Union competence and initially falling under the ‘third-pillar’ – are subject 
to a system of ‘opt ins’ and ‘opt outs’ applied to the UK, Ireland and Denmark. 
 
The right of residence of a European Citizen in a second Member State is 
guaranteed by Article 20(2)(a) and Article 21 TFEU, and is facilitated in secondary 
legislation by Directive 2004/38/EC (the ‘Citizens’ Rights Directive’). The Citizens’ 
Rights Directive determines the conditions under which this general right of 
residence is exercised. It affords an unconditional right of residence for up to three 
months to all European citizens and their family members,262 and thereafter limits the 
right of residence to those European citizens who are workers/self-employed persons, 
or who are students or in possession of ‘sufficient resources’ and who have 
comprehensive sickness insurance.263 European citizens who are no longer workers 
or self-employed persons may retain that status (and thereby the right to residence in 
                                                 
262 An individual may however lose this right in the event that they become ‘an unreasonable burden 
on the social assistance system of the host Member State’ – Art 14(1) Directive 2004/38/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ L 158, 
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a second Member State) under certain circumstances stipulated in the Directive.264 A 
right of permanent residence is acquired by those ‘Union citizens who have resided 
legally for a continuous period of five years in the host Member State’.265 That right 
is not subject to the conditions noted above, and once acquired can be lost ‘only 
through absence from the host Member State for a period exceeding two consecutive 
years’.266  
The rights indicated above may be subject to certain administrative 
formalities, which are evidentiary rather than constitutive of the right contained 
therein.267 Non-compliance with administrative requirements such as registration 
requirements may result in sanctions that are ‘proportionate and non-
discriminatory’.268 A Member State may curtail the rights of residence granted by the 
Directive ‘on grounds of public policy, public security or public health’, and any 
measures taken on grounds of public policy or public security must conform with the 
principle of proportionality.269 
Member States are able to revoke the right of residency should the individual 
concerned no longer satisfy the conditions of extended residency stipulated in Art 7 
of Directive 2004/38/EC. For the purposes of establishing and retaining a right of 
residence, a Member State is not permitted to lay down a fixed amount which they 
regard as ‘sufficient resources’ but rather must take into account the individual 
circumstances of the individual concerned.270 Moreover, recourse to the social 
assistance system may not automatically constitute grounds for expulsion of an EU 
                                                 
264 Ibid, Art 7(3) 
265 Ibid, Art 16(1). Art 16(3) elaborates that ‘Continuity of residence shall not be affected by 
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for compulsory military service, or by one absence of a maximum of twelve consecutive months for 
important reasons such as pregnancy and childbirth, serious illness, study or vocational training, or a 
posting in another Member State or a third country.’ The CJEU has further determined that periods of 
residence within a Member State prior to the accession of the Member State of nationality to the 
Union count towards the period of continuous residence (Joined Cases C-424/10 and C-425/10, 
Tomasz Ziolkowski and Barbara Szeja and Others v Land Berlin, Judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) of 21 December 2011), as do periods of residence completed before transposition of the 
Citizens’ Rights Directive (Case C-162/09, Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Lassal [2010] 
ECR I-09217). 
266 Directive 2004/38/EC, Art. 16.4 (supra, n.262) 
267 Ibid, Art. 25 
268 Ibid, Arts 8(2) and 9(3) 
269 Ibid, Art. 27 
270 Ibid, Art. 7(4) 
84 
 
citizen from a host Member State on the grounds of lack of sufficient resources.271 In 
all cases, a host Member State may not impose a threshold for ‘sufficient resources’ 
that is higher than that for which nationals become eligible for social assistance.272  
 The ability of a host Member State to revoke an individual’s right of 
residence in order to condition the social rights received under Union law is, 
however, limited. Once an EU citizen or a third-country national family member has 
acquired the right of permanent residence in a host Member State, their right to 
remain there is unconditioned by any requirement of sufficient resources. An 
individual who has acquired the right of permanent residence may thus be expelled 
only on ‘serious grounds of public policy or public security’, and is entitled to equal 
treatment in the receipt of all social welfare for the duration of their continued 
residency.273 
A Host Member State is also unable to expel those who non-economically 
active EU Citizens who derive a right of residence from the primary right of their EU 
citizen child: in Baumbast the Court recognised the right of residence of a parent for 
the duration of the child’s education, and in Teixeira it was made explicit that the 
continuation of such a right was not dependent upon fulfilment of the condition of 
sufficient resources.274 Such a right has also been recognised for the third-country 
national care givers of EU citizen children: in Chen, a third country national parent 
acquired a right of residence as the primary carer of an EU citizen child.275 In that 
case the third-country national in question had sufficient resources to maintain 
herself and her child and required no recourse to public funds, whilst in Ruiz 
Zambrano the Court went one step further, and required that the Member State grant 
a work permit to the third-country national parent of a (static) EU citizen child, in 
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order to facilitate his acquisition of the sufficient resources required under the 
Directive.276 
Family members of migrant EU citizens are also afforded rights of residence 
of residence under the Citizens’ Rights Directive. These rights are ‘secondary’ rights 
that are derived from the family member’s relation to the European citizen, and are 
intended to facilitate the free movement of European citizens within the Union. 
European citizens as well as third country nationals may benefit from the provisions 
relating to family members of migrant EU citizens, such that those European citizens 
who do not fulfil the necessary conditions of extended residency in their own right 
may nevertheless be eligible for residency as family members of EU citizens who do. 
The Directive makes a distinction between two categories of relation. ‘Family 
members’ of EU citizens are ‘beneficiaries’ of the rights of residence detailed in the 
Directive. The spouse or registered civil partner of an EU citizen, direct descendants 
of the EU citizen or their spouse/civil partner who are under the age of 21 or who are 
dependants, and dependent direct relatives in the ascending line of the EU citizen or 
spouse/civil partner fall within this category.277 Article 3.2 of the Directive also 
identifies a group of persons for whom entry and residence shall be ‘facilitated’. This 
group is constituted of ‘the partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable 
relationship, duly attested’,278 and of ‘other family members…who, in the country 
from which they have come, are dependants or members of the household of the 
Union citizen having the primary right of residence, or where serious health grounds 
strictly require the personal care of the family member by the Union citizen’.279 The 
obligations placed upon Member States by the Directive in relation to such persons 
are limited to undertaking ‘an extensive examination of [their] personal 
circumstances’ and justifying denial of entry or residence to them.280  
 
Family members who are beneficiaries under the Directive receive rights of 
residence akin to those of EU citizens, charted above: if for example an EU citizen 
qualifies for a period of residency of more than three months, their non-EU citizen 
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family member receives a corollary right for so long as that EU citizen continues to 
fulfil the conditions of residence.281 The right of residence of a non-EU national 
family member is evidenced by receipt of a ‘residence card of a family member of a 
Union citizen’, which is valid for a maximum period of five years from the date of 
issue.282 The Directive provides for retention of the right of residence by family 
members in the event of death or departure of the EU Citizen,283 and in the event of 
divorce, annulment of marriage or termination of registered partnership, though 
imposes differential conditions upon EU and non-EU national family members under 
these circumstances.284 Family members of Union citizens acquire a right of 
permanent residence after legally residing in the host Member State for a period of 
five years, and for non-EU national family members this period of residence must 
have been spent residing with the Union citizen.285 Non-EU national family members 
who acquire a right of permanent residence shall be issued with a permanent 
residence card, renewable automatically every ten years.286  
Following entry into force of the Directive, some confusion existed amongst 
Member States as to the scope of non-EU national family members to whom it 
applied. Article 6.2 of the Directive states that the right of extended residence ‘shall 
also apply to family members in possession of a valid passport who are not nationals 
of a Member State, accompanying or joining the Union citizen’.287 The 
implementation of this provision by Member States was substantially influenced by a 
CJEU determination that pre-dates the Directive itself, but which ruled on the 
application of prior Community legislation in the same area.288 In Akrich the Court 
had determined that the Community instruments concerned covered only freedom of 
movement within the Community, being ‘silent as to the rights of a national of a 
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non- Member State, who is the spouse of a citizen, in regard to access to the territory 
of the Community’.289 As a result, such a person ‘must be lawfully resident in a 
Member State when he moves to another Member State to which the citizen of the 
Union is migrating or has migrated’.290 The Court reasoned that the rights granted to 
family members under EU law were intended to ensure that an EU citizen and family 
member did not receive less favourable rights when migrating to another Member 
State, and that in the absence of the non-EU national family member holding an 
initial right of residence within the Community there could be no question of 
receiving less favourable treatment in another Member State. The refusal to grant 
residence to such a family member could not therefore in these circumstances 
constitute a deterrent to the exercise of the EU citizen’s right to free movement 
within the Community. 
On the basis of Akrich, several Member States adapted their national 
instruments so as to make the right of residence of non-EU national family members 
conditional upon prior lawful residence in another Member State. Denmark, Ireland, 
Finland and the UK introduced this measure by legal instrument, while seven other 
Member States (Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Cyprus, Malta and 
the Netherlands) achieved this result through administrative guidelines.291 The status 
of non-EU national family members was not, however, definitively determined by 
Akrich, not least because the precise scope of the decision was unclear. In the 
subsequent case of Jia the CJEU held that Community law ‘does not require’ prior 
lawful residence in another Member State for Community rights of residence to be 
accessed, but left unanswered the question of whether Member States were permitted 
to impose this condition.292  
The issue was definitively settled by the CJEU in 2008, when the Court in 
Metock ruled that ‘the refusal of a host Member State to grant rights of entry and 
residence to the family members of a Union citizen is such as to discourage that 
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citizen from moving to or residing in that Member State, even if his family members 
are not already lawfully resident in the territory of another Member State’.293 
Submissions made by several governments that the Member States retained exclusive 
competence to regulate the first access of non-EU national family members to Union 
territory were rejected by the Court, which confirmed that Union law requires 
national immigration laws to be dissaplied to family members of migrant EU citizens 
at their point of entry into Union territory.294 
Metock confirmed that the family members of EU citizens were entitled to 
residence in the ‘host’ Member State to which that EU citizen had migrated, and that 
this right was unfettered by the initial application of national immigration law. Prior 
to recent case-law, such rights of residency were limited to the family members of 
migrant EU citizens, and were not enforceable against the Member State of 
nationality of the EU citizen in the absence of movement throughout the Union. This 
limitation was a product of the ‘wholly internal principle’, which had long dictated 
that Member State nationals could rely upon their rights as European Citizens only in 
‘cross-border’ situations that were not ‘wholly internal to a Member State’.295 That 
principle was written into the drafting of the Citizens’ Rights Directive itself, which 
was limited in application to ‘all Union citizens who move to or reside in a Member 
State other than that of which they are a national, and to their family members…who 
accompany or join them’.296  
The extent of residency rights that family of ‘static’ EU citizens (i.e. those 
that had not yet exercised their right of free movement within the Union) can derive 
under Union law was re-considered in a trio of cases before the CJEU in 2011 and 
2012. In Ruiz Zambrano, the Court was asked to consider whether a third-country 
national derived a right of residence in Belgium by virtue of the birth of his EU 
citizen children, notwithstanding that those children had never exercised their right 
of free movement within the Union. The CJEU concluded that, despite falling 
outwith the scope of application of the Citizens’ Rights Directive, the applicant had 
both a right of residence in Belgium and a right to receive a work permit under EU 
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law on the grounds that ‘Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have 
the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance 
of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union.’297 
The significance of the decision in Ruiz Zambrano was potentially enormous, 
calling into question the continued validity of the wholly internal principle in its 
application to European Citizenship and, more specifically, raising the possibility 
that Member States may be required to dissapply national immigration law from the 
family members of its own nationals.298 The scope of the judgment was however 
initially unclear, and generated much speculation as to the possible limits of those 
situations in which an EU citizen might be ‘deprived of the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of the rights’ conferred upon them.299 The subsequent case of McCarthy 
did little to clarify matters, with the Court applying the Ruiz Zambrano test but 
reasoning that refusal of an EU residency permit to a static EU citizen (whose 
application was made with the sole purpose of thereby generating a dependant right 
of residency for her third-country national spouse) did not fall within the scope of 
deprivation.300 The later case of Dereci proved more successful in clarifying the 
criterion relating to the denial of the genuine enjoyment as referring ‘to situations in 
which the Union citizen has, in fact, to leave not only the territory of the Member 
State of which he is a national but also the territory of the Union as a whole’.301 The 
desirability of residing together with a family member within Union territory on 
economic grounds was for this purpose insufficient to establish that the Union citizen 
would otherwise be forced to leave the territory of the Union.302 
                                                 
297Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l'emploi [2011] ECR I-01177 at para. 
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The cumulative effect of the Metock and Ruiz Zambrano line of case-law is 
that family members of all migrant EU citizens are exempt from the application of 
national immigration law, and family members of static EU citizens are exempt from 
immigration control only when denial of residency to them would deprive the EU 
citizen from the genuine enjoyment of his rights by forcing him to leave the territory 
of the Union. The relationship between the two remains however slightly unclear, as 
there is an argument to be made that no European citizen capable of independently 
exercising his or her right of free movement will be forced to leave the territory of 
the Union upon denial by a Member State of residency to their third-country national 
family member, as by virtue of Metock they have the option to reside together in a 
second Member State. The extension of the right of residence under EU law to 
family members of static EU citizens may well therefore be confined to those family 
members upon whom the EU citizen is dependent. 
 
The discussion above concerns those provisions that facilitate residence for 
EU citizens and their family members with the objective of securing a common 
market. Harmonisation of immigration control outwith the objective of free 
movement for EU citizens has also developed as a necessary corollary of the 
abolition of internal borders within the Schengen Area, and as part of the Union’s 
commitment to the development of an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ for EU 
citizens and third-country nationals alike.  
Initial entry to the Schengen Area is regulated by common visa provisions on 
short stay and transit visas, which allow for entry to and circulation within the 
Schengen area for a maximum of three months during any six-month period.303 Long 
stay visas (for a period of stay exceeding 3 months, previously known as ‘D’ visas) 
fall within national competence, but once issued confer a right under EU law to 
limited circulation within the Schengen area. Since 2010, third country nationals 
issued with a long-stay visa by a Member State can move freely between Schengen 
states for up to three months in any six month period.304 Regulation (EC) No 
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539/2001 identifies a list of third countries from which visas are required to enter the 
Schengen zone, and identifies those individuals that are exempt from this 
requirement. Schengen visa provisions are applicable only to those 22 of the 27 
Member States that are within the Schengen area, and to those three countries that 
are within the Schengen zone but which are not Member States.305 Member States 
lying outwith the Schengen zone continue to apply national provisions on visa 
requirements, and retain their own country-specific lists as to those countries of 
origin subject to visa requirement. 
Satisfaction of necessary visa conditions facilitates an individual’s entry to 
the Schengen Area and legitimises their presence within the territory for a period of 
up to three months, but does not confer upon them the right of extended residence 
that acts as a gateway to social citizenship. The European Union enjoys limited 
competence over residence rights for third-country nationals within certain Member 
States, which is confined to procedural guarantees: a single application procedure for 
third-country nationals seeking residency and work permits within the Union is 
provided for by Directive 2011/98/EU (the ‘Single Procedure Directive’).306 
Provisions of that Directive are without prejudice to Schengen visa requirements 
detailed above, or (in the case of non-Schengen Member States and for the issue of 
visas for periods of stay exceeding 90 days) the visa requirements imposed under 
national legislation. The residence permit acquired under the harmonised process 
secures for the holder the right of entry and residence in the Member State of issue 
for the duration of validity of the card and also secures some rights of equal 
treatment in relation to working conditions,307 but does not entitle holders to rights of 
residence in a second Member State. Member States are able to retain control over 
migratory flows through the capacity to declare an application inadmissible by 
reason of the volume of third-country nationals seeking entry and residence within 
their territory on the grounds of employment. The UK, Ireland and Denmark do not 
participate in the Single Procedure Directive.  
                                                                                                                                          
third country nationals with a long stay visa within the Schengen area 
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Third country nationals who reside legally and continuously within the 
territory of a Member State for the period of five years immediately prior to 
application are entitled to receive the status of ‘long term resident’, and are granted a 
correlative right of equality that entitles them to receipt of social citizenship rights.308 
Periods of absence shorter than six months in duration and not exceeding a total of 
ten months within the five year period prior to application do not affect the 
continuity of residence for the purpose of acquisition of that status.309 In order to 
acquire the status of long-term resident, a third-country national must evidence to the 
Member State of residence that they have sufficient resources for themselves and 
their family, and sickness insurance of the level required of nationals of the Member 
State concerned.310 Once acquired, the status of long-term resident can be lost only 
by detection of fraudulent acquisition, expulsion or by absence from Union territory 
for a period of twelve consecutive months.311 Those individuals in possession of the 
status of long term resident are entitled to be issued with a ‘long term resident’s 
permit’, which is valid for a period of at least five years and is automatically 
renewable upon expiry. 
Acquisition of the status of long-term resident entitles the holder to equal 
treatment with nationals of that Member State in a broad range of areas, including 
access to employment, social security and the receipt of tax benefits. Long term 
residents are protected from expulsion, and may be expelled only where the 
individual concerned ‘constitutes an actual and sufficiently serious threat to public 
policy or public security’.312 Long term residents also acquire the right of extended 
residence (more than three months) in a second Member State, subject to evidence of 
stable, regular and sufficient resources and sickness insurance,313 and thus benefit 
from the same principles of free movement that apply to European Citizens. Under 
Art 16 of the Long Term Resident’s Directive, long term residents are entitled to 
slightly more beneficial rights of family reunification upon movement to a second 
Member State (see further below). 
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Those third country nationals that do not fulfil the requisite requirements for 
residency in their own right may be eligible to acquire a right of residence in a 
Member State by reason of Union provisions on family reunification. Council 
Directive 2003/86/EC on family reunification (the ‘Family Reunification Directive’) 
grants a right of residence to family members of those third-country nationals who 
are in receipt of a residence permit issued by a Member State for a period of validity 
of one year or more and who has ‘reasonable prospects’ of obtaining a right of 
permanent residence (‘the sponsor’).314 Article 8 of the Directive further permits 
Member States to impose a requirement that the sponsor has stayed lawfully in the 
territory of the Member State for a period not exceeding two years, before having 
his/her family members join him/her. 
Member States are obliged under the Family Reunification Directive to 
authorise the entry and residence of the sponsor’s spouse and the minor children of 
either the sponsor or his or her spouse. They are also are entitled to authorise the 
entry of ‘first-degree relatives in the direct ascending line of the sponsor or his or 
her spouse, where they are dependent on them and do not enjoy proper family 
support in the country of origin’, and the ‘adult unmarried children of the sponsor or 
his or her spouse, where they are objectively unable to provide for their own needs 
on account of their state of health’.315 Authorisation of the entry and residence of the 
long term partner of the sponsor and the registered partner of the sponsor is at the 
discretion of national implementing regimes.316 The right of residence under the 
Directive is subject to the conditions of adequate accommodation, basic sickness 
insurance and sufficient resources,317 and is subject to curtailment on the grounds of 
public policy, public security or public health.318  
Member States are obliged to provide qualifying family members with an 
initial residency permit of one year, which is renewable thereafter.319 The sponsor’s 
family members are entitled to access to education, employment and self-employed 
activity and access to vocational guidance and further training in the same way as the 
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sponsor.320 The Directive provides for the grant of an autonomous residence permit 
to the family member (i.e. issued to them in their own right, and independent from 
their relationship with the sponsor) after five years of residence. The UK, Ireland and 
Denmark do not participate in the Family Reunification Directive. 
 
The provisions above detail the standard procedure for receipt of an EU 
residency permit on either the grounds of employment or family reunification, and 
for the receipt of long-term residency status. Specialised and privileged procedures 
apply for the entry and residence of third country nationals for the purposes of study, 
scientific research and for the purposes of highly qualified employment.  
Entry and residence of third-country nationals within the Union for the 
purposes of highly qualified employment is regulated by the ‘Blue Card 
Directive’.321 The Directive allows Member States to retain overall control of the 
volume of admissions for such purposes, whilst harmonising the conditions and 
procedure of entry and residence.322 Third-country nationals may apply for a blue 
card by presenting a valid contract or offer of ‘highly qualified employment’ for a 
period of at least one year, a document attesting to fulfilment of the requisite 
conditions of professional employment, a valid visa and residence permit and 
evidence of the level of sickness insurance required by nationals of that Member 
State. For the purposes of the Directive, ‘highly qualified employment’ refers to paid 
employment in the Member State with the requisite adequate and specific 
competence, proven by higher professional qualifications.323  
Possession of an EU Blue Card entitles the holder to enter, re-enter and stay 
in the territory of the issuing Member State during period of validity.324 Holders of 
the card are guaranteed equal treatment with nationals of the Member State of issue 
in regard to various aspects of employment conditions and criteria,325 and are subject 
to privileged processes of family reunification and acquisition of long term residency 
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status (see further below). After 18 months of legal residence in the first Member 
State, the holder of a Blue Card is entitled to move to a second Member State for the 
purposes of highly qualified employment.326 Family members residing with the Blue 
Card holder in the first Member State are entitled to accompany or join the Blue Card 
holder upon movement to second Member State. The UK, Ireland and Denmark are 
not participating in the Directive.  
The entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of study is 
regulated by Directive 2004/114/EC,327 and the admission of third-country nationals 
for the purposes of scientific research is regulated by Directive 2005/71/EC.328 
Neither The UK, Ireland nor Denmark is taking part in Directive 2004/114/EC, and 
of those countries only Ireland has opted to take part in Directive 2005/71/EC. 
 
 Conclusion: fragmentation of membership competences across 2.5.
constitutional asymmetries 
The foregoing chapter has examined the transfer of legislative competence to non-
state polities above and below the state, and has sought to contextualise the 
disaggregation of sovereignty against the recognition and development of alternative 
identity groupings. It has noted that the transfer of competence to sub-state polities in 
the UK and Spain result from de facto horizontal and vertical asymmetries that 
manifest between the constituent units and between the constituent units and the 
centre: devolution is the product of claims to autonomy asserted by self-conscious 
national minorities that have a history of self-governance, which in turn are 
supported by variations in wealth and demography across the state territory. By 
contrast, transferral of competence to the European Union is responsible for attempts 
to generate a common European identity capable of sustaining the goals of enhanced 
economic integration, largely pursued through the creation of the status of European 
Citizenship and the investment of rights therein. 
The chapter has argued that there are three forms of membership competence 
determinative of the social rights that an individual receives, and thus which 
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determine the extent to which he enjoys equality of membership in a given polity: the 
competences to provide social goods and services (encompassing the competence to 
determine the level of welfare provision available, and the administrative 
responsibility to deliver it), the competence to allocate social goods and services (the 
ability withdraw or extend those rights), and the competence to secure access to 
social goods and services through the ‘gateways’ of nationality, European 
Citizenship, and residence. In the traditional model of membership that operates 
within the boundaries of the nation-state, the competence to provide, to allocate and 
to precondition the receipt of membership benefits are all co-vested in the state, 
which thus has ultimate control over the boundaries of its citizenship.  
With the transfer of legislative competence to non-state polities above and 
below the level of the state, these membership competences are fragmented across 
multiple polity levels. The competence to provide social goods and services is 
enjoyed by both the state and sub-state polities in Spain and the UK, in a transfer of 
competence that is bounded by subject matter. The two polities thus remain of 
concurrent relevance for the social rights that a given individual receives: a person 
may, for example, fall within a particular sub-state membership grouping for the 
purposes of a right to education or healthcare, and within a state-wide membership 
grouping for the purpose of receipt of social security. 
The competence enjoyed by state and sub-state polities to allocate the benefits 
of the social goods and services that they provide is not exclusive, but rather is 
shared with the European Union by virtue of the right of equality enjoyed by 
European Citizens and their family members (and certain other groups of third-
country nationals including long-term residents). The result of this relocation of 
competences is that polities at the sub-state, state and EU levels all have competence 
to allocate the benefits of social membership. The boundaries of inclusion in or 
exclusion from social membership at the state and sub-state levels is determined 
through allocation of social rights, whereas the boundaries of inclusion in and 
exclusion from social membership under EU law is determined by the scope of the 
right of equal treatment, upon which basis social rights are allocated to given 
individuals. Within these competences each polity must engage in the process of 
determining the boundaries of social membership, determining the basis upon which 
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those respective rights are allocated and thus who is entitled to receive the benefit of 
social rights or of equal treatment.  
A final form of membership competence manifests in the competence to 
control residence and formal status as ‘gateways’ to membership, and thus to 
determine admission into the class of persons eligible to receive the benefits of 
membership. Competence over residence and nationality is in both Spain and the UK 
reserved to the State, with the result that sub-state polities have no competence to 
control admission to the group of persons entitled to receive the benefits of social 
membership. Transfer of competences to the European Union has also limited the 
competence of the state in this regard: the European Union has assumed competence 
to control the rights of residence of European Citizens and their family members in a 
second Member State, and also a limited control over the right of residence of certain 
other third-country national family members. Nationality is the dominant gateway 
through which both rights of residence and the parasitic status of European 
Citizenship are acquired. Control over this gateway, too, is now influenced partly by 
the European Union: whilst the conferral of nationality for the time being remains 
within the exclusive control of the State, withdrawal of nationality that leads to the 
loss of the status of European Citizenship is subject to a requirement of 
proportionality under EU law. 
Two observations can be drawn from the distribution of these membership 
competences across the constitutional asymmetry. First, the competence to allocate 
the benefits of social membership is shared across polity levels, each of which must 
determine the basis upon which the benefits of rights are extended or withdrawn so 
as to meet the demands of social justice. Secondly, the fragmentation of these 
competences means that membership boundaries are interdependent, with the result 
that exercise of a competence in one polity has the capacity to influence the 
boundaries of social membership in another. 
The following case studies aim to probe the significance of this fragmentation 
for the allocation of social rights as the substantive benefit of membership. The case 
studies draw examples from both the UK and Spain to illustrate the basis upon which 
non-state polities allocate social rights, and the way in which those membership 
boundaries interact across the constitutional asymmetry. 
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3. Effect of EU membership competences upon equal 
membership, examined through the lens of minimum 
income allowances 
 Introduction: equal membership and minimum income 3.1.
allowances 
The equality of membership that lies at the heart of citizenship is realised through a 
bundle of civic, political and social rights, which form the substantive benefits of 
membership. Social rights, upon which this study is focussed, have been secured 
through welfare systems that have developed throughout the twentieth century. 
Welfare provision is paradigmatically linked with the nation-state: the ‘nation’ 
generates the social solidarity necessary to drive the pursuit of social justice, and the 
‘state’ provides the organisational framework within which those objectives are 
attained.329 
The fragmentation of membership competences across asymmetric 
constitutions presents certain challenges to this model. The competence of the 
European Union to secure free movement of persons between Member States widens 
access to those social rights provided from national resources through the conferral 
of rights of residence and a correlative right to equal treatment. States and sub-state 
polities consequently have more residents to whom to provide social welfare, raising 
issues of sustainability. Moreover, a broader range of residents enjoy entitlements to 
social welfare as a result, with more third-country nationals deriving entitlements to 
equal access under EU law than would otherwise be eligible to receive social rights 
under the national system. Member States have, in turn, sought to mitigate the impact 
of these developments by conditioning those rights conferred under EU law; 
restricting where possible initial rights of residence within their territory, and 
otherwise narrowing the eligibility criteria that circumscribe receipt of welfare. 
Whereas these entitlements affect most areas of welfare provision, it is in the 
grant of non-contributory minimum income allowances that these tensions are most 
evident: such benefits are grounded exclusively in ideals of social justice (rather than 
as a right ‘bought’ by social insurance), and thus test most acutely the boundaries of 
equal membership. The following pages examine the effect of EU membership 
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competences upon the parameters of equal membership, through a study of 
entitlement to minimum income allowances in the UK and Spain. For this purpose 
the following definition of a minimum income allowance is adopted: 
 
‘a universal non-contributory subjective and non-discretionary right 
to social assistance, granted generally under the form of a means-
tested differential income. As main pillar of a dedicated scheme, it 
acts as (part of) the ultimate safety net of social protection in order to 
prevent individual or households, which are not covered by other 
social protection schemes and with insufficient resources to support 
themselves, to fall into (severe) poverty or under decent living 
standards as perceived in national societies.’330 
 
The chapter details the provision of minimum income allowances in the UK 
and Spain, and examines the eligibility criteria pertaining to nationality and residence 
that condition their receipt. It then examines entitlement to these benefits arising 
from the EU law principle of equal treatment, before turning to consider the reactive 
exercise of state competences to condition the impact of EU rights. The study 
concludes that EU membership competences alter the parameters of equal 
membership in two countervailing ways: EU law secures access to social rights for 
resident non-nationals who may otherwise have been ineligible under the national 
system, thereby extending the scope of equal membership provided by the State, 
which has in turn prompted a reactive constriction of the basis on which Member 
States allocate equal membership through the imposition of eligibility criteria that 
indirectly favour Member State nationals. 
 The following chapter examines exclusively the effect upon equal 
membership of the ‘vertical’ constitutional relationship between the European Union 
and the two Member States that form the focus of this study. This constitutional 
relationship is a complex one, and whilst both Member States and the Union as a 
whole enjoy protected spheres of competence (Member States through the principles 
of conferral and subsidiarity, and the Union through the principles of supremacy and 
direct effect), the balance between respective competences is such that Member 
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States must ensure the conformity of national laws pertaining to social membership 
with EU law. Membership boundaries are thus subject to contestation not only by 
reason of de facto vertical asymmetries between national and EU membership 
decisions, but also in the de iure asymmetry that ensures the supremacy of EU law in 
the case of conflict between the two. 
The focus in the following chapter upon vertical asymmetries between EU and 
Member State membership definition foreshadows investigation in chapter four of 
the additional sub-state dimension of this web of constitutional relations. 
 
 Provision and allocation of minimum income allowances in the 3.2.
UK and Spain 
3.2.1. Minimum income allowances in the UK and Spain 
Social security in England, Scotland and Wales is provided by the UK State.331 Four 
main minimum income allowances can be identified from a group of benefits that in 
UK legislation are collectively referred to as ‘income-related benefits’: ‘income-
assessed jobseekers’ allowance’, ‘income-related employment and support 
allowance’, ‘income support’ and ‘state pension credit’.332 These benefits provide a 
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children(Department for Work and Pensions, ‘Universal Credit’ (2012)  
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minimum income allowance to persons falling within a defined set of circumstances, 
irrespective of the insurance contributions that they have made. Income-assessed 
jobseeker's allowance secures a minimum income for persons who are seeking 
employment. The allowance is available to persons aged 18-65 who have not made 
sufficient national insurance contributions to access contribution-based jobseekers’ 
allowance, or who have exhausted their six-month entitlement under that scheme.333 
Income-related employment and support allowance secures a minimum income for 
persons below state-pension age who are unable to work due to illness or disability. 
Income support guarantees a minimum income for persons with familial dependents 
who are not seeking employment, and is available to a person between the ages of 
18-65 who is pregnant, is a lone parent with a child under five, or is a carer.334 State 
pension credit is available to persons above state pension age on a low income, and 
the allowance ‘tops-up’ the income of a recipient to the stipulated threshold amount. 
Receipt of all four of these benefits is means-tested against both household income 
and a savings cap, with the situation of an applicant’s partner taken into account, and 
is not dependent upon the applicant having made insurance contributions.335 
 
In Spain, both the Cortes Generales and the Autonomous Communities have a 
degree of competence over the provision of minimum income allowances. Three 
main forms of non-contributory minimum income guarantee are available within the 
Spanish welfare system: non-contributory employment benefits, non-contributory 
social security pensions, and a minimum integration allowance.336  
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<europa.eu/ey2012/BlobServlet?docId=9043&langId=en> accessed 18 Feb 2013; European 




Non-contributory benefits for unemployed persons are regulated by the State, 
and consist of a special unemployment allowance (subsidio por desempleo) and an 
active integration income (Renta Activa de Inserción Laboral).337 Unemployment 
allowance is paid when contributory–based unemployment allowances have been 
exhausted, are means-tested, and are conditional upon the applicant having 
‘dependant family charges’.338 Recipients must be signed up with an employment 
agency and must not have refused a suitable offer of employment or vocational 
training.339 The active integration income ‘aims at facilitating labour insertion for 
long term unemployed workers over 45 years of age’, and is subject to means-
testing.340  
Non-contributory social security pensions (Pensiones no Contributivas de la 
Seguridad Social) are regulated within the national scheme of social security, but are 
managed in partnership with Autonomous Communities.341 Non-contributory 
pensions were introduced in an overhaul of social assistance programmes in 1990, 
and are comprised of means-tested retirement pensions for persons over the age of 
65, and means-tested invalidity pensions for persons aged between 18 and 65.342  
Finally, minimum integration allowances (rentas mínimas de inserción) are 
regulated by Autonomous Communities, and form the ‘last safety net’ for social 
                                                 
337 European Commission (2011), Your social security rights in Spain, page 32 
338 Cabrero (2009), page 8; Arriba and Ibáñez (2012), page 8; Noguera (2000) page 7. The benefit is 
paid for a period of six months, and is renewable for a period of up to a maximum of 18 months. 
Persons over 45 may renew for a period of up to 30 months, whilst eligible persons over the age of 52 
may receive it until retirement age (European Commission (2011), Your social security rights in 
Spain, pages 31-32). 
339 European Commission (2011), Your social security rights in Spain, page 21 
340 Arriba and Ibáñez (2012), page 8. The allowance is also paid to other persons including those who 
are in receipt of an invalidity pension, or who are victims of domestic violence (Cabrero (2009), pages 
12 and 14). The benefit is payable for a maximum of 11 months (European Commission (2011), Your 
social security rights in Spain, page 32). 
341 Cabrero (2009), page 8. See also European Commission (2011), Your social security rights in 
Spain, page 36: ‘non-contributory benefits are recognised by the Autonomous Communities…that 
have had the functions for the institute of elderly and social services transferred to them’; and Thomas 
Bahle, Vanessa Hubl and Michaela Pfeifer, The Last Safety Net: A Handbook of Minimum Income 
Protection in Europe (Policy Press 2011) at page 137: ‘National social security also offers non-
contributory pensions for older and disabled persons when they are not eligible for contributory 
pensions. While these categorical schemes are institutionalised by the central government, general 
social assistance is subject to the mesogovernments of the 17 Autonomous Communities and the 
Autonomous Cities of Ceuta and Melilla’. 
342 Act 26/1990, Law of Non-Contributory Pensions of the Social Security. See Cabrero (2009), pages 
8 and 12; Noguera (2000), pages 7 and 8; and Arriba and Ibáñez (2012), page 2. 
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protection.343 Minimum incomes ‘target those between the ages of 25 and 64 in 
situations of extreme poverty and with difficulties relating to social and/or 
employment integration’.344 Provision of minimum integration allowances differs 
substantially between Autonomous Communities, which each have ‘different access 
requirements and, above all, varying protective intensities and conditions for social 
and labour market insertion’.345 Receipt of minimum integration allowance is 
discretionary under the schemes of most Autonomous Communities, and is only an 
entitlement in Basque, Navarre, Madrid, Asturius and Catalonia.346 
 In addition to these three general forms of minimum income allowance, there 
also exists a special minimum for Spanish persons residing abroad and returnees 
(prestación por razón de necesidad a favor de los españoles residentes en el exterior 
y retornados).347 
 
3.2.2. Allocation of minimum income allowances: equality of residents  
In both the UK and Spain, receipt of minimum income allowances is conditioned by 
the fulfilment of certain residence requirements. 
In order to be eligible for a non-contributory invalidity pension from the Spanish 
State, a person ‘must be legally residing in Spain and have been resident in Spain for 
at least five years, including the two years immediately preceding the date of 
application’.348 In order to be eligible for receipt of a non-contributory retirement 
pension, a person ‘must be resident in Spain and have been resident in Spain for at 
least ten years between his 16th birthday and the date of retirement, including the two 
                                                 
343 Cabrero (2009), pages 4 and 12. Cabrero notes that the role of regional minimum insertion schemes 
‘is secondary, residual in comparison with the other social protection schemes…, but even so, they 
are of growing importance in the general system of guaranteed income’ (ibid, page 13). 
344 Ibid, page 8.  See also Arriba and Ibáñez (2012), page 4: these programmes ‘aim at facilitating 
social insertion of the recipient families (along the lines of the early principles established by the 
French RMI). Such benefits were intended to provide monetary resources to those citizens potentially 
active in the labour market confronting situations of need’.  
345 Cabrero (2009), page 6. Arriba notes that common ‘quasi-universalitic’ entitlements can be 
identified, including the use of families as units of reference, means-testing of applicants and 
residence requirements (Arriba and Ibáñez (2012), page 9). 
346 Cabrero (2009), pages 8 and 6. See also Bahle, Hubl and Pfeifer (2011), page 139. 
347 For Spanish nationals residing abroad, assistance is determined annually by the emigration office, 
and returnees are entitled to an amount equalling the non-contributory retirement pension. For Spanish 
nationals residing abroad, assistance is determined annually by the emigration office, and returnees 
are entitled to an amount equalling the non-contributory retirement pension (European Commission 
(2011), Your social security rights in Spain, page 35). 
348 Ibid, page 34. See also Bahle, Hubl and Pfeifer (2011), page 138. 
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calendar years immediately preceding the date of the application’.349 A person is 
resident for these purposes if they are both legally and factually resident and 
domiciled in Spain.350 
Unemployment allowances are not directly conditioned by residence 
requirements in the same way as are non-contributory pensions, but rather receipt of 
both the ‘subsidio de desempleo’ and the ‘Renta Activa de Inserción Laboral’ is 
dependent upon an individual being registered as unemployed with the relevant 
authorities.351 An individual will cease to be registered if they go abroad, though 
registration is not interrupted by travelling for a period of 90 days or less within the 
European Union.352 Special provisions apply for determining the amount of these 
benefits to which returning emigrants are entitled: such persons are entitled to 
receive unemployment allowances for 18 months rather than six, and can get 
integration income and the basis of their status as a returning emigrant.353  
Catalan regulations on the minimum insertion income require an applicant 
both to be registered in a municipality of Catalonia, and to prove continuous and 
effective residence there for a period of one year prior to making the application.354 
Exceptions apply to this requirement: where the applicant has continuous and 
effective residence in Catalonia for four out of the previous five years, he will be 
eligible to receive minimum insertion income notwithstanding that he has not been 
                                                 
349 European Commission (2011), Your social security rights in Spain, page 34 
350 Article 10 of Real Decreto 357/1991 states that ‘El requisito de residencia legal para el 
reconocimiento y conservación del derecho a la pensión quedará acreditado siempre que teniendo el 
interesado domicilio en territorio español, resida en el mismo, ostentando la condición de residente’ 
(Real Decreto 357/1991, Boletín Oficial del Estado, núm. 69 de 21 de marzo de 1991, páginas 8958 a 
8963. <http://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-1991-7270> accessed 28 Feb 2013). 
351 European Commission (2011), Your social security rights in Spain, page 31; Ministerio de Empleo 
y Seguridad Social (Servicio Público de Empleo Estatal), Protección por desempleo: Subsidio de 
desempleo (2013), page 2; Servico Público de Empleo Estatal (Subdirección General de Prestaciones 
por Desempleo), Renta Activa de Inserción: Protección por desempleo (Catálogo de publicaciones de 
la Administración General del Estado 2013), page 5 
352 Servico Público de Empleo Estatal (Subdirección General de Prestaciones por Desempleo) (2013), 
page 6 
353 Ibid, page 6; Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social (Servicio Público de Empleo Estatal) 
(2013), page 1 
354 Miquel Àngel Purcalla Bonilla and others, La Renda Mínima d’inserció Catalana en el Sistema de 
Protecció Social (Generalitat de Catalunya. Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics 2006), pages 124-126. 
Absences for any reason of periods of less than 90 days in a year do not interrupt residence. A 
requirement of registration is found in the regulations of all Autonomous Communities (Cabrero 
(2009), page 15). See also Bahle, Hubl and Pfeifer (2011) page 139: ‘All programmes require a 
period of residence prior to the application for benefits (6-12 months), a condition that aims to 
prevent ‘welfare tourism’ due to the varying benefit levels among the regions’. 
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so resident for the previous year. Returning emigrants who are classified within the 
scope of ‘Catalan communities abroad’ do not have to fulfil a one year residence, and 
neither do women who have taken up residence in Catalonia in order to prevent 
abuse to themselves or their children.355 In contrast to other Autonomous 
Communities, Catalan regulations do not dissaply this one-year residence condition 
to persons moving within Spain from other Autonomous Communities, by way of 
reciprocity.356 
 
An individual’s entitlement to minimum income allowances in the UK is 
conditioned both by his immigration status and by the nature of his residence in the 
UK.357 These eligibility conditions are imposed in the form of two negative 
restrictions: in order to be eligible to receive income-related benefits an individual 
must be neither a ‘person subject to immigration control’, nor a ‘person from 
abroad’.358  
A ‘person subject to immigration control’ is a person who is not an EEA 
national, and who requires leave to enter or remain in the UK but does not have it, 
has leave to remain that is subject to restrictions on access to public funds, or has 
leave to enter or remain subject to a written undertaking by a third person assuming 
responsibility for their maintenance and accommodation.359 Application of this test 
creates a category of non-nationals that are exempt from the receipt of income-
related benefits, a-priori to any examination of their actual residence in the UK.360 In 
practice, the vast majority of third-country nationals granted leave to enter and 
remain in the UK are subject to conditions of no recourse to public funds, and will 
                                                 
355 Bonilla and others (2006), pages 127-128 
356 Ibid, page 128 
357 For a list of relevant secondary legislation and the primary legislation under which it was enacted, 
see Annex 3: Legislation determinative of minimum income guarantees in the UK, page 133. For a 
detailed consolidated summary of the relevant eligibility criteria see Annex 4: Eligibility criteria for 
receipt of minimum income allowances in the UK, page 134. 
358 These restrictions are imposed through a combination of immigration and social security 
legislation.  
359 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, s115. This category also includes persons who have 
continuation of leave to enter or remain subject to an impending decision on an appeal against refusal 
to vary limited leave or grant asylum. 
360 The exclusion applies to all of the income-related benefits noted above, plus some other forms of 
non-contributory benefits. Exceptions apply to the general exclusion of persons subject to immigration 
control, for example in circumstances in which the sponsor has died, or if the remittances that a 
‘person subject to immigration control’ receives from abroad are temporarily interrupted. 
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thus be ineligible to receive income-assessed benefits by virtue of their status as a 
‘person subject to immigration control’.361  
Persons who are not exempt from the receipt of income-related benefits in the 
UK by virtue of their status as a ‘person subject to immigration control’ must 
demonstrate ‘habitual residence’ in the UK362 in order to receive income-related 
benefits.363 The condition of ‘habitual residence’ is comprised of both a legal and a 
factual element. Regulations stipulate that no person will be ‘habitually resident’ 
unless they have a ‘right to reside’ in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the 
Isle of Man or the Republic of Ireland, and the regulations identify three categories 
of EU Citizens and their family members who do not have a ‘right to reside’ for 
these purposes.364 The consequence of these provisions is that persons exercising a 
three-month unconditional right of residence in the UK under EU law, persons 
exercising an extended right of residence in the UK under EU law who are 
jobseekers or the family members of jobseekers, and persons exercising a right of 
                                                 
361 Social Security Advisory Committee, Report by the Social Security Advisory Committee under 
Section 174(1) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 and the statement by the Secretary of 
State for Social Security in accordance with Section 174(2) of that Act (HMSO 1994), page 7 
362 Or in the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man or the Republic of Ireland. 
363 Persons who are not habitually resident in the UK are considered to be ‘persons from abroad’ and 
are not eligible for income-related benefits. UK regulations stipulate certain categories of EU citizens 
and their family members for whom the ‘habitual residence’ requirement is waived. These persons 
are: a) Member State national workers and self-employed persons; b) Member State nationals who 
have retained the status of worker or self-employed persons because they are temporarily unable to 
work due to illness, or are in involuntary unemployment; c) Family members of persons stated in (a) 
and (b); d) Persons who have acquired a right of permanent residence in the UK under Art 17 
Directive 2004/38/EC (Exemptions for persons no longer working in the host Member State and their 
family members); e) Bulgarian or Romanian nationals who hold an accession worker authorisation 
document and who are working in accordance with the conditions set out in that document. (See 
Jobseeker’s Allowance Regulations 1996 (S.I. 1996/207), Regulation 85A(4)(a) – (f);  
Income Support (General) Regulations 1987 (S.I. 1987/1967), Regulation 21AA(4)(a) – (f); 
Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008 (S.I. 2008/794), Regulation 70(4)(a) – (f); 
Housing Benefit Regulations (S.I. 2006/ 213), Regulation 10(3B)(a) – (f); 
Council Tax Benefit Regulations 2006 (S.I. 2006/215), Regulation 7(4A)(a) – (f); and 
State Pension Credit Regulations 2002 (S.I. 2002/1792) Regulation 2(4)(a) – (f)). 
364 These persons are a) persons exercising their three-month unconditional right of residence in the 
UK under EU law; b) persons with extended right of residence in the UK under EU law who are 
jobseekers or the family members of jobseekers; and c) persons with a right to reside in the UK under 
EU law as the primary carer of a British citizen (a ‘Ruiz Zambrano’ right of residence). By way of 
exception, persons exercising an extended right of residence as jobseekers are not exempt from 
receiving income-assessed jobseekers allowance. (See 
Jobseeker’s Allowance Regulations 1996 (S.I. 1996/207), Regulation 85A(2) and (3); 
Income Support (General) Regulations 1987 (S.I. 1987/1967), Regulation 21AA(2) and (3); 
Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008 (S.I. 2008/794), Regulation 70(2) and (3); and  
Housing Benefit Regulations (S.I. 2006/ 213), Regulation 10(2) and (3)) 
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residence in the UK under EU law as the primary carer of a British citizen, are all 
prevented from accessing income-related social benefits in the UK.  
Persons who are not exempted from receipt of benefits by virtue of their 
status as a ‘person subject to immigration control’ or through application of the ‘right 
to reside’ element of the habitual residence test must demonstrate actual habitual 
residence in the UK at the time of application in order to be eligible to receive 
benefits. Actual habitual residence is an objective test that focusses upon the ‘fact 
and nature’ of a person’s residence.365 ‘Residence’ for this purpose requires a ‘more 
settled state than merely physical presence in a country’, such that an individual 
‘must be seen to be making a home’ there.366 The ‘habitual’ nature of that residence 
is a question of fact to be determined by reference to ‘the length, continuity and 
general nature’ of a person’s actual residence:367 residence is habitual only after an 
‘appreciable period of time’ of actual residence, which will vary depending on the 
circumstances of each case.368 Factors that are relevant to the determination of the 
period of residence required before it may be considered ‘habitual’ include ‘bringing 
possessions, doing everything necessary to establish residence before coming, having 
a right of abode, seeking to bring family, [and having] "durable ties" with the 
country of residence or intended residence’.369 
 
 The residence requirements that condition receipt of minimum income 
allowances in both the UK and Spain do not simply refer to an individual’s 
authorised presence within the territory at the time of the application, but rather 
                                                 
365 Decision CIS/1067/1995.  See also Nessa v. Chief Adjucation Officer [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1937, in 
which Lord Slynn noted that ‘as a matter of ordinary language a person is not habitually resident in 
any country unless he has taken up residence and lived there for a period’ (page 1942, Para E). 
366 Decision CIS/1067/1995, para. 19 
367 Ibid, para. 20 
368 Ibid, paras. 27-28. See also Nessa v. Chief Adjucation Officer [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1937: ‘It is a 
question of fact to be decided on the date where the determination has to be made on the 
circumstances of each case whether and when that habitual residence had been established…The 
requisite period is not a fixed period. It may be longer where there are doubts. It may be short’ (1942 
para H – 1943 para A). 
369 Ibid, at page 1942, Para H. Commissioner’s Decision CIS/4474/03 has stated that a ‘period of 
between one and three months is likely to be appropriate to demonstrate that a person’s residence is 
habitual in nature. Cogent reasons should be given where a period longer than three months is 
considered necessary’. The claimant must provide evidence in support of these factors but if 
challenged in court the burden of proof lies with the Department of Work and Pensions to prove, on 
the balance of probabilities, that a claimant is not habitually resident for the purposes of receipt of 
social assistance (Steven Kennedy, ‘EEA nationals: the ‘right to reside’ requirement for benefits’ 
(House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/SP/5972 2011), page 7). 
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require that an individual satisfy an extended period of residence prior to making the 
application. Residence requirements in this sense serve both to contain welfare 
provision within the territorial boundaries of the polity, and also identify persons 
eligible to receive benefits by reason of their established links within the society.370 
The objectivity of the residence requirements is greater in the Spanish system, in 
which a proscribed length of residence (five years in the case of disability 
allowances, and 10 for retirement allowances) suffices to demonstrate that an 
individual has the required link with Spain. The ‘habitual residence’ test applied in 
the UK is more subjective - the period of time required for an applicant to prove a 
sufficient degree of social integration varies on a case-by case basis, with reference 
drawn from such factors as family ties.371 
The right to receive minimum income allowances in the UK and Spain is thus 
conditioned primarily by reference to residence (in the sense of physical presence in 
the territory), and by social integration (in the form of extended residence 
requirements), rather than by nationality. Non-resident nationals are exempted from 
receipt of these allowances by application of the residence criteria, and are thus 
ineligible to receive minimum income allowances from the state of which they 
formally are members.372 Conversely, non-nationals may be eligible to receive 
minimum income allowances from the State by virtue of their residence and social 
integration.  
                                                 
370 The UK Supreme Court has recognised that the residence requirements seek to ensure that ‘that the 
claimant has achieved economic integration or a sufficient degree of social integration in the United 
Kingdom or elsewhere in the Common Travel Area as a pre-condition of entitlement to the benefit’ 
(Patmalniece v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2011] UKSC 11, para 46). 
371 A variety of indicators that might be used to ascertain whether an individual has acquired habitual 
residence in the UK are outlined in the caseworker guidance issued by the Department of Work and 
Pensions. They include such questions as: ‘What did the claimant do to establish his/her residence in 
the United Kingdom before arriving here?’; ‘What has the claimant done to bring his/her possessions 
with him/her to the United Kingdom?’; ‘Does the claimant have a family – spouse or children? If 
he/she does and they are not in the United Kingdom with him/her, does he/she intend that they will 
join him/her in the United Kingdom?’; ‘What existing ties does the claimant have with the United 
Kingdom?’; and ‘Did the claimant bring any money with him/her to assist him/her in settling in the 
United Kingdom?’ (Department of Work and Pensions, ‘Code of Appeals Procedure (Appendix 7a: 
Response paragraphs – habitual residence)’ (2009) <http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/app07a.pdf> 
accessed 4 Nov 2102). 
372 Though, as noted above, this is subject to exception in Spain, where a special minimum income 
allowance is available to Spanish emigrants. A significant number of returning UK nationals are 
ineligible to receive income-related benefits by virtue of application of the habitual residence, test: in 
the twelve months to the end of November 2008, 2,948 British nationals failed the test (Kennedy 
(2011), page 3). 
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Within these parameters, nationality does, however, continue to be a relevant 
factor in determining eligibility to receive minimum income allowances in both the 
UK and Spain. A large proportion of resident non-nationals are exempt from receipt 
of minimum income allowances in the UK by virtue of their immigration status, 
irrespective of the length of time for which they are resident. Returning emigrants in 
Spain are afforded privileged rights when accessing minimum income allowances, 
and Spanish nationals can under certain circumstances access a specific minimum 
allowance when residing outwith Spanish territory. Social integration (inferred 
through a period of extended residence) is thus the predominant but not sole 
determinator of receipt of minimum income allowances, for which purpose an 
individual’s nationality continues to be of significance. 
 
 
 EU competence to allocate social rights: EU law right of equal 3.3.
access to minimum income allowances 
The conditions under which an individual is entitled to receive minimum income 
allowances within the UK and Spanish welfare systems is no longer determined 
exclusively within the competence of the respective legislatures responsible for the 
provision of those benefits. European Union law grants certain persons a right to 
work and/or reside in the UK and Spain, and grants to them a right of equal treatment 
with nationals of that State in the receipt of social benefits for the duration of their 
residence.  
 
3.3.1. Background: co-ordination of social security and scope of right of 
equal treatment 
Since the European Economic Community was first conceived it was recognised that 
territorially-bounded systems of social security presented a potential obstacle to the 
free movement of workers within a common market.373 Two possible solutions to 
this problem presented themselves: the harmonisation of Member State social 
                                                 
373 Rob Cornelison notes that the ‘principle of territorially’ refers to the ‘freedom of Member States to 
use …territorial elements in defining the scope of their social security schemes’, a freedom which, he 
notes, ‘could have harmful consequences for people moving from one state to another’ (Rob 
Cornelissen, ‘Achievements of 50 years of European Social Security Coordination’ in Yves Jorens 
(ed), 50 years of Social Security Coordination: Past – Present – Future (European Commission (DG 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities) 2009), page55). 
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security systems – either through the adoption of common minimum standards, or 
through the approximation of laws – or through the co-ordination of systems by their 
mutual adjustment in so far as they concern migrant nationals.374  
Despite attempts by the French Prime Minister during negotiations on the Treaty of 
Rome to proceed on the basis of harmonization of social security systems,375 the 
latter option of co-ordination prevailed and was written into Article 51 of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community. This provision is now contained in 
Article 48 TFEU, and states that ‘[t]he European Parliament and Council shall, 
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, adopt such measures 
in the field of social security as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for 
workers’.376 
 
Co-ordination of social security systems between Member States 
Co-ordination of social security between Member States is achieved through four 
main mechanisms: determination of the Member State’s legislation to which an 
individual is subject; prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nationality vis-
à-vis nationals of that state; protection of ‘rights in the course of acquisition’, 
through the ‘aggregation of periods of insurance and/or residence spent in each of 
the respective countries’; and protection of rights already acquired, through allowing 
for the exportability of social benefits.377 These four aspects of co-ordination are 
                                                 
374 Simon Roberts, ‘A Short History of Social Security Coordination’ in Yves Jorens (ed), 50 years of 
Social Security Coordination: Past – Present – Future (European Commission (DG Employment, 
Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities) 2009), page 16. Roberts explains that ‘[c]o-ordination adjusts 
social security schemes in relation to each other to protect the entitlements of migrants while leaving 
national schemes in tact in other respects’. 
375 Fritz W.  Scharpf, The European Social Model (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 645, 
page 646; Roberts (2009), page 16 
376 The wording of Art 48 TFEU differs in some respects from Art 51 EEC: whereas Art 48TFEU 
allows for measures to be adopted through the ordinary legislative procedure, Art 51 EEC required 
unanimous approval by the Council. Art 48 TFEU also contains an additional provision, whereby a 
member of the Council may refer the proposed measure for consideration by the European Council, 
where it considers that the draft measure would ‘affect important aspects of its social security system, 
including its scope, cost, or financial structure, or would affect the balance of that system’. 
377 Roberts (2009), page 18. See also Sean Van Raepenbusch, ‘The Role of the European Court of 
Justice in the Development of Social Security Law of Persons Moving Within the European Union’ in 
Yves Jorens (ed), 50 years of Social Security Coordination: Past – Present – Future (European 
Commission (DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities) 2009). Art 51 EEC expressly 
stated that measures enacted thereunder must make arrangements to secure the aggregation of periods 
under the laws of several countries for the purpose of determining benefits, and to secure the payment 
of benefits to persons resident in the territories of Member States.  
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contained in Regulation 883/2004 on the co-ordination of social security systems, 
which was enacted under what is now Article 48 TFEU (at that time Article 42 
EC).378 The general rule is that an individual is subject to the legislation of the 
Member State in which he is pursuing an activity as an employed or self-employed 
person, or otherwise in the Member State in which he is resident.379 Equality of 
treatment with nationals of the competent Member State is set out in Article 4 of the 
Regulation, which states that ‘Unless otherwise provided for by this Regulation, 
persons to whom this Regulation applies shall enjoy the same benefits and be subject 
to the same obligations under the legislation of any Member State as the nationals 
thereof’.  
 
Material scope of co-ordination: social benefits 
 
The right of equal treatment for persons falling within the scope of the Regulation is 
enjoyed in respect of the ten ‘branches’ of social security to which the Regulation 
applies. 380 The Regulation applies ‘to general and special social security schemes, 
whether contributory or non-contributory’,381 but does not apply to ‘social and 
medical assistance’. The CJEU has consistently held that ‘a benefit may be regarded 
as a social security benefit in so far as it is granted, without any individual and 
discretionary assessment of personal needs, to recipients on the basis of a legally 
defined position and provided that it concerns one of the risks expressly listed’ in the 
ten branches of social security.382  
Social welfare provisions that are classified as ‘social assistance’ (and which 
are thus outwith the scope of Regulation 883/2004) may nevertheless still fall within 
                                                 
378 Regulation 883/2004, OJ L 166, 30.4.2004, pages 1–123. The Regulation was enacted in order to 
‘modernise and simply’ its predecessor, Regulation 1408/71, OJ L 149, 5.7.1971, pages 2–50 (see 
Regulation 883/2004 Preamble, point 3). 
379 Regulation 883/2004, Articles 11-16. Where an individual falls under the legislation of a given 
Member State, that Member State is referred to as the ‘competent’ Member State. 
380 Those ten branches are: sickness benefits; maternity and equivalent paternity benefits; invalidity 
benefits; old-age benefits; survivors' benefits; benefits in respect of accidents at work and 
occupational diseases; death grants; unemployment benefits; pre-retirement benefits; and family 
benefits (Regulation 883/2004, Article 3(1)). 
381 Ibid,, Article 3(2) 
382 Case C-78/91, Hughes v Chief Adjudication Officer [1992] ECR I-4839, paragraph 15. Referenced 
also in: Joined Cases 379/85 to 381/85 and 93/86, CRAM Rhône-Alpes v Giletti [1987] ECR 955, 
paragraph 11; and Case 249/83, Hoeckx v. Openbaar Centrum voor MaatschappelijkWelzijn [1985] 
ECR 973, paragraphs 12 to 14).  
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the scope of equal treatment under EU law. Migrant workers are entitled to equal 
treatment in respect of ‘social advantages’, which the CJEU has broadly defined to 
be ‘all those which, whether or not linked to a contract of employment, are generally 
granted to national workers primarily because of their objective status as workers or 
by virtue of the mere fact of their residence on the national territory’.383 Moreover, 
the development of European Citizenship has conferred a general right of equal 
treatment upon Union citizens in the receipt of social advantages, independently of 
their economic status.384 That right to equality is subject to certain limitations that 
are intended to ensure that migrant EU Citizens and their family members do not 
become an ‘unreasonable burden’ on the host Member State: a Member State ‘shall 
not be obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during the first three months 
of residence or, where appropriate, the longer period provided for in Article 14(4)(b) 
[retention of right of residence by jobseekers]’.385 The CJEU has held that conditions 
imposed upon access to social advantages can be justified only to the extent that 
those conditions serve to establish ‘that a genuine link exists between the person 
seeking work and the employment market of that State’ (in the case of jobseekers’ 
                                                 
383 Case 207/78, Ministère Public v Even [1979] ECR 02019, para. 22 
384 Case C-85/96, María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998 ECR Page I-02691], para 61 – 63; 
Case C-184/99, Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] 
ECR I-06193 paras 32-39; Case C-456/02, Michel Trojani v Centre public d'aide sociale de Bruxelles 
(CPAS) [2004] ECR I-07573. This general right has since been included in Art 24(1) of Directive 
2004/38/EC, which states that ‘all Union citizens residing on the basis of this Directive in the territory 
of the host Member State shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State within 
the scope of the Treaty’. 
385 Directive 2004/38/EC Art 24(2). Protections of Member States’ welfare systems are also built into 
the right to reside itself – persons seeking residence for the purpose of study and those seeking 
residence on the grounds of independent means must have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in 
the host Member State and have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to 
become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period of 
residence (Directive 2004/38/EC Arts 7(1)(b) and (C); Art 14(1)). 
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allowance),386 or, in the case of maintenance grants for students, that a student has 
‘demonstrated a certain degree of integration into the society of that State’.387 
With the exception of income-support in the UK, all of the minimum income 
allowances examined above are ‘social benefits’ to which a right of equality attaches 
under Regulation 883/2004: those minimum income allowances are all granted on 
the basis of a legally defined position and ‘without any individual and discretionary 
assessment of personal needs’,388 and fall within one of the ten branches of social 
security stipulated in the Regulation.389 Income-support in the UK had previously 
been considered as a social benefit falling within the scope of co-ordination 
regulations,390 but the nature of that allowance has been adapted such that it no 
longer falls within one of the stipulated branches of social security.391 It is now 
                                                 
386 Case C-138/02, Brian Francis Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2004] ECR I-
02703: ‘The existence of such a link may be determined, in particular, by establishing that the person 
concerned has, for a reasonable period, in fact genuinely sought work in the Member State in 
question’ (paras 69-70). The benefit under question was jobseekers’ allowance. See also Joined Cases 
C-22/08 and C-23/08, Athanasios Vatsouras and Josif Koupatantze v Arbeitsgemeinschaft (ARGE) 
Nürnberg 900 [2009] ECR I-04585, in which the Court held that ‘in view of the establishment of 
citizenship of the Union and the interpretation of the right to equal treatment enjoyed by citizens of 
the Union, it is no longer possible to exclude from the scope of Article 39(2) EC [now Article 45(2) 
TFEU] a benefit of a financial nature intended to facilitate access to employment in the labour market 
of a Member State’ (para 37). See further text below at n.422. 
387 Case C-209/03, The Queen, on the application of Dany Bidar v London Borough of Ealing and 
Secretary of State for Education and Skills [2005] ECR I-02119: ‘The existence of a certain degree of 
integration may be regarded as established by a finding that the student in question has resided in the 
host Member State for a certain length of time’ (paras 57-59). 
388 Rentas mínimas de inserción provided by Autonomous Communities may or may not be classified 
as a social benefit within the scope of the Regulation. This will depend upon whether receipt of the 
allowance is discretionary (in Catalonia receipt is non-discretionary, but this is not the case in other 
Autonomous Communities), and whether it is granted by reason of ancillary cover to one of the 
stipulated branches of social security. 
389 Income-assessed jobseeker's allowance (UK) and non-contributory benefits for unemployed 
persons (ES) fall within the branch of ‘Employment benefits’; Income-related employment and 
support allowance (UK), and non-contributory social security pensions (disability) (ES) fall within 
branches of ‘invalidity’/‘sickness’ benefits; State pension credit (UK) and non-contributory social 
security pensions (retirement) (ES) fall within the branch of ‘retirement benefits’.  
390 Income-support had been classed as a ‘special non-contributory cash benefit’ under Regulation 
1408/71 
391 In a briefing produced by the European select committee in 2010, the then Minister for 
Employment, Chris Grayling, is quoted as explaining that ‘Income Support is no longer a social 
security benefit but a social assistance benefit, as the extent of coverage and purpose of the benefit 
has changed over time, and social assistance benefits are not covered by the coordination rules. 
Additionally the list is amended to reflect the introduction of Employment and Support Allowance 
(income related) which replaces Income Support for those who are sick. The UK asked for both of 
these changes’ (UK Parliament, ‘Documents considered by the European Scrutiny Committee on 2 
February 2011’ (2011)  <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmeuleg/428-
xv/42807.htm#note18> accessed 18 Nov 2012, para 5.15). 
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classed as social assistance, and thus falls outwith the scope of equal treatment 
conferred by Regulation 883/2004.  
 Exportability of social benefits is secured within Article 7 of the Regulation, 
which states that ‘cash benefits payable under the legislation of one or more Member 
States or under this Regulation shall not be subject to any reduction, amendment, 
suspension, withdrawal or confiscation on account of the fact that the beneficiary or 
the members of his/her family reside in a Member State other than that in which the 
institution responsible for providing benefits is situated.’ The effect of this 
requirement is that Member States who otherwise condition receipt of social benefits 
by reference to residence criteria must disapply those conditions to persons who are 
insured within their system by virtue of Regulation 883/2004, and who reside 
elsewhere. 
The general rule that social benefits are exportable, and thus cannot be 
conditioned by reference to a residence requirement, is subject to exception for 
‘special non-contributory cash benefits’. These benefits are defined by reference to 
their non-contributory nature (‘the conditions for providing and for calculating the 
benefits are not dependent on any contribution in respect of the beneficiary’), and 
‘special’ intent to provide ‘supplementary, substitute or ancillary cover’ against the 
risks covered by the ten branches of social security in order to ‘guarantee the 
persons concerned a minimum subsistence income’.392 All of the UK minimum 
income allowances examined above (with the exception of income-support which, it 
has been noted, is not a ‘social benefit’ within the meaning of the Regulation) are 
classified as special non-contributory cash benefits within Annex X of the 
Regulation.393 Of the three minimum income allowances available in Spain, non-
                                                 
392 Or to provide solely for the ‘specific protection for the disabled, closely linked to the said person's 
social environment in the Member State concerned’ (Regulation 883/2004, Article 70). 
393 Despite their classification under Regulation 883/2004 as special non-contributory cash benefits, 
UK regulations still, however, allow for the exportability of these benefits through the disapplication 
of the habitual residence requirement for the following persons:  
a) Member State national workers and self-employed persons 
b) Member State nationals who have retained the status of worker or self-employed persons because 
they are temporarily unable to work due to illness, or are in involuntary unemployment 
c) Family members of persons stated in (a) and (b) 
d) Persons who have acquired a right of permanent residence in the UK under Art 17 Directive 




contributory social security pensions and minimum integration allowances provided 
by the Autonomous Communities are classified as special non-contributory cash 
benefits.394 
Unemployment allowances granted by the Spanish State in the form of 
‘subsidio de desempleo’ and the ‘Renta Activa de Inserción Laboral’ are not classed 
as special non-contributory cash benefits, but are nevertheless subject to special 
provisions that curtail their exportability in order to provide ‘a fairer financial 
balance between Member States in the case of unemployed persons who reside in a 
Member State other than the competent State’.395 Entitlement to these benefits is 
‘retained for a period of three months from the date when the unemployed person 
ceased to be available to the employment services of the Member State which he/she 
left’.396 
Member States (and sub-state polities) are thus required under EU law to 
extend minimum income allowances on an equal basis to persons falling within the 
scope of the Regulation who are resident within their territory. Residence is defined 
within the Regulation as ‘the place where a person habitually resides’,397 which is a 
matter to be determined by reference to ‘the duration and continuity of presence on 
the territory of the Member States concerned’ and ‘the person’s situation’, including 
‘the nature and the specific characteristics of any activity pursued, in particular the 
place where such activity is habitually pursued, the stability of the activity, and the 
duration of any work contract’, ‘his family status and family ties’, and ‘the exercise 
of any non-remunerated activity’.398 EU law does not, however, confer entitlement to 
minimum income allowances upon persons who are otherwise insured in the UK and 
                                                                                                                                          
e) Bulgarian or Romanian nationals who hold an accession worker authorisation document and who 
are working in accordance with the conditions set out in that document (see list of legislation at 
n.363). 
394 Where those allowances are non-discretionary and supplement the receipt of non-contributory 
pensions, and thus are ‘social benefits’ within the meaning of the Regulation. 
395 Decision No U4 concerning the reimbursement procedures under Article 65(6) and (7) of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Article 70 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009, OJ C 57, 25.2.2012, 
pages 4–5 
396 Regulation 883/2004, Article 64. This provision correlates to the residence requirements under 
Spanish law discussed above, which allow a person to continue to receive the benefits when travelling 
within the Union for a period of up to 90 days. 
397 Regulation 883/2004, Article 1(j) 
398 Regulation 987/2009, Article 11, OJ L 284, 30.10.2009, pages 1–42 
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Spain (by virtue of their economic activity there), but who reside outwith the 
territory of the respective States. 
 
Personal scope 
The provisions of Regulation 883/2004 apply to ‘nationals of a Member State, 
stateless persons and refugees residing in a Member State who are or have been 
subject to the legislation of one or more Member States, as well as to the members of 
their families and to their survivors’, and to ‘the survivors of persons who have been 
subject to the legislation of one or more Member States, irrespective of the 
nationality of such persons, where their survivors are nationals of a Member State or 
stateless persons or refugees residing in one of the Member States.’399 
The combined provisions of the Regulation entitle such persons who are ‘habitually 
resident’ in the UK or Spain to receive minimum income allowances on equal terms 
with nationals of those States.400 By way of exception, family members of EU 
citizens are not entitled to equal treatment in the receipt of income-assessed 
jobseekers’ allowance in the UK, or unemployment benefits in the form of ‘subsidio 
de desempleo’ or ‘Renta Activa de Inserción Laboral’ in Spain: as unemployment 
benefits, these minimum income allowances belong to a set of primary benefits that 
are available only to EU citizens.401 
                                                 
399 The initial regulation in this field - Regulation No 3 of 1958, OJ 17, 6.10.1958, pages 406–416 - 
referred to ‘wage-earners and other assimilated workers’, but this definition was replaced in 
Regulation 1408/71 to refer to workers and family members. It was amended in 1981 to extend to 
self-employed persons and their family members (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1390/81, OJ L 143, 
29.5.1981, pages 1–32), and again in 1999 to cover students and their family members (Council 
Regulation (EC) No 307/1999, OJ L 38, 12.2.1999, pages 1–5).  Adaptations in Regulation 883/2004 
to include all nationals (rather than just economically active) reflect increased scope as a result of 
Court’s use of case-law having linked right of equality directly to status of European Citizenship, and 
bring in line with provisions of Directive 2004/38/EC that grant right of equality to all European 
Citizens (Case C-85/96, María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-02691; Case C-
184/99, Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-
06193). Van Raepenbusch notes that ‘under the impulse of [the Court of Justice], Regulations (EEC) 
Nos 1408/71 and 574/72 have also become instruments of intended to guarantee the right of European 
Citizens to move and to reside freely within the European Union, independently of the exercise of any 
economic activity’ (Van Raepenbusch (2009), page 33). 
400 Family members for this purpose are defined by the national legislation under which the benefit is 
granted. Where there is no definition of family member provided under that legislation, family 
member is ‘the spouse, minor children, and dependent children who have reached the age of majority 
shall be considered members of the family’ (Regulation 883/2004 Article 1(i)). 
401 The CJEU had previously held that family members were entitled to equal treatment only in 
respect of ‘derived rights, acquired through their status as a member of the family or a survivor of a 
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This right to equality in receipt of minimum income allowances has also been 
extended to certain other resident third-country nationals by legislation enacted under 
Article 79 TFEU (which confers a competence to define the rights of third-country 
nationals legally resident in a Member State). The personal scope of the right to 
equality under EU law in the receipt of minimum income allowances differs between 
the UK and Spain, as the UK has opted out of the majority of these provisions 
concerning third-country nationals. The United Kingdom is required under EU law to 
extend minimum income allowances to resident third-country national workers, self-
employed persons and students and their family members who are in cross-border 
situations.402 Spain, by contrast, is required to extend minimum income allowances 
to all third-country nationals who are in cross border situations and their family 
members (including those who are not economically active),403 to third-country 
nationals who are ‘long-term residents’ in Spain,404 and also under certain 
circumstances to third-country national workers who are not in a cross-border 
situation.405 The differing application of EU law in the UK and Spain results from 
exercise of the UK’s ‘opt-outs’ to legislation enacted under Title V TFEU, and is an 
example of the horizontal de iure asymmetry that manifests between Member States 
as a result of the variable geometry of EU law. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
worker’, with the result that for a long period of time they were not entitled to any of the (personal) 
minimum income allowances under discussion (Case 40/76, Slavica Kermaschek v Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeit [1976] ECR 01669). A later judgment of the Court curtailed this principle, ruling that family 
members are entitled to receive personal benefits other than those that were specifically conferred 
upon a person by reason of their status as a worker (Case C-308/93 Bestuur van de Sociale 
Verzekeringsbank v J.M. Cabanis-Issarte [1996] ECR I-02097, paras 23-34). 
402 Having opted out of Regulation 1231/2010 (see n.403, below), the UK continues to apply 
Regulation 859/2003 (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, pages 1–3), extending the (otherwise repealed) provisions 
of Regulation 1408/71 to third-country nationals in cross-border situations. 
403 Regulation 1231/2010, extending Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 
to nationals of third countries who are not already covered by these Regulations solely on the ground 
of their nationality, OJ L 344, 29.12.2010, pages 1–3  
404 Article 11 of Directive 2003/109/EC 
405 Third-country national workers enjoy a right of equal treatment with nationals of the Member State 
in which they reside under Article 12 of Directive 2011/98 (supra, n.306). Directive 2011/98 allows 
for Member States to restrict the right of equal treatment conferred upon third-country national 
workers under Article 12, but stipulates that Member States ‘shall not restrict such rights for third-
country workers who are in employment or who have been employed for a minimum period of six 
months and who are registered as unemployed’. 
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3.3.2. Summary: EU allocation of minimum income allowances in the UK and 
Spain 
Minimum income allowances secure a ‘safety net’ in order to guarantee a minimum 
standard of living that is acceptable to the society. In both the UK and Spain, those 
allowances – as a benefit of social membership – are conditioned primarily by 
reference to extended residence requirements (as an indicator of social integration), 
and are subject to certain restrictions that privilege nationals and exempt non-
nationals.  
The parameters of equal membership are subject to influence the of EU 
competence to allocate and to control access to social goods and services: EU law 
confers certain rights of residence in the UK and Spain, with the result that a higher 
volume of people are able to access minimum income allowances by virtue of their 
residence within the State territory.406 Moreover, third-country national residents 
who would otherwise be ineligible to receive such allowances under national 
principles of allocation in the UK are entitled to receive minimum income 
allowances by virtue of the right of equal treatment. The effect of EU membership 
competences on equal membership is thus twofold: it both presents a challenge to the 
sustainability of minimum income allowances by reason of a larger volume of 
resident persons, but also changes the classes of persons who fall within the scope of 
equal membership, and thus the very basis on which equal membership is allocated. 
The concession in the scheme of social security co-ordination to the non-
exportability of minimum income allowances has gone some way to mitigating this 
tension, in that it allows Member States to continue to frame equality of membership 








                                                 
406 For a summary of EU allocation of minimum income allowances in the UK, see Annex 5: EU law 
entitlements to minimum income allowances in the UK, page 136. 
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 Reactive exercise of state and sub-state competences 3.4.
3.4.1. Free-movement, co-ordination of social security and ‘welfare tourism’ 
The free movement of persons throughout the Union and the right of equal treatment 
to receipt of social security benefits that it entails has prompted concern from some 
Member States over the possibilities for ‘welfare tourism’ – a pejorative term that 
supposes that persons exercise their rights of free movement in such a way as to 
maximise the social welfare benefits to which they are entitled, and in so doing are in 
some way ‘abusing’ the welfare systems of Member States.407 Fears over ‘welfare 
tourism’ have grown in political salience in tandem with the expanding scope of EU 
social security co-ordination, in which a growing number of persons are entitled to a 
right to equality by reason both of an extension of rights to non-economically active 
European Citizens, and also through admission of new Member State nationals to 
that class of persons through successive enlargements of the Union.  
Notwithstanding that empirical studies have found little or no correlation 
between welfare standards and migratory patterns (suggesting that social welfare 
does not constitute the ‘pull factor’ that is assumed by those who fear ‘welfare 
tourism’),408 the prominence of this issue in the domestic political arena – especially 
in those states in which there is an identifiable ‘Eurosceptic’ outlook – has led to the 
suggestion that welfare co-ordination could prompt a ‘race to the bottom’. In the 
absence of any minimum welfare standards, the argument goes, states are 
                                                 
407 Initial use of this terminology as part of a political agenda in the UK has been attributed to 
Conservative Home Secretary Peter Lilley in 1993 (Kennedy (2011), page 5; Philip Larkin, Migrants, 
social security, and the 'right to reside': a licence to discriminate? (2007) 14 Journal of Social 
Security Law 61, page 64). The same issue has been represented in less loaded terms within the phrase 
‘welfare migration’, in a field of study that seeks empirical evidence of the extent to which migration 
patterns are driven by welfare standards (see, e.g., Corrado Giulietti and Jackline Wahba, (2012) 
Welfare Migration (Centre for Population Change Working Paper Number 18) ESRC Centre for 
Population and Change 
<http://www.cpc.ac.uk/publications/2012_Welfare_Migration_WP18_Giulietti_et_al.pdf> accessed 
28 Feb 2013). 
408 A study conducted prior to the 2004 enlargement projected that there was ‘little empirical evidence 
to support the assumption that welfare states with generous benefits and accessible labour markets 
will become magnets for welfare migration’ (Jon Kvist, Does EU enlargement start a race to the 
bottom? Strategic interaction among EU member states in social policy (2004) 14 Journal of 
European Social Policy 301, page 1). This projection was supported in a study in 2012, which found 
that ‘it is plausible to conclude that fears about immigrant abuse of welfare systems are somewhat 
unfounded or at least exaggerated. Overall the empirical evidence on the welfare magnet hypothesis 
is mixed’ (Corrado Giulietti and Jackline Wahba, (2012), page 23). 
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incentivised to curtail the provision of social welfare in order to protect its 
sustainability.  
There are three potential ways in which a state may exercise its membership 
competences so as to mitigate the impact of EU law upon welfare provision: they 
may reduce the level of welfare provision available, in order to reduce potential 
‘pull’ factors and to accommodate the increased number of persons entitled to access 
those benefits (with the result that welfare provision becomes broader and thinner); 
they may attempt to increase the threshold required of social integration through 
making more strenuous those residence requirements that condition receipt of 
minimum income allowances; or they may seek to condition initial access to those 
benefits through revocation of rights of residence and control over access to the 
labour market. 
 Of the first, it is difficult to ascertain with any certainty a causality between 
levels of national welfare expenditure and the extension of social rights under EU 
law. At a purely abstract level it is clearly somewhat self-defeating for states to 
reduce welfare standards in order to secure their protection, and we might assume 
that such action would be one of last resort when faced with economic necessity.409 
What is worthy of note, however, is that there is evidence to suggest that the general 
process of European integration is in certain Member States responsible for an 
increase in general welfare standards. This trend has been observed in Spain, where 
the enhancement of social security provisions throughout the 1980s and 1990s has 
been attributed in part to the ‘positive pressure’ asserted by open co-ordination of the 
European social model during a period of significant transformation of the Spanish 
                                                 
409 Such necessity has been evidenced in Spanish austerity programmes, instigated in response to the 
global economic crisis and enhanced under the terms of the European bailout of Spanish banks in late 
2012. The Toledo Pact of 2010 ‘envisages extensive pension reform and is supposed to achieve cuts to 
the value of four per cent of GDP by 2030’ (Arne Heise and Hanna Lierse, The Effects of European 
Austerity Programmes on Social Security Systems (2011) 2 Modern Economy 498, page 505). There 
has since been further reduction in welfare expenditure in both Spain and the UK: ‘In Spain, public 
wages, public hiring and minimum wages were frozen and measures introduced in April 2012 
imposed a cut of 10 billion euro per year in healthcare and education benefits. In the UK, 
infrastructure investment was increased but there was a cut in family policies and the introduction of 
a single tier pension for future retires despite the reduction of corporate tax’ (Piera Sciama, Austerity: 
endangering the Welfare States, endangering Europe? Nouvelle Europe (2013) 
<http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/en/austerity-endangering-welfare-states-endangering-europe> 
accessed 1 March 2013). 
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welfare system.410 One study on the impact of accession to the EU on the redesign of 
the Spanish welfare system in 2007 found that: 
‘significant Europeanization has taken place [in Spain]…qualitative 
progress in terms of gains in equity and social citizenship is 
notorious. Such progress was especially intense from the mid 1980s 
to the early 1990s. In particular, social citizenship was enhanced in 
the fields of healthcare, non-contributory benefits, social services for 
dependent people, and labour insertion policies.’411 
Whereas there is little evidence to suggest that the growing scope of equality 
under EU law has been responsible for reduction in levels of minimum income 
allowances provided in Spain and the UK, both of these States have implemented 
certain measures to reduce the number of persons entitled to receive those 
allowances. 
 
3.4.2. Restriction of access: control of residence 
One of the ways in which Member States seek to curtail the receipt of minimum 
income allowances by migrant EU Citizens and their family members is through 
exerting control over the right of residence to which a right of equality attaches.412 
The extent to which Member States may do this within the bounds of EU law is, 
                                                 
410 Ana Guillén, Santiago Álvarez and Pedro Adão E Silva, Redesigning the Spanish and Portuguese 
Welfare States: The Impact of Accession into the European Union (2007) 8 South European Society 
and Politics 231, page 263. The study further notes that ‘For the Spanish and Portuguese populations, 
becoming Europeans meant, among other things, attaining ‘European levels of social protection’’.  
411 Ibid, page 262. These findings have been widely supported in other research (see e.g. Cabrero 
(2009), page 5, and Luis Moreno, ‘Spain in the European Union: the First Twenty-Five Years (1986-
2011)’ in Joaquín  Roy and María  Lorca-Susino (eds), Spain in the European Union: the First 
Twenty-Five Years (1986-2011) (University of Miami 2011)); and Ana M. Guillén and Santiago  
Álvarez, The EU’s impact on the Spanish welfare state: the role of cognitive Europeanization (2004) 
14 Journal of European Social Policy 285; Steen Mangen, The 'Europeanization' of Spanish Social 
Policy (1996) 30 Social Policy and Administration 305). 
412 It was made clear by the CJEU in Case C-456/02, Michel Trojani v Centre public d'aide sociale de 
Bruxelles (CPAS) [2004] ECR I-07573 that so long as an EU Citizen remains lawfully resident in a 
Member State they are entitled to equal access to social advantages, notwithstanding that they are 
neither economically active nor self-sufficient: ‘a citizen of the Union who is not economically active 
may rely on Article 12 EC where he has been lawfully resident in the host Member State for a certain 
time or possesses a residence permit….it remains open to the host Member State to take the view that 
a national of another Member State who has recourse to social assistance no longer fulfils the 
conditions of his right of residence. In such a case the host Member State may, within the limits 
imposed by Community law, take a measure to remove him. However, recourse to the social 




however, very limited: free movement is, after all, the foundation upon which the 
European Union is built.  
One way in which Member States may seek to restrict rights of residence is to 
tighten administrative procedures so as to ensure that only those entitled to reside 
under EU law do so. This course of action has recently been adopted in Spain, where 
legislation was introduced in 2012 to police more closely the exercise of an extended 
right of residence under EU law. Prior to this amendment, Spanish law had granted a 
right of residence to persons solely on the basis of their status as European Citizens, 
and had not required that they meet the conditions attaching to a right of extended 
residence under Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC.413 New legislation has now 
imported the conditions stipulated under the Directive into national law, requiring 
that EU citizens applying for residence in Spain produce ‘evidence of sufficient 
financial means to support themselves (and dependants)’, and stating that they ‘may 
also be asked for proof of private or public healthcare insurance’.414 These measures 
were introduced with the express intent of protecting the provision of welfare 
services, as indicated in preamble of the amending legislation: 
‘Article 7 of Directive 2004/38/EC [has not been transposed] in 
literal terms. This circumstance has resulted in, and assuming it is 
left unchanged will continue to result in, a serious economic harm to 
Spain, especially in terms of the failure to secure the return of the 
expenses incurred in the provision of health and social services to 
European citizens.’415 
 
  Whereas Spain is only recently adapting the transposition of Directive 
2004/38/EC so as to enforce the conditions stipulated therein, many other Member 
States have adopted a restrictive interpretation of Directive 2004/38/EC that is more 
                                                 
413 COM(2008) 840 final, page 5 (supra, n.291) 
414 British Embassy Madrid, ‘Entry & residence requirements’ (2013)  
<http://ukinspain.fco.gov.uk/en/help-for-british-nationals/living-in-spain/residence-req/> accessed 27 
Feb 2013  
415 Real Decreto-ley 16/2012, de 20 de abril, de medidas urgentes para garantizar la sostenibilidad del 
Sistema Nacional de Salud y mejorar la calidad y seguridad de sus prestaciones [‘Royal Decree 
16/2012 on urgent measures to ensure the sustainability of the national health system and improve the 
quality and safety of its services'] Boletín Oficial del Estado Núm. 98 Martes 24 de abril de 2012 Sec. 
I. Pág. 31280 <http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2012/04/24/pdfs/BOE-A-2012-5403.pdf> accessed 26 Feb 
2013. The relevant amending paragraph is ‘Disposición final quinta. Modificación del Real Decreto 
240/2007, de 16 de febrero, sobre entrada, libre circulación y residencia en España de ciudadanos de 
los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea y de otros Estados parte en el Acuerdo sobre el Espacio 
Económico Europeo’, (Pág 31309). 
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problematic in its compliance with EU law. A conformity study on the transposition 
of Directive 2004/38/EC into national legislation found that ‘[t]he overall 
transposition of Directive 2004/38/EC is rather disappointing. Not one Member State 
has transposed the Directive effectively and correctly in its entirety. Not one Article 
of the Directive has been transposed effectively and correctly by all Member 
States’.416 Specifically, the study noted that ‘[t]he transposition of Article 5(2) [the 
right of entry] is often incorrect and/or incomplete, and the legislative shortcomings 
result in frequent violations of the rights of family members, notably those who are 
third country nationals’, and that ‘twelve Member States have transposed the notion 
of ‘sufficient resources’ incorrectly or ambiguously. Problems relate mostly to 
setting a minimum amount regarded as sufficient and failure to take the decision on 
the basis of personal circumstances’.417 Such issues of non-compliance are however 
unlikely to be allowed to continue – in 2010 the Commission signified its intention to 
launch, where necessary, infringement proceedings on the incorrect transposition of 
Directive 2004/38/EC, and to pursue to as a priority the 63 enforcement actions in 
the area of free movement and residence of EU Citizens outstanding at that time.418 
 The competence of Member States to revoke rights of residence under EU 
law is also limited. Notwithstanding that conditions of self-sufficiency attach to the 
right of extended residence in a Member State for non-economically active persons 
and students,419 recourse to the social assistance system of a host Member State may 
not itself constitute grounds for expulsion by reason of lack of sufficient resources.420 
Moreover, no requirement of sufficient resources attaches to the retention of a right 
of residence for EU citizen jobseekers and their family members, who ‘may not be 
expelled for as long as the Union citizens can provide evidence that they are 
                                                 
416 COM(2008) 840 final, Page 3 
417 Ibid, pages 5-6. The report did find, however, that most Member States had on the whole correctly 
transposed Articles 6 and 7 of the Directive (right of residence for up to three months, and right of 
residence for more than three months). 
418 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic 
and Social Committee under Article 25 TFEU on progress towards effective EU Citizenship 2007-
2010 COM(2010) 603 final <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/citizen/files/com_2010_602_en.pdf> accessed 
10 Oct 2012, page 7 and 8 
419 See text above at n.385 
420 Case C-184/99, Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve 
[2001] E.C.R I-061930, paras 42-43; Case C-456/02, Michel Trojani v Centre public d'aide sociale de 
Bruxelles (CPAS) [2004] ECR I-07573, para 45. Member States are entitled to check as to whether an 
individual has sufficient resources when there is reasonable doubt that they do not, but such checking 
may not be systematic (Directive 2004/38/EC Art 14(2) and (3)). 
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continuing to seek employment and that they have a genuine chance of being 
engaged’.421 This right of residence has proved particularly contentious given the 
ruling by the CJEU in Collins and Vatsouras that such persons are entitled to claim 
non-contributory employment benefits for the duration of their residence in the host 
Member State.422 
 The limited circumstance in which EU law does allow Member States 
(indirectly) to control rights of residence is through the imposition of transitory 
controls on access to the labour market of nationals from newly acceded Member 
States, and both the UK and Spain have made use of these controls.423 Spain 
removed initial controls on access to the labour market for both Bulgarian and 
Romanian workers when they were reviewed in 2009, but later re-instated 
restrictions on Romanian workers in 2011 with approval from the Commission, due 
to serious disturbances in the Spanish labour market.424  
The UK, by contrast, chose to extend the period of transitory controls on both 
Bulgarian and Romanian nationals, which are now due to expire on 1st January 2014. 
The foreseeable end of these restrictions has reignited the debates that were voiced at 
the time of the 2004 enlargement on the anticipated increase in migration and its 
negative impact on the sustainability of welfare provision. Popular press has, as in 
2004, played a prominent role in igniting these fears, with some tabloids employing 
inflammatory and discriminatory language to fan the flames: 
‘We’re on our way to Britain: a year from now up to 29m Bulgarians and 
Romanians will have the right to settle in Britain and claim benefits. And the 
gypsies in the slums of Sofia can hardly wait…’  
(Daily Mail, 23rd December 2012) 
 
                                                 
421 Directive 2004/38/EC Art 14(4)(b) 
422 Case C-138/02, Brian Francis Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2004] ECR I-
02703; Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08, Athanasios Vatsouras and Josif Koupatantze v 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft (ARGE) Nürnberg 900 [2009] ECR I-04585 (see n.386, above). 
423 Such measures may not directly prohibit free movement, but largely attain this effect by preventing 
persons from acquiring the status of worker or jobseeker that confers upon them a right of extended 
residence. 
424 Migration Advisory Committee, ‘Review of the transitional restrictions on access of Bulgarian and 
Romanian nationals to the UK labour market’ (2011) 
<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/workingwithus/mac/-
restrictions-worker1/transitional-restrictions.pdf?view=Binary> accessed 26 Feb 2013, pages 22-23. 
See also European Citizen Action Service, ‘Who's afraid of the Latest EU Enlargement?’ (2008) 
<http://www.ecas-citizens.eu/content/view/203/260/> accessed 23 Feb 2012, page 32.  
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‘The UK is much better than Romania. All my mates will come in 2014: A 
Tidal wave of Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants is threatening to swamp 
Britain — and flood our overstretched jobs market’  
(The Sun, 11 Nov 2012) 
There are limited projections as to the number of expected ‘A2’ nationals that will 
exercise their right of free movement to live in the UK; Deputy Prime Minister Nick 
Clegg has refused to disclose official projections, calling them ‘unhelpful’,425 whilst 
Foreign Secretary William Hague has claimed that any attempt to estimate the 
number would be ‘guesswork’.426 It has since been widely publicised that the UK 
Government, in response to these concerns, has considered running a negative 
advertising campaign to dissuade Bulgarian and Romanian nationals from exercising 
their Treaty right to move to the UK.427 In contrast to the high levels of migration 
popularly anticipated, however, research has shown that ‘statistics show a low 
interest of EU2 nationals to work in the UK’, pointing out that ‘the fact that only 
salaried work is governed by transitional arrangements does not lead to masses of 




                                                 
425 The Independent has reported that ‘the leader of the liberal democrats said making the figures 
public would not help "public confidence in the immigration system", and that the figures were not 
"precise" and were more like "guesstimates"’ (The Independent, ‘Nick Clegg refuses to reveal 
immigration estimates on LBC radio show’ (20 Feb 2013) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/nick-clegg-refuses-to-reveal-immigration-estimates-
on-lbc-radio-show-8502919.html> accessed 20 Feb 2013 
426 BBC News, ‘William Hague: 'Benefit tourism must end'’ (3 March 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21647808> accessed 3 March 2013 
427 One minister is quoted as ‘saying that such a negative advert would ‘correct the impression that 
the streets here are paved with gold’’ (The Guardian, ‘Immigration: Romanian or Bulgarian? You 
won't like it here’ (27 Jan 2013) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/jan/27/uk-immigration-
romania-bulgaria-ministers> accessed 27 Jan 2013). This revelation has drawn anger from Romania 
and has been widely mocked by the liberal press, prompting the Guardian newspaper to compile a 
series of spoof adverts in this vein (The Guardian, ‘Putting people off coming to Britain: your 
pictures’ (29 Jan 2013) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/gallery/2013/jan/29/immigration-britain-
ministers-gallery#/?picture=403153052&index=0> accessed 29 Jan 2013) 
428 The relatively low levels of immigration to the UK from A2 nationals lend support to the argument 
that – the ‘problem’ of immigration notwithstanding – the UK on balance still benefits from EU law 
provisions that secure free movement.  A report by the European Citizen Action Service thus noted 
that ‘[d]uring the third quarter of 2007 930 Bulgarians and 2705 Romanian received their 
registration certificates for pursuing self-employed activity…By comparison: in total there are 1.57 
million UK citizens living in other EU countries (European Citizen Action Service (2008), page 37). 
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3.4.3. Effect of EU co-ordination upon allocation of minimum income 
allowances 
The limited capacity of Member States to control rights of residence has prompted 
them instead to attempt to curtail the right of equality enjoyed by migrant EU 
Citizens and their family members. Such action has been witnessed in the UK, where 
regulations concerning the grant of minimum income guarantees in the UK have 
been amended with increasingly more restrictive residence criteria in 1994, 2004 and 
2012, with the express intention of restricting the eligibility of migrant EU citizens 
and their family members. 
The first relevant amendment to the UK regulations came in 1994 with the 
introduction of the ‘habitual residence’ test as a means by which to condition receipt 
of minimum income allowances.429 The habitual residence test as it was introduced 
at this time consisted only of the ‘factual’ element described on page 107, above, 
under which a person is required to demonstrate an ‘appreciable period of residence’ 
and a ‘settled intention to reside’ in the UK before being entitled to receive income-
related benefits.430  
Preparatory documents drawn up by the Department of Social Security at the 
time at which the proposed amendment was laid before the Social Security Advisory 
Committee reveal the specific intent of the Government to reduce eligibility to 
income-related benefits in response to a perceived ‘abuse’ of the system by ‘welfare 
tourists’: 
‘The proposal is part of a process of narrowing access to benefit for 
people the taxpayer should not be asked to support. This is 
particularly relevant now as the Government takes measures to 
ensure that the burden of social security expenditure does not 
outstrip the taxpayer’s ability to provide funding. In part, the 
proposal is also designed to deal with the well documented abuses of 
                                                 
429 By way of context, in March /April of 1994 accession negotiations were concluded with Austria, 
Sweden, Finland and Norway, and Hungary and Poland formally applied to join the EU (EUROPA, 
‘European Union History’ (2012)  <http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1990-
1999/1994/index_en.htm> accessed 20 Nov 2012). 
430 The test was introduced into social security legislation by ‘The Income-related Benefits Schemes 
(Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 3) Regulations 1994’ (S.I. 1994/1807). Prior to this amendment, 
the category of ‘persons from abroad’ who were exempt from receipt of social benefits largely 




these income’-related benefits by some non-UK nationals, which 
have caused public anxiety’.431 
The Department implicitly acknowledged that these objectives were intended to 
counter the effects flowing from European free movement rights: the test was 
specifically designed with a view to the welfare systems of other EU Member States, 
and sought ‘to place the conditions of entitlement to these benefits on a similar 
footing to the eligibility conditions for state benefits of other EEA Member States’.432 
Consternation arose throughout the drafting of these regulations that the test 
of habitual residence – intended to restrict access of EU migrants to minimum 
income allowances – would apply also to returning British migrants. The Social 
Security advisory Committee on this basis had recommended that the amending 
regulations, in the form that was laid before them, ought not to be enacted.433 
Specifically, the Committee noted that ‘there will almost inevitably be cases where 
returning UK nationals are refused benefit, with consequent hardship. Although the 
numbers may be few, we share the view of our respondents that this would be a very 
undesirable outcome’.434 The issue was also debated before the House of Lords, with 
Earl Russell arguing: 
 
‘I think that everyone has an entitlement to one country which they 
can call their own, where they can go back and feel that they are 
entitled to relief, help and support in an emergency... What will 
happen to those people who return to what they believe to be their 
own country? They cannot obtain work instantly and yet they will 
                                                 
431 Social Security Advisory Committee, Report by the Social Security Advisory Committee under 
Section 174(1) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 and the statement by the Secretary of 
State for Social Security in accordance with Section 174(2) of that Act (HMSO 1994), appendix 2, 
para. 3 
432 Ibid, appendix 2 para 4. Recognition to this effect was also given in a debate of the regulation in 
the House of Lords, in which Earl Russell noted that ‘the regulations to which I am calling our 
attention originate from a speech by the Secretary of State at the Conservative Party Conference in 
1993 directed to the phenomenon of what has come to be known as benefit tourism —people from 
other countries within the European Union coming here and taking advantage of the benefit system, in 
effect, it is alleged, to have a free holiday. The language of that speech is something that it is not 
necessary for me to touch upon now; but I will say that it is agreed that the content needs to be taken 
seriously’( Hansard, HL Deb 20 October 1994 vol 558 cc384-98).  
433 The Committee had also expressed other concerns, related to the complexity of the habitual 
residence test, and its impact upon Irish nationals and refugees. The Committee’s recommendations in 
respect of the latter two groups were accepted by the Government and the Regulations were amended 
before being enacted (Social Security Advisory Committee (1994), page 419). 
434 Ibid,, page 14 
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receive no benefit. The likeliest outcome is that they will do what 
they did before the benefit system existed: they will beg.’435 
 
Such criticisms illustrate a latent tension surrounding the basis on which the 
rights of social citizenship are allocated, which has been brought into the spotlight by 
increasing potential for intra-EU migration: although commonly accepted that 
extended residence as a measure of social integration is an appropriate basis on 
which to allocate rights, a popular sense remained that returning British citizens 
ought to derive rights by virtue of their nationality. Though there was little 
discussion as to the scope of the desired exception, (would it apply to British citizens 
who had been born abroad, and who had never resided in the UK? Would it apply to 
foreign nationals who had been born in the UK and lived there the majority of their 
life?), such arguments apparently envisage that something akin to ‘domicile of birth’ 
ought to constitute an alternative means upon which to allocate social rights.436 The 
requisite societal links would in this event be established not only by a person having 
actually established residence in a territory, but on the basis of a historic sense of 
community belonging fostered by national identity. The Government rejected such 
proposals, noting that ‘[i]t would be contrary to European law to introduce new 
legislation in this area which would discriminate, either directly or indirectly, on the 
basis of nationality’.437 
 In the form in which it was introduced, the requirement of actual habitual 
residence still however raised certain issues of compatibility with EU law. Whilst the 
provisions on ‘special non-contributory cash benefits’ allow UK law to impose a 
condition of ‘habitual residence’, that term has been used in the UK to impose a 
minimum threshold of social integration rather than simply to apportion 
responsibility between Member States. The requirement under UK law that a migrant 
EU Citizen demonstrate an ‘appreciable period of residence’ in the UK before being 
entitled to receive minimum income allowances has been considered by the CJEU to 
be incompatible with EU law, with the Court ruling that ‘the length of residence in 
the Member State in which payment of the benefit at issue is sought cannot be 
                                                 
435 Hansard, HL Deb 20 October 1994 vol 558 cc384-98 
436 Domicile of birth is a legal construct that allocates a domicile to a child on the basis of the domicile 
of her parents (see eg Kostakopoulou (2008), page 120). 
437 Social Security Advisory Committee (1994), page 3 
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regarded as an intrinsic element of the concept of residence’ for the purpose of 
restricting access to minimum income allowances.438 
 
The ‘habitual residence’ test was further amended in 2004 in response to fears 
over EU enlargement,439 stating that no person would be ‘habitually resident’ in the 
UK unless he had a ‘right to reside’ there.440 A submission by the National 
Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI) to the Irish 
Department of Social and Family Affairs notes the context in which these 
amendments were enacted: 
 
‘There has been a sustained, emotive, xenophobic and irresponsible 
campaign in British tabloid newspapers which have resulted in a 
knee jerk reaction from the British government. The following 
headlines give some examples of the tenor of this form of journalism, 
some of which borders on incitement: 
 
- ‘Gypsies Guide to NHS Scrounging’: Daily Star, 19 February 2004 
- ‘Aids and the NHS tourists’: Daily Mail, 26 June 2003 
- ‘Migrants Invasion Warning’: The Sun, 2 February 2004 
- ‘See you in May. Thousands of travellers are on their way’: The Sun, 
19 January 2004 
- ‘500 immigrants EVERY day to swamp Britain’: Daily Express, 30 
January 2004 
-  ’We must oppose liberals’ scorn of our immigration fears’: Daily 
Express, 6 February 2004’441 
 
The 2004 regulations were undoubtedly aimed at EU nationals and their 
family members as a direct response to the prevailing public fears that EU 
enlargement would bring unsustainable pressure to bear on the UK welfare system, 
but the scope of application of the right to reside test was initially somewhat 
ambiguous. Further amendments to the income-related benefit regulations in 2006 
                                                 
438 Case C-90/97, Robin Swaddling v Adjudication Officer [1999] ECR I-01075, para 30. The impact 
of this decision upon the interpretation of habitual residence is limited to application of that test to 
persons exercising Treaty rights: the Court of Appeal have since held that Swaddling necessitates no 
general re-interpretation of the habitual residence test outwith these bounds (Gingi v Secretary of State 
for Work and Pensions [2001] EWCA Civ 1685). 
439 The Social Security (Habitual Residence) Amendment Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/1232) 
440 Kennedy (2011), page 4 
441 National Consultative Committee On Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI), ‘Proposed Changes 
in the Social Welfare Code Arising from EU Enlargement’ Submission to the Department of Social 




clarified those circumstances in which an individual would not have a ‘right of 
residence’ for the purposes of the habitual residence test,442 and who are thus 
exempted from receipt of minimum income allowances: persons exercising an 
unconditional three month right of residence in the UK under EU law, and persons 
exercising an EU right of extended residence in the UK as a jobseeker or as the 
family member of a jobseeker.  
In 2012 the scope of persons ineligible to receive income-related benefits by 
virtue of the ‘right to reside’ test was extended also to include third-country national 
care-givers of migrant EU citizens, in response to the acquisition by such persons of 
an EU law right of residence following the decision of the CJEU in Ruiz 
Zambrano.443 The UK Government had delayed the process of adapting UK 
immigration regulations in accordance with the decision in Ruiz Zambrano – with 
twenty months elapsing between delivery of the Court’s judgment and the necessary 
changes to UK immigration regulations entering into force444 – and had ensured that 
the relevant amendments to the minimum income allowances were in place prior to 
that right being granted. Amendments to the Immigration (European Economic Area) 
Regulations 2006 and to the respective regulations on minimum income allowances 
entered into force concurrently on 8 November 2012, with the result that persons 
who had previously been exempt from receipt of benefits as third-country nationals 
subject to immigration control never acquired access to them by virtue of their new 
rights of residence under Union law. 
 
 Application of the ‘right to reside’ element of the habitual residence test as a 
means by which to condition access to minimum income allowances under EU law 
has been the source of much controversy, and its compatibility with the right of non-
discrimination under Article 18 TFEU is highly questionable. This issue came before 
the UK Supreme Court in 2011 in Patmalniece,445 in which the Court considered by 
majority verdict that the right to reside test indirectly discriminates against non-
                                                 
442 The Social Security (Persons from Abroad) Amendment Regulations 2006 
443 Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l'emploi (ONEM) [2011] ECR I-
01177. See also Lansbergen and Miller (2011). 
444 The judgment of the Court was delivered on 8 March 2011, and amendments to the Immigration 
(European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 did not enter into force until 8 Nov 2012. 
445 Patmalniece v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2011] UKSC 11 
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British nationals: the test puts nationals of other Member States ‘at a particular 
disadvantage’, but it is one that ‘some UK nationals may fail to meet…because, 
although they have a right of residence, they are not habitually resident here’.446 
Invoking Bidar and Collins,447 the Supreme Court considered that the indirect 
discrimination was justifiable on the grounds that it prevents the ‘exploitation of 
welfare benefits by people who come to this country simply to live on benefits without 
working here’,448 and that that justification is (as is required under the Collins 
formulation), independent of the nationality of the persons concerned: ‘[a] person’s 
nationality does, of course, have a bearing on whether that test can be satisfied. But 
the justification itself is blind to the person’s nationality. The requirement that there 
must be a right to reside here applies to everyone, irrespective of their 
nationality’.449  
Delivering a dissenting opinion, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe contested the 
finding of the majority that the ‘right to reside’ test pursued a legitimate objective 
that was independent of an intention to differentiate on the grounds of nationality. 
Accepting (with some reluctance) that the test was one of indirect rather than direct 
discrimination, Lord Walker was of the opinion that ‘the correlation between British 
nationality and the right to reside in Great Britain is so strong that the issue of 
justification must in my view be scrutinised with some rigour’.450 He disagreed with 
the majority opinion that the objective of ‘a sufficient degree of social integration’ 
operated independently of nationality, finding instead that such measures ‘are 
probably aimed at discriminating against economically inactive foreign nationals on 
the grounds of nationality. Whether or not that was the intention of those who framed 
them, they have that effect’.451 Lord Walker thus argued that the measure could not 
                                                 
446 Ibid. para 29 
447 See above, text at n.386 – 387 
448 Patmalniece v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2011] UKSC 11 para 46 
449 Ibid. para 52. Lord Rodger and Lord Brown agreed in full with the judgment delivered by Lord 
Hope, and Baroness Hale delivered a separate opinion that reached the same conclusions as Lord 
Hope. The judgment delivered by Baroness Hale differed primarily in its emphasis upon CJEU 
jurisprudence on the right to residence in a host Member State, which she interpreted as leaving it 
‘open to member states to make entitlement to such benefits dependent on the right to reside in the 
host country’ (para 106). 
450 Ibid. para 73 
451 Ibid. para 79 
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be justified by reference to a legitimate and objective aim that was independent of an 
individual’s nationality.452  
 
The issue of compatibility of the right to reside test with EU law – in 
particular whether such a requirement can be justified as a proportionate means by 
which to achieve a legitimate aim – is far from settled. In July 2009, the AIRE 
Centre and ILPA submitted a complaint to the European Commission about the 
potential infringement of EU law,453 and at the time at which judgment in 
Patmalniece was delivered, the European Commission had issued a ‘formal notice’ 
inviting the UK to submit observations on the matter.454 Subsequent to delivery of 
the Patmalniece judgment the European Commission has issued a ‘reasoned opinion’ 
to the UK Government as the first stage in enforcement proceedings which may 
effectively oblige the UK to disapply the right to reside test to EU citizens.455 The 
UK Government responded to the reasoned opinion in November 2011 as 
required,456 and – whilst the content of that response has not been made public457 – it 
may be inferred from statements of successive Ministers of State for the Department 
for Work and Pensions that it indicated the intention of the UK Government to 
continue to make receipt of minimum income allowances conditional upon 
                                                 
452 Lord Walker’s position, rejected by the majority of the Court, had previously been adopted by the 
House of Lords in a unanimous decision in Orphanos v Queen Mary College HL 1 April 1985 [1985] 
1 A.C. 761. In that case, which concerned a similar test of ordinary residence that circumscribes 
entitlement to financial support for higher education, the House of Lords concluded that the 
imposition of a residence requirement did constitute indirect discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality, and moreover that ‘ordinary residence is…so closely related to their nationality that the 
discrimination cannot be justified irrespective of nationality’ (page 773, para B). Orphanos was not 
referenced in Patmalniece. 
453 The AIRE Centre and Immigration Law Practitioners' Association (ILPA), ‘Note on European 
Commission infringement proceedings against the UK concerning the right-to-reside test’ (2011) 
<http://www.airecentre.org/data/files/Right_to_Reside_Infringement_Proceedings.pdf> accessed 27 
Sep 2012 
454 Pursuant to Art 258 TFEU  
455 The Commission was of the opinion that ‘as this test indirectly discriminates against non-UK 
nationals coming from other EU Member States it contravenes EU law. This is why the European 
Commission has requested the United Kingdom to stop its application.  The request takes the form of 
a ‘reasoned opinion’ under EU infringement procedure’ (European Commission, (2011) PRESS 
RELEASE: Social security coordination: Commission requests United Kingdom to end discrimination 
of EU nationals residing in the UK regarding their rights to specific social benefits (Reference: 
IP/11/1118) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1118_en.htm> accessed 27 Sep 2012).  
456 Hansard, 30 April 2012: Column 1327W 
457 In October 2012 I submitted a Freedom of Information Request to the Department of Work and 
Pensions to obtain the correspondence between the UK Government and the Commission on this 
issue, but on 6 November 2012 received a reply stating that this information was exempt from 
disclosure under s44 of the Act (Ref Fol 3737). 
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satisfaction of the test. In June 2012 the then Secretary of State Chris Grayling stated 
in the House of Commons that: 
‘I continue to have concerns about the efforts of the European 
Commission to increase its influence over the social security policies 
adopted by national Governments…I am determined that social 
security should remain a national matter, and will continue to resist 
efforts by the EU to interfere… I am absolutely clear that we have to 
get the Commission to change…We have to win battles in the 
Commission, the Parliament and the European Court.’ 
 
Addressing the issue in September 2012, the then Secretary of State Iain Duncan 
Smith offered a similarly combative statement: 
 
The European Commission wants to end the habitual residence test. 
As a result, we would have to pay benefits to EU migrants as and 
when they arrive and they would not have to prove that they have been 
here, are working and have a residence. I believe that that is 
fundamentally wrong, as do the Government. The habitual residence 
test is vital to protect our benefits system and to stop such benefit 
tourism. I also do not believe that the EU has any rights in that area… 
I want to put it on the record that the costs of the proposal could be 
enormous. 
 
Such statements by senior Cabinet ministers serve to highlight the depth of tension 
that exists between nationally-bounded welfare systems and EU rights of equal 
entitlement to minimum income allowances in the UK. They shine a bright spotlight 
upon the contested parameters of equal membership demanded by social justice, and 
illustrate clearly the way in which those parameters are being adapted in response to 
EU membership competences. The UK response has signalled a shift in the very 
justificatory basis of allocation of social rights, with eligibility criteria that 
(indirectly) distinguish on the basis of nationality displacing social integration as the 
basis of entitlement to social rights. In the UK context there has thus been a 
polarisation between the extension of social rights to EU Citizens under EU law, and 
a responsive shift back towards nationally-bounded models of social justice in the 




 Conclusion: the effect of EU membership competences upon 3.5.
equality of membership 
The foregoing discussion has highlighted the tension that exists between the 
provision of minimum income allowances in a state-centric welfare system, and the 
extension of those rights to migrant EU Citizens and their family members under 
Union law. It has focussed exclusively on the vertical asymmetries between the EU 
and Member States that manifest in the respective spheres of competence of those 
polities and in the membership decisions taken within them. The case study has 
found that EU law rights of residence and of equal treatment grant a greater number 
of persons access to minimum income allowances than are eligible under the national 
system, creating problems of sustainability for the Member States. Moreover, EU 
law rights require that Member States grant minimum income allowances to a wider 
range of resident persons than who would otherwise be entitled to receive them 
under national provisions, where those systems otherwise impose restrictions on the 
rights received by resident non-nationals.  
The depth of this tension has increased in line with the growing scope of 
persons entitled to equal treatment in the receipt of minimum income allowances 
under EU law, which has increased both by reason of the extension of rights to non-
economically active persons on the basis of Europeans Citizenship, and the 
increasing number of persons vested with this status following successive 
enlargements of the Union. Fears over the sustainability of welfare systems in light 
of the increased number of recipients have prompted both the UK and Spain to take 
countervailing measures to restrict the impact of EU rights to equal treatment. Such 
action has been evidenced in attempts to control residence in State territory, and in 
the application of progressively restrictive residence criteria as a means by which to 
increase the threshold of social integration giving rise to entitlement. 
Parameters of equal membership are thus subject to both direct and indirect 
contestation by EU competence: EU law widens the frame of equal membership 
provided by the State, and Member States have sought in response to condition the 
receipt of minimum income allowances with eligibility criteria that privilege 
nationals over non-nationals. 
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4. Effect of sub-state membership competences on equal 
membership, examined through the lens of differential fee 
imposition for higher education and prescriptions 
 
The previous chapter has examined how the parameters of equal membership are 
contested by European Union competence to control access to social citizenship 
rights through conferral of rights of residence, and to allocate social rights by way of 
a requirement of equal treatment.  
The paradigmatic model of membership in which social rights are tied to the 
nation-state458 is subject also to contestation by the devolution of legislative 
competence to sub-state polities. Exercise of devolved legislative competence to 
determine and administer differential social rights constructs distinct (and privileged) 
membership groupings within the boundaries of national membership, and thus 
challenges the egalitarianism presumed of formal citizenship. Differentiated social 
rights have engendered public debate about ‘discriminatory’ and inequitable policies, 
a perception that stems largely from the fact that whilst sub-state legislatures have 
legislative competence to provide differentiated goods, that differentiated policy is 
financed either in whole or in part from shared national resources.459 Such perception 
of social injustice is exacerbated in the UK context by measures taken by sub-state 
polities to curtail the rights enjoyed by persons moving within the state to access 
services in a polity other than that one which they are ‘ordinarily resident’, and 
through the extension of benefits to European Citizens from which nationals are 
excluded. 
Whereas the previous chapter focussed exclusively upon the vertical 
asymmetries that manifest between the EU and Member States, the following chapter 
considers the additional layer of asymmetry that exists as a result of the devolution of 
competence to sub-state polities. It examines the construction of sub-state 
membership groupings in the UK and Spain through examination of differential fee 
imposition by sub-state polities. Unlike diffuse infrastructural policy variations, 
differential fees are clearly comparable across polities in terms of individual 
advantage, and affect all persons accessing that service on a direct and immediate 
                                                 
458 See text above between nn.111 and 118. 
459 See above at n.198 
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basis. It is for this reason that they have been harnessed in public consciousness in 
terms of equality and privilege. Exercise of devolved competences resulting in 
differential fee imposition has attracted substantial attention in the UK context, 
where all sub-state legislatures have adopted measures that abolish prescription 
charges and provide more favourable regulation of higher education cost than is in 
place in England under UK legislation. These same issues have recently proved 
contentious in Spain, where prescription fees have been subject to variation in 
Madrid and Catalonia, and the cost of higher education differs between Autonomous 
Communities. 
The case-study to follow commences with an overview of differential fee 
imposition in relation to higher education and prescription charges, charting the de 
facto horizontal asymmetries that manifest between sub-state polities as a 
consequence of the exercise of devolved competences. The primary focus is upon 
differential fee imposition across constituent polities of the UK, and the study also 
considers how these issues manifest within Spain by way of a contextual comparison. 
Having established an overview of the differentiated rights, the study then proceeds 
to consider in more detail the manner in which these sub-state membership groupings 
in the UK have been shaped by fears of intra-state ‘welfare migration’, before 
examining how they interact with the right of equal treatment enjoyed by migrant EU 
Citizens. Finally, the study considers the characterisation of differentiated social 
rights as ‘discriminatory’, and the implications that this holds for the stability of the 
constitutional asymmetry. 
 
 Differential policies and privileged membership groups 4.1.
4.1.1. Tuition fees 
Individual liability in respect of higher education tuition fees in the UK is determined 
by two forms of regulatory control that have been devolved to sub-state legislatures: 
regulatory fee controls limit the amount that Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) 
may charge a student in respect of tuition, and publicly-funded financial support 
reduces students’ liability in respect of fees incurred.460 Whereas regulatory fee caps 
                                                 
460 See Annex 6: Legislation determinative of higher education fees in the UK (page 138)  
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are determined within the competence of the polity in which the HEI is located, 
financial support is provided to a student by the polity in which they are domiciled 
and is exportable throughout the UK.461 Each sub-state polity adopts different rules 
as to the level of fee regulation and financial support, and the scope of persons 
entitled to benefit from them.462 Individual liability in respect of tuition fees is thus 
determined by a complex interaction of differentiated regulatory measures enacted in 
both the ‘receiving’ and the ‘sending’ sub-state polity.  
Fees charged by HEIs in Scotland to Scottish-domiciled students are subject 
to regulatory stipulation, at a level set at £1,820 for the academic year 2012/13.463 
Fees charged by HEIs in Scotland to persons domiciled elsewhere in the UK are 
unregulated, but in practice HEIs have agreed to cap fees that they charge to ‘rest of 
the UK’ students at £9,000.464 Since 2001 the Scottish Government has provided 
non-means-tested grants to cover the full cost of fees for Scottish-domiciled persons 
studying in Scotland, with the result that such persons no longer pay towards the cost 
of their tuition.465 Tuition grants provided by the Scottish Government are, however, 
                                                 
461 The term ‘domicile’ is used by government bodies to refer to the sub-state unit in which a student 
was ordinarily resident prior to commencing study (see further below on intra-state movement and 
boundaries of equal membership). 
462 For a consolidated summary of the eligibility criteria contained in UK regulations (relating to 
England), see Annex 7: Eligibility criteria for regulatory fee cap and student support in England 
(page 140). 
463 Student Fees (Specification) (Scotland) Order 2011 (SSI 2011/455) s.3, enacted under section 9 of 
the Further and Higher Education (Scotland) Act 2005. 
464 Education (Fees) (Scotland) Regulations 2011 (SSI 2011/389), enacted under section 1 of The 
Education (Fees and Awards) Act 1983. The Scottish Government has signalled its intention to 
formalise the £9,000 fee cap for ‘rest of the UK’ students through secondary legislation (Scottish 
Government, ‘Consultation on the Draft Student Fees (Specification) (Scotland) Order 2011’ 
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/06/27091056/0> accessed 20 Aug 2012, page 12). 
Given that the average annual fee charged by HEIs in Scotland to ‘rest of the UK’ students has been 
significantly lower than this limit (£6,841 for the year 2012/2013), Universities Scotland have 
questioned the need to do so (Universities Scotland, ‘Average RUK fee in Scotland is significantly 
lower than average fees charged by universities in England’ <http://www.universities-
scotland.ac.uk/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=95&cntnt01returnid=17> 
accessed 13 Oct 2012); BBC News, ‘Scotland's university leaders say legal cap on fees 'not needed' 
(19 Feb 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-21502716> accessed 19 Feb 
2013). 
465 On 27th January 2000 the Scottish Parliament endorsed the ‘Framework Document: Working 
Together for Wider Access to Further and Higher Education and a Fair Deal for Students’, which 
documented of a package of proposals for ‘widening access, promoting lifelong learning, alleviating 
hardship and providing support during study’, including the policy of providing non-means-tested 
grants to all ‘Scottish-domiciled’ students studying (HEIs) in Scotland (Scottish Parliament Enterprise 
and Lifelong Learning Committee, (2001) Stage 1 Report on the Education (Graduate Endowment 
and Student Support) (Scotland) (No.2) Bill 
<http://archive.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/historic/x-enterprise/reports-01/elr01-01-
02.htm> accessed 15 Oct 2012). Thereafter, the Education (Graduate Endowment and Student 
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not exportable outwith Scotland, and Scottish–domiciled students who study 
elsewhere in the UK are entitled to a ‘fees loan’ of £9,000 per year to cover the cost 
of fees charged by those institutions.466 
Regulatory control over higher education has followed a different trajectory 
elsewhere in the UK. Legislation enacted by the UK Parliament has progressively 
increased the regulatory cap on fees charged by HEIs in England. In 2004 the cap 
was increased from a flat-rate cap of £1,125,467 to a variable-rate fee cap of between 
£1,200 and £3,000.468 Those limits were increased exponentially in legislation 
enacted in 2010, and from September 2012 a person studying at a HEI in England is 
liable for between £6,000 and £9,000 per year in tuition fees.469 Persons domiciled in 
England are entitled to a ‘fee loan’ from the UK Government in respect of the full 
                                                                                                                                          
Support) (Scotland) Act 2001 inserted section 73(f) into the Education (Scotland) Act 1980, allowing 
for the Secretary of State to make regulations determinative of the grant of allowances in respect of 
persons undertaking courses of education. The current regulations enacted under this basis are the 
Students' Allowances (Scotland) Regulations 2007 (SSI 2007/153), as subsequently amended. 
Introduction of tuition fee grants was initially accompanied by the levying of an ‘endowment fee’ 
upon grant recipients, who were required to repay £3,000 to the Scottish Government after graduation 
upon reaching threshold earnings of £25,000 (Education (Graduate Endowment and Student Support) 
(Scotland) Act 2001; The Graduate Endowment (Scotland) Regulations 2001). The Graduate 
Endowment Fee was abolished in 2008, since which time Scottish-domiciled students studying in 
Scotland have incurred no personal liability in respect of higher education tuition (Graduate 
Endowment Abolition (Scotland) Act 2008). 
466 Scottish domiciled students studying elsewhere in the UK may be eligible to receive a grant of up 
to £2,150 per year to reduce the level of their loan. Unlike the tuition fee grant provided to Scottish 
domiciled students studying in Scotland, this is a means-tested grant and persons with a family 
income of over £34,195 per year will receive nothing (Student Awards Agency for Scotland, ‘What 
financial support can I get?’ (2013) <http://www.saas.gov.uk/student_support/scottish_outside/2006-
2007/financial_support.htm> accessed 2 Feb 2013). 
467 Fee regulation was first introduced across the UK under s.26 of the Higher Education Act 1998. 
Between the years 1998 and 2002 the fee cap was set at £1,025 (S.I. 1999/496 s.11), rising to £1,100 
in 2003 (S.I. 2002/195 s.11) and to £1,125 in 2004 (S.I. 2002/3200 s.11). 
468 Section 23 of the Higher education Act 2004 required the governing bodies of HEIs in receipt of a 
grant from the Funding Council to ensure that the fee that they charge to students for tuition fall 
within prescribed limits. Where an ‘English approved plan’ is in force (a plan which details how the 
HEI will comply with certain requirements related to access to higher education), the governing body 
must ensure that fees do not exceed the ‘higher amount’, and where an ‘English approved plan’ is not 
in force, the governing body must ensure that fees do not exceed the ‘basic amount’. When the 
variable fee cap was first introduced in 2004 the basic and higher amounts were set at £1,200 and 
£3,000 respectively (S.I. 2004/1932, s.4), with these limits rising to £1,345 and £3,375 respectively 
for academic year 2011/2012 (S.I. 2011/432 reg.2(3)), 
469 This increase was achieved under the provisions of the 2004 Act. Secondary legislation simply 




cost of their tuition, which is paid directly to the HEI in settlement of tuition fees and 
is repaid by graduates upon reaching a threshold income after graduation.470 
Persons domiciled in Wales and Northern Ireland and who are studying at 
HEIs in those respective polities are liable to pay £3575 per year towards the cost of 
their tuition. This is achieved through slightly different mechanisms: the Welsh 
Assembly has imposed a regulatory fee cap on HEIs in Wales of £9,000, and 
provides Welsh-domiciled students with a loan of £3575 and a grant for the 
remainder of the fee.471 The Northern Ireland Assembly has set a fee cap of £3575 
for students domiciled in Northern Ireland, and provides to them a loan for the full 
amount.472 As in Scotland, fees for ‘rest of the UK’ students in Northern Ireland are 
unregulated but in practice are capped at £9,000. The grant provided to Welsh-
domiciled students by the Welsh Government travels with the student when studying 
in other areas of the UK. Students domiciled in Northern-Ireland and studying 
elsewhere in the UK receive a fee-loan of £9,000 from the Northern Ireland 
Executive.473 
The sum effect of differential policy enacted within these devolved 
competences is that the individual liability of a UK national in respect of tuition fees 
varies drastically depending both upon where in the UK that person is domiciled and 
where in the UK they study. Persons domiciled in England pay up to £9,000 per year 
in respect of their tuition irrespective of where in the UK they study, whereas persons 
domiciled in Wales pay £3,575 per year irrespective of where in the UK they study. 
                                                 
470 Section 22 of the Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998 provides the legal basis for the issuing 
of grants or loans in connection with undertaking a higher education course. The current regulations 
enacted under this provision are the Education (Student Support) Regulations 2011 (S.I. 2011/1986). 
471 UCAS, ‘The cost of studying in the UK for 2013 entry’ (2012) 
<http://www.ucas.ac.uk/students/studentfinance/> accessed 20 Dec 2012; Student Finance Wales, 
‘What you can get’ (2012) 
<http://www.studentfinancewales.co.uk/portal/page?_pageid=616,7249166&_dad=portal&_schema=
PORTAL>; Student Finance Wales, ‘A guide to financial support for higher education students in 
2012/2013’ (2012) 
<http://www.studentfinancewales.co.uk/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/WPIPG001/WPIPS002/WPIPS069/WP
IPS108/WPIPS109/SFW_GUIDE_NEWSTUDENTS_ENGLISH_1213.PDF> accessed 20 Dec 2012 
472 Whilst these differing mechanisms mean that students who are domiciled in either Wales and 
Northern Ireland and who are studying at institutions in those respective polities are liable for the 
same amount of fees, they impact differently upon persons domiciled elsewhere in the UK who study 
within those polities. 
473 UCAS (2012); Student Finance Northern Ireland, ‘Financial support for new students in 2013/14’ 
(2012) 
<http://www.studentfinanceni.co.uk/portal/page?_pageid=54,1266217&_dad=portal&_schema=POR
TAL#section3> accessed 20 Dec 2012 
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Students domiciled in Northern Ireland pay a fee of £3,575 per year when studying in 
Northern Ireland, and up to £9,000 per year when studying elsewhere in the UK. 
Students domiciled in Scotland do not pay any fees to study in Scotland, but pay fees 
of up to £9,000 when studying in other polities in the UK.  
Regional variance in the cost of higher education is also evidenced in Spain, 
where Autonomous Communities have the competence to regulate fees within 
central limits set by the General Assembly of University Policy. These limits were 
raised from 2012, and Autonomous Communities now fix tuition fees rates at 
between 15% and 25% of the total cost of proving the service.474 The rise in 
regulatory limits has witnessed an increase in the regional disparity in fee charges: 
whereas fee rates in Galicia and the Asturias remained constant between academic 
years 2011/12 and 2012/13, the average cost of a bachelors’ degree from a 
University in Catalonia increased by 66.7% in this period.475 Prices for first 
enrolment on a bachelor’s degree vary both according to the subject studied and the 
Autonomous Community in which it is undertaken, with fees for the academic year 
2012/2013 ranging from €591 per year for the least expensive subjects in in Galicia, 
up to €2371.8 per year for the most expensive subjects in Catalonia.476  
 
  
                                                 
474 Ley Orgánica 6/2001, Título II, Artículo 6 (Boletín Oficial del Estado Núm. 96, Sábado 21 de abril 
de 2012,Sec. I. Pág. 30977). See El Mundo, ‘Los universitarios pagarán hasta 540 € más por tasas y se 
penaliza al repetidor’ (19 April 2012) 
<http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/04/19/espana/1334852926.html> accessed 5 March 2013; and 
Reuters, ‘Spain passes health, education reforms to cut costs’ (20 April 2012) 
<http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USL6E8FKFBI20120420> accessed 5 March 2013.  
475 Asturias and Galicia saw no increase in fees from previous year (Gobierno de España (Ministerio 
de Educación Cultura y Deporte), ‘Estadísticas precios públicos universitarios (Curso 2012-2013)’ 
(2012) <http://www.mecd.gob.es/educacion/universidades/estadisticas-informes/estadisticas/precios-
publicos.html> accessed 5 March 2013; Gobierno de España (Ministerio de Educación Cultura y 
Deporte), ‘Datos y Cifras del Sistema Universitario Español. Curso 2012/2013’ (2012)  
<http://www.mecd.gob.es/dctm/sue/datos-y-cifras-sistema-universitario-
espanol.pdf?documentId=0901e72b814eed28> accessed 5 March 2013, page 39). 
476 The lowest per-credit fee for first-time enrolment in a Bachelor’s degree in Galicia is €9.85/credit, 
and the highest is per-credit fee in Catalonia is €39.53 /credit (Gobierno de España (Ministerio de 
Educación Cultura y Deporte) (2012); Gobierno de España (Ministerio de Educación Cultura y 
Deporte) (2012), page 39). A bachelor’s degree requires 240 credits, taken at an average of 60 credits 
per year (Gobierno de España (Ministerio de Educación Cultura y Deporte), ‘The Spanish University 
System’ (2012) <http://universidad.es/en/spain/spains-universities/spanish-university-system> 
accessed 20 Dec 2012). Fees are much higher for students on a second enrolment, costing between 
30% and 40% of total cost on second enrolment, and between 65% – 100% of cost on third enrolment 




Table 1: Liability of UK domiciled students for contribution towards tuition for 
academic year 2012/2013  
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Whilst the 2012 rise in tuition fees caused some public consternation, the 
regional variation of fees has not attracted the same depth of criticism as in the 
UK.477 The Spanish system of fee regulation displays more centralised conformity 
than in the UK, as variation operates within limits set by the State. Financial support 
in respect of these fees is centralised in order to guarantee the equality of Spanish 
nationals,478 and persons moving between Autonomous Communities for the 
purposes of study are entitled to benefit from the same fee rate. 
 
4.1.2. Prescription charges 
A second area in which divergence in social policy has resulted in regional fee 
variation is in the charges levied on prescription medication, which are determined 
within the regulatory competence of the polity in which that medication is 
dispensed.479 Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have now abolished prescription 
                                                 
477 Catalan News Agency, ‘University fees to be raised 7.6% next September in Catalonia’ (21 June 
2011) <http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/society-science/university-fees-be-raised-76-next-
september-catalonia> accessed 4 March 2013 
478 A Eurydice report notes that ‘in order to guarantee that all students, regardless of their place of 
residence, have the same opportunities to gain access to higher education, the State has established a 
general grants and assistance system charged to its general budget’ (European Commission 
Education Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, (2012) Structures of education and training 
systems in Europe. Spain. 2009/10 
<eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/documents/eurybase/structures/041_ES_EN> accessed 20 
Feb 2012, page 51). Financial assistance takes the form of short-term ‘mortgage style’ loans provided 
to Spanish and EU national students, which that must be repaid within three years of graduation (UK 
Government Department for Business Innovation and Skills, (2010) Review of Student Support 
Arrangements in Other Countries Research Paper Number 10 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31991/10-670-
review-student-support-in-other-countries.pdf> accessed 3 March 2013, page 157). Variance in 
financial support does however manifest in the supplementary loans and bursaries are offered by 
Autonomous Communities. Under the scheme implemented in Catalonia, loans of up to €9,000 are 
available to persons enrolled on courses in Catalonia, and to persons registered as residents in 
Catalonia who are studying in non-Catalan universities (Generalitat de Catalunya Agència de Gestió 
d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca, ‘Pre-doctorate scholarships and grants: Pre-doctorate loans’ 
(2011) 
<http://www10.gencat.cat/agaur_web/AppJava/english/a_beca.jsp?categoria=predoctorals&id_beca=1
6648> accessed 15 Feb 2013; Generalitat de Catalunya Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de 
Recerca, ‘Bases del Programa de Préstamos Preferentes Subvencionados para Estudiantes 
Universitarios. Curso 2010-2011’ (2011) 
<http://www10.gencat.cat/agaur_web/generados/angles/home/recurs/doc/bases_prefe__2010_11_cast
ella.pdf> accessed 21 Feb 2013). 
479 The statutory basis for charging for prescription fees is found in National Health Service Act 2006 
s.172 (applying to England only); National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978 s.69; National Health 
Service (Wales) Act 2006 s.121 (Wales); and Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) 
Order 1972/1265, Sch. 15. The following regulations enacted under these respective Acts are currently 
determinative of fees charged in respect of prescriptions: National Health Service (Charges for Drugs 
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charges for persons resident within their territory, whereas the charges levied for 
medication dispensed at pharmacies in England have risen steadily.  
 
Trajectory of prescription fees up until 2011 (Source: BBC News)480 
 
 
Several polities in the UK charge differential fees depending upon where a 
prescription was written, with the result that prescription charges in the UK vary 
dependent both upon the polity in which the service is delivered, and the polity in 
which the recipient resides.481 Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish prescriptions that are 
                                                                                                                                          
and Appliances) Regulations 2000 (SI 2000/620) (applying to England only); The National Health 
Service (Free Prescriptions and Charges for Drugs and Appliances) (Scotland) Regulations 2011 (SSI 
2011/55) s.3; National Health Service (Free Prescriptions and Charges for Drugs and Appliances) 
(Wales) Regulations 2007 (S.I. 2007/121), s.3 and Charges for Drugs and Appliances (Abolition) and 
Supply of Appliances Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2010 (NI SI 2010/71). 
480 BBC News, ‘Prescription charges abolished in Scotland’ (1 April 2011) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12928485> accessed 20 Aug 2012 
481 As GPs apply a ‘catchment area’ to the services they deliver, persons are usually resident in the 
same polity in which the prescriptions issued by their GP are written. There are exceptions to this 
general rule: a person requiring the services of a GP when away from their place of residence can 
enrol as a ‘temporary resident’ (NHS Choices, (2012)  <http://www.nhs.uk/chq/Pages/how-do-i-
register-as-a-temporary-resident-with-a-gp.aspx?CategoryID=68&SubCategoryID=158> accessed 26 
Feb 2013), and persons resident close to the English/Welsh or English/Scottish border may be resident 
in one polity, but their local GP may be registered in another. Persons registered with a GP in England 
but who are resident in Scotland or Wales are eligible to receive an ‘Entitlement Card’, which when 
presented with their prescription, entitles them to free prescriptions in the polity in which they are 
resident (The National Health Service (Free Prescriptions and Charges for Drugs and Appliances) 
(Scotland) Regulations 2011 (SSI 2011/55) s.4(1)(g); National Health Service (Free Prescriptions and 
Charges for Drugs and Appliances) (Wales) Regulations 2007 (S.I. 2007/121), s.11). See NHS 
Scotland, ‘Entitlement cards’ (2013)  <http://www.psd.scot.nhs.uk/doctors/entitlement-cards.html> 
accessed 17 Feb 2013; NHS Wales, ‘Entitlement cards’ (2013) 
<http://www.healthcosts.wales.nhs.uk/entitlement-cards> accessed 19 Feb 2013. Exemptions from 
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cashed at pharmacies in Scotland are dispensed free of charge, whilst English 
prescriptions cashed at pharmacies in Scotland are charged at £7.65 each.482 All 
prescriptions cashed in England are charged at £7.65, with the exception of 
prescriptions from Northern Ireland which are dispensed free of charge.483 
Prescriptions dispensed in Wales are free of charge, with the exception of English 
prescriptions which are charged at £7.65.484 All prescriptions dispensed in Northern 




Prescription charges have also been subject to variance between Autonomous 
Communities in Spain. From June 2012 a €1 surcharge was levied on all 
prescriptions dispensed at pharmacies in Catalonia, as part of a package of measures 
                                                                                                                                          
prescription charges apply in all polities for certain persons on low income or with certain illnesses, or 
in respect of certain medications.  
482 The National Health Service (Free Prescriptions and Charges for Drugs and Appliances) (Scotland) 
Regulations 2011 (SSI 2011/55), s.3(1) and 3(2) 
483 National Health Service (Charges for Drugs and Appliances) Regulations 2000/620 s.3(1) and 
s.7.D 
484 National Health Service (Free Prescriptions and Charges for Drugs and Appliances) (Wales) 
Regulations 2007/121, s.3; NHS Scotland, (2011) Abolition of Prescription Charges 
<http://www.psd.scot.nhs.uk/prescriptioncharges.html#FAQ2> accessed 17 Feb 2013; Northern 
Ireland Government Services, (2013) Prescription Charges <http://www.nidirect.gov.uk/prescription-
charges> accessed 17 Feb 2013 
485 Charges for Drugs and Appliances (Abolition) and Supply of Appliances Regulations (Northern 
Ireland) 2010/71; Northern Ireland Government Services (2013) 
Location of Pharmacy 





















England £7.65 £7.65 £7.65 Free 
Scotland  £7.65 Free Free Free 
Wales £7.65 Free Free Free 
NI Free Free Free Free 
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enacted by the Catalan Generalitat intended to reduce the budgetary deficit.486 
Similar measures were subsequently enacted in Madrid.487 The Catalan fee is 
reported to have generated €46 million of revenue in the first six months, reducing 
public expenditure on pharmaceuticals in Catalonia by 23.9% compared to the 
previous year.488 The measure has proved contentious, not least because prior to 
entry into force of the Catalan charge, the Spanish Cortes introduced a centralised 
‘co-payment’ scheme whereby all persons must pay between 10% and 60% of the 
cost of state-subsidised prescription medication.489 Catalans are consequently 
‘affected by two fiscal measures for the same product’,490 and the Spanish 
Government has challenged the constitutionality of the measures on the ground that 
they contravene the right to equality of all Spanish nationals. On 15th January 2013 
the Constitutional Court admitted the Government’s appeal against prescription fee, 
suspending the measures for a period of five months pending review.491 
 
 
                                                 
486 Llei 5/2012, del 20 de març, de mesures iscals, inanceres i administratives de l’impost sobre les 
estades en establiments turístics. See Catalan News Agency, ‘The Catalan Government keeps the drug 
prescription fee despite Madrid’s additional measures’ (19 April 2012) 
<http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/catalan-government-keeps-drug-prescription-fee-
despite-madrid%E2%80%99s-additional-measures> accessed 10 Feb 2013; and Catalan News 
Agency, ‘Catalan citizens start to pay the drug prescription fee from Saturday’ (22 June 2012) 
<http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/society-science/catalan-citizens-start-pay-drug-
prescription-fee-saturday> accessed 10 Feb 2012. 
487 El País, ‘Madrid follows Catalonia with drug prescription surcharge’ (31 Oct 2012) 
<http://elpais.com/elpais/2012/10/31/inenglish/1351694298_854013.html> accessed 17 Feb 2013 
488 Catalan News Agency, ‘The Constitutional Court halts Catalonia’s drug prescription fee, bank 
deposit tax and judicial fees’ (15 Jan 2013) 
<http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/constitutional-court-halts-
catalonia%E2%80%99s-drug-prescription-fee-bank-deposit-tax-and-judi> accessed 15 Jan 2013 
489 Real Decreto-ley 16/2012, de 20 de abril, de medidas urgentes para garantizar la sostenibilidad del 
Sistema Nacional de Salud y mejorar la calidad y seguridad de sus prestaciones (Boletín Oficial del 
Estado, Núm. 98 Martes 24 de abril de 2012, Sec. I. Pág. 31278). See also IberoSphere, ‘New co-
payment scheme for Spanish medical prescriptions’ (5 July 2012) 
<http://iberosphere.com/2012/07/new-co-payment-scheme-for-spanish-medical-prescriptions/6502> 
accessed 10 Feb 2013; and Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, ‘Spanish Public Healthcare 
System: Is it Sustainable?’ (2013) 
<http://www.cidob.org/en/publications/articulos/spain_in_focus/february_2013/spanish_public_health
care_system_is_it_sustainable> accessed 28 Feb 2013. 
490 Catalan News Agency (2013), reporting on the position adopted by the Spanish Government. 
491 Ibid. See also El País, ‘Constitutional Court freezes one-euro prescription fee on medicines in 
Catalonia’ (15 Jan 2013) <http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/01/15/inenglish/1358263600_236902.html> 
accessed 13 Feb 2012. On 29 January the Madrid surcharge was also suspended by the Constitutional 
Court (El País, ‘Constitutional Court suspends copayment on prescriptions in Madrid’ (29 Jan 2013) 
<http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/01/29/inenglish/1359464673_893000.html> accessed 24 Feb 2013). 
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 Intra-state movement and parameters of equal sub-state 4.2.
membership 
The foregoing overview of differential fee rates illustrates the disparities in social 
rights that ensue from exercise of devolved competences. It also indicates that those 
disparities are in the UK context not simply the product of territorially-differentiated 
social policy. Rather, they arise from curtailment of the rights of persons accessing 
services in a sub-state polity of which they are not a member, and – in the case of 
Scottish tuition grants – the curtailment of rights of persons exporting that benefit 
outwith the sub-state polity of which they are a member.  
These distinct sub-state membership groupings have been constructed in 
response to concern that persons may travel within the state to access preferential 
services offered within a particular region, resulting in disproportionate pressure 
being exerted on resources of those sub-state polities with the most preferential 
arrangements. In the case of prescription charges, where the financial gain to the 
individual is relatively low, such intra-state ‘welfare migration’ is likely to be limited 
to border regions where people can access the service of a neighbouring polity with 
ease. Such patterns have been reported in Spain, where unofficial reports have 
suggested a 5% increase in persons accessing pharmaceutical services in Azuqueca 
de Henares – a town in the Autonomous Community of Castile-La Mancha that lies 
on the border with the Community of Madrid – following introduction of the €1 
surcharge on prescriptions dispensed in the Community of Madrid.492  
Both the scope and effect of such ‘welfare-migration’ is likely to be far 
greater in the case of tuition fees, with a mobile populous of students incentivised to 
move to one polity over another in light of the significant financial advantages that 
would result. Discussing the variance in tuition fee rates following the increase in the 
regulatory cap in England with effect from 2012, the Scottish Government noted 
that: 
 
                                                 
492 El País reports that ‘[t]he Castilla-La Mancha health department believes the impact of this drug 
tourism boom will be minimal. Citing the example of Aragon after Catalonia became the first region 
to apply a one-euro co-payment charge, it believes the practice will soon disappear’ (El País, ‘Have 
prescription, will travel: Are drug charges creating pharmacy tourism boom?’ (11 Jan 2013) 
<http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/01/11/inenglish/1357914446_299468.html> accessed 11 Jan 2013). 
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‘Scotland will become the cheapest destination for higher education 
in the UK. Students who usually live in England could, for example, 
continue to pay fees of £1,820 per year to attend a Scottish university 
as opposed to up to five times that – £9,000 – in their home nation. 
This would create an unparalleled level of competition for places at 
Scottish universities, displacing suitably qualified Scottish domiciled 
students.’493 
 
In response to significant divergences in social policy, sub-state polities in the 
UK have thus reactively narrowed the bounds of equal membership, curtailing 
eligibility of persons who are accessing services or goods and who do not have the 
requisite link with that polity. In the case of prescription charges, the requisite link is 
established through residence, in a condition that is indirectly imposed upon the 
recipient by reference to the polity in which the prescription was written.494 In 2005 
the Welsh Health Minister explained the motivation behind measures to restrict the 
benefit of free prescriptions to persons presenting a Welsh prescription form: 
 
‘The measures announced today will overcome concerns raised 
that the reduced prescription charges in Wales could attract 'health 
tourists' from outside Wales, coming to benefit from the lower 
charges. We're committed to introducing free prescriptions for all 
in Wales by April 2007. Prescriptions will fall by another £1 on 1 
April 2006 to £3 and will be the next step in meeting that goal. 
While there is little evidence of prescription tourism to date, as 
prescriptions gets cheaper, the risks will increase.’495 
 
                                                 
493 Scottish Government (2011), page 7. The prudence of this measure as a means by which to protect 
places for Scottish students has been called into question, with some sources noting that Scottish 
students may lose out on places offered to English counterparts who pay higher fees (The Guardian, 
‘Competition for places at Scottish universities will be fierce in 2012’ (12 Sep 2011) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2011/sep/12/scottish-universities-uk-students-fees> accessed 
28 Aug 2012). 
494 See above at n.481 
495 Welsh Government, ‘Action on Health Tourism’ (2005) <http://www.wales.nhs.uk/news/3688> 
accessed 15 Aug 2012. See also comments made in 2005 by the (then) First Minister for Wales 
Rhodri Morgan: ‘(Health tourism) isn't a problem yet, but it could be when the difference gets even 
starker next year or the year after’ (BBC News, ‘Pledge to stop 'health tourists' (1 April 2005) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/4402041.stm> accessed 17 Aug 2012). Such restrictions have not 
eliminated concerns regarding welfare migration, with several claims that people are ‘cheating the 
system’ by falsely registering with GPs in Wales when resident in England using addresses of friends, 
or failing to de-register when moving elsewhere (The Telegraph, 'Thousands of English patients go to 
Wales for free prescriptions' (17 April 2008) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1895846/Thousands-of-English-patients-go-to-Wales-for-
free-prescriptions.html> accessed 13 Sep 2012). See also Daily Mail, ‘Wales now has more NHS 
patients than people as English flock over the border for free prescriptions’ (16 April 2008) 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-560103/Wales-NHS-patients-people-English-flock-border-
free-prescriptions.html> accessed 15 Feb 2013. 
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Residence does not, however, prove sufficient to establish the necessary link 
between recipient and polity in the case of subsidised provision of higher education, 
where people often re-locate their residence in the course of accessing the service in 
question. Sub-national polities in the UK have consequentially restricted access to 
Higher Education benefits through what is colloquially referred to as an individual’s 
‘domicile’. This concept – which in its technical form is a subjective test of a 
person’s ‘real’ or ‘permanent home’ – is approximated in regulations through the 
condition of a qualified form of ‘ordinary residence’. The natural meaning of 
‘ordinary residence’ refers to a voluntary residence for ‘settled purposes’ as part of 
the ‘regular order’ of a person’s life,496 but where this term is used to condition 
access to higher education services it is accompanied by the interpretative provision 
that ‘a person who is ordinarily resident in England, Wales, Scotland, Northern 
Ireland or the Islands, as a result of having moved from another of those areas for 
the purpose of undertaking…the current course…is to be considered to be ordinarily 
resident in the place from which the person moved’.497  
 This qualified form of ordinary residence was initially used solely as a means 
by which to apportion jurisdictional responsibility for the provision of student 
                                                 
496 The leading judgment concerning the interpretation of ‘ordinary residence’ is R. v Barnet LBC Ex 
p. Shah (Nilish) [1983] 2 A.C. 309, in which Lord Scarman explained that ‘ordinarily residence refers 
to a man's abode in a particular place or country which he has adopted voluntarily and for settled 
purposes as part of the regular order of his life for the time being, whether of short or of long 
duration’ (page 343). Prior to this case, the Local Authorities that were at that time in charge of 
allocating grants had considered the concept of ‘ordinary residence’ from precluding persons that 
were so resident for the purpose of study. The House of Lords in Shah rejected this proposition: ‘An 
attempt has been made in this case to suggest that education cannot be a settled purpose. I have no 
doubt it can be. A man's settled purpose will be different at different ages. Education in adolescence 
or early adulthood can be as settled a purpose as a profession or business in later years’ (page 344). 
As a result of this decision, regulations determinative of ‘sufficient connection with the UK’ that were 
at that time passing through Parliament were supplemented with the condition that a person must have 
been ‘ordinarily resident’ other than wholly or mainly for the purpose of receiving full time education 
(Education (Fees and Awards) Regulations 1983 (S.I. 1983/937)), reflecting the Government’s 
intention to ‘restore the situation broadly to what it was before the 16th December judgment [in 
Shah]’ (Hansard, HL Deb 12 May 1983 vol 442 cc634-46). 
497 Education (Student Support) Regulations 2011 (SI 2011/1986), s1(3) (English regulations). Similar 
provision is found in Scottish regulations: ‘a person who is ordinarily resident in Scotland as a result 
of having moved from a part of the United Kingdom other than Scotland for the purpose of 
undertaking a course of education is to be considered to be ordinarily resident in the part of the 
United Kingdom from where they moved’ (Education (Fees) (Scotland) Regulations 2011 (SSI 
2011/389), Regulation 2(3) and (4); Students’ Allowances (Scotland) Regulations 2007 (SSI 
2007/153), Regulation 2(3) and (4)). These conditions ‘approximate’ a person’s domicile in that they 
provide objective from which the individual’s ‘real’ or ‘permanent’ home is presumed. The two do 
not, however, necessarily coincide: a person (especially a postgraduate or mature student) may re-
locate for the purpose of education but not, subjectively, retain a ‘real’ home elsewhere.  
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support between sub-state polities, ensuring that student finance is exportable from 
the sub-state polity from which the student had travelled rather than received in the 
sub-state polity to which they had moved to study. Such apportionment of 
responsibility creates differential rights between persons studying at the same HEI 
but who are subject to the regulatory control of different sub-state polities: a student 
at a HEI in Scotland who is accessing English student finance receives a fee-loan to 
cover the cost of their tuition, whereas a student who is accessing Scottish student 
finance is eligible for a fee grant.498  
As the divergence between regulatory fee caps has increased, a condition of 
ordinary residence has also been used by sub-state polities as a means by which to 
distinguish between categories of persons falling within their regulatory control. 
Prior to amendments entering into force in 2012, all UK domiciled students were 
eligible to benefit from the regulatory fee stipulation at Scottish universities, 
irrespective of the sub-state polity in which they were resident prior to commencing 
study.499 In 2011, the Scottish Parliament enacted measures to exempt students at 
Scottish universities who are ‘ordinarily resident’ in England from receiving the 
benefit of regulatory fee stipulation, in order to ‘maintain current levels of cross 
border student flows within the UK and thereby protect opportunities for Scottish 
domiciled students’ in light of increase in fee rates at universities in England.500  
 
 Equal membership and inter-state migration: equality of EU Citizens 4.3.
Discussion thus far has been concerned with the construction of membership 
boundaries within a group of UK-domiciled persons, and has considered the extent to 
which sub-state polities extend or withdraw the boundaries of equal membership in 
                                                 
498 Differential student support arrangements introduced a ‘middle tier’ into individual liability for 
tuition in Scotland prior to removal of the fee cap in 2011: prior to this date, both Scottish- and ‘rest of 
the UK’-domiciled students were charged the same fees, but those fees were met on behalf of 
Scottish-domiciled students by the Scottish Government. 
499 Education (Fees and Awards) (Scotland) Regulations 2007 (SSI 2007/152) s.7 and Schedule 1 
required an individual only to have a ‘relevant connection’ with the United Kingdom (rather than to 
Scotland) in order to benefit from the regulatory fee cap. 
500 Scottish Government (2011), page 13. Similar measures have been introduced in Northern Ireland, 
where the regulatory fee cap of £3575 applies only to students domiciled within the territory, and an 
unregulated fee rate of £9,000 is applied by HEIs in Northern Ireland to ‘rest of the UK’ students. 
England and Wales make no differentiation between persons domiciled within constituent units of the 
UK for the purpose of fee regulation, requiring simply that a person is domiciled in the UK. 
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the context of intra-state movement. Sub-state competence to allocate membership 
benefits is, however, not exclusive, but rather is subject to the right of non-
discrimination enjoyed by migrant EU citizens under EU law.501 The interaction of 
sub- and supra-state competences is especially disruptive of equal membership in the 
context of higher education in the UK. 
The right of non-discrimination under Art 18 TFEU secures access to higher 
education for EU Citizens in a second Member State on terms equal to those enjoyed 
by nationals of that Member State.502 Scotland is therefore required to ensure that 
HEIs within its territory do not charge higher fees to migrant EU citizens than they 
do to UK nationals, and must make available fee loans and grants to migrant EU 
citizen students on the same basis as it does to UK nationals who are ordinarily 
resident in Scotland.503 As a result of their EU law right of equal treatment, EU 
Citizens who move to Scotland for the purpose of study from another Member State 
are entitled both to benefit from the regulatory fee cap, and to receive a full grant in 
respect of tuition.  
The CJEU has consistently held that the right to non-discrimination enjoyed 
by European Citizens cannot be invoked in a ‘wholly internal situation’, with the 
result that EU law allows for the construction barriers to intra-state movement by 
sub-state legislatures, in so far as those barriers differentiate between nationals of 
that Member State who have yet to exercise their right of free movement throughout 
                                                 
501 The right of equal treatment is limited to EU citizens in cross-border situations, and does not 
extend to secure the equality of EU Citizens moving across internal borders within the territory of the 
state of which they are nationals.  For this reason sub-state polities can distinguish between groupings 
of UK-domiciled persons under national law, but are prohibited from applying differential rights to 
migrant EU citizens under EU law. 
502 In Case 293/83, Françoise Gravier v City of Liège [1985] ECR 00593, the CJEU considered that 
imposition of a ‘minerval’ (a registration fee) upon non-Belgian nationals studying vocational courses 
at Belgian institutions was contrary to the right of non-discrimination.  In arriving at this conclusion, 
the Court made reference to the common vocational training policy established under Art 128 EEC, 
and noted that ‘[a]ccess to vocational training is in particular likely to promote free movement of 
persons throughout the Community, by enabling them to obtain qualification in the Member State 
where they intend to work’ (para.24). The subsequent case of Blaizot confirmed that university studies 
in general are regarded as vocational training (Case 24/86, Vincent Blaizot v University of Liège and 
others [1988] ECR 00379). 
503 In Lair the CJEU held that the right of non-discrimination attaches to access to higher education, 
requiring Member States to grant financial assistance on equal terms ‘only in so far as such assistance 
is intended to cover registration and other fees, in particular tuition fees, charged for access to 
education’ (Case 39/86, Sylvie Lair v Universität Hannover [1988] ECR 03161, para. 16). Member 
States are entitled to restrict maintenance grants within certain limits (Case C-209/03, The Queen, on 
the application of Dany Bidar v London Borough of Ealing and Secretary of State for Education and 
Skills [2005] ECR I-02119; see discussion on minimum income allowances at n.387, above). 
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the Union.504 This introduces an ‘anomaly’ in fee differentiation, whereby sub-state 
legislatures may curtail access of nationals moving within state territory, but are 
required under EU law to secure equality of treatment with EU Citizens moving from 
a second Member State. As a result, EU Citizens domiciled in a second Member 
State acquire more preferential rights when studying in Scotland than do UK 
nationals domiciled in England, Wales or Northern Ireland.  
A second form of ‘anomaly’ occurs when considering the intra-state 
movement of EU Citizens domiciled in the UK. Although intra-state movement of 
UK nationals is a ‘wholly internal situation’ outwith the bounds of EU law, sub-state 
legislatures are prohibited under EU law from restricting the benefits enjoyed by 
migrant EU Citizens who move across internal state boundaries.505 Addressing a 
measure enacted by a sub-state legislature in Belgium that restricted the benefit of a 
social insurance scheme to persons resident within its territory, the CJEU explained 
that: 
 
‘Migrant workers, pursuing or contemplating the pursuit of 
employment or self-employment in one of those two regions, might 
be dissuaded from making use of their freedom of movement and 
from leaving their Member State of origin to stay in Belgium, by 
reason of the fact that moving to certain parts of Belgium would 
cause them to lose the opportunity of eligibility for the benefits which 
they might otherwise have claimed’506 
 
The Court thus came to the conclusion that ‘legislation of a federated entity of a 
Member State’ that limits receipt of benefits on the grounds of residence in that 
territory is contrary to the right of free movement throughout the Union, ‘in so far as 
                                                 
504 Case C-212/06, Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v Flemish 
Government [2008] ECR I-01683. Considering a care insurance scheme established by a sub-state 
legislature in Belgium, the Court considered that ‘application of the legislation at issue in the main 
proceedings leads, inter alia, to the exclusion from the care insurance scheme of Belgian nationals 
working in the territory of the Dutch-speaking region or in that of the bilingual region of Brussels-
Capital but who live in the French- or German-speaking region and have never exercised their 
freedom to move within the European Community. Community law clearly cannot be applied to such 
purely internal situations. It is not possible…to raise against that conclusion the principle of 
citizenship of the Union set out in Article 17 EC…The Court has on several occasions held that 
citizenship of the Union is not intended to extend the material scope of the Treaty to internal 
situations which have no link with Community law’ (para 37-39). On the wholly internal principle, see 
section 2.3.1 at page 50, above. 
505 By ‘migrant EU Citizen’ it is meant those that have exercised a right of free movement in a second 
Member State. 
506 Walloon para.48 
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such limitation affects nationals of other Member States or nationals of the Member 
State concerned who have made use of their right to freedom of movement within the 
European Community.’507 
As a result of this approach, a migrant EU Citizen is entitled to benefit both 
from a regulatory fee cap and a full grant in respect of tuition, even where they had 
previously been domiciled elsewhere in the UK prior to commencing study in 
Scotland. Not only, then, are EU Citizens domiciled in a second Member State 
subject to more preferential rights than UK nationals domiciled in England, Wales, 
or Northern Ireland, but a UK national and a non-UK EU Citizen who are both 
domiciled in the UK outwith Scotland are subject to differentiated rights purely by 
reason of their nationality.  
 
Table 2: Liability in respect of tuition under Scottish Regulations508 
 Domiciled in 
Scotland 
Domiciled 
elsewhere in UK 
Domiciled in another 
Member State 
UK 
national Nil £9,000 
£9,000  
if domiciled in England, 
Wales or Northern Ireland 
prior to exercising right of 
free movement  
 
Nil  
if domiciled in Scotland 
prior to exercising right of 




Nil Nil Nil 
 
This distinction attracted a substantial degree of attention when it was 
confirmed by the Scottish Government in the spring of 2012 that dual nationals 
holding both UK nationality and that of a second Member State who are domiciled in 
England, Wales or Northern Ireland are entitled to benefit from receipt of a fee grant 
in respect of tuition costs. Specifically, the Scottish Government confirmed that ‘In 
                                                 
507 Walloon para. 60 
508 Education (Fees) (Scotland) Regulations 2011 (SSI 2011/389), Schedule 1 
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assessing whether a dual UK/EU national [is entitled to receipt of a grant] the 
approach taken by SAAS was to consider whether that person satisfies the criteria 
solely on the basis of the person’s status as a national of an EU member state other 
than the UK’.509 
This clarification gave rise to suggestions that UK nationals could acquire the 
nationality of a second Member State in order to bring themselves within the scope 
of more favourable conditions applied to non-UK EU citizens; an option available in 
particular to UK nationals born in Northern Ireland, who are entitled to acquire Irish 
citizenship under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement.510 As tuition fees across 
the UK rose in 2012, several reports circulated noting the ‘loophole’ that allowed 
dual nationals domiciled in Northern Ireland to benefit from free tuition in Scotland, 
when they would otherwise be liable for fees of £3,575/year when studying in 
Northern Ireland and fees of up to £9,000/year when studying in England, Wales or 
Scotland. This situation was reported in overwhelmingly negative terms in the UK 
press, reflecting multiple discontents rooted in differentiation based on domicile, the 
perceived inequity of preferential rights afforded to migrant EU citizens, and the fact 
that one particular sub-national group are in a position to avoid differential fee 
imposition, where others are not: 
 
‘Loophole that lets Irish students dodge Scottish tuition fees’ [‘Teenagers are 
exploiting a loophole that grants EU students free tuition while UK residents are 
forced to pay up to £9,000 a year’] Daily Express May 2nd 2012  
 
                                                 
509 Scottish Government Education Circular LJ/002/2012 (unpublished), referenced in Scottish 
Government (Employability Skills and Lifelong Learning Directorate), ‘Scottish Government 
Education Circular LJ/05/2012’ (2012) <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0041/00415203.pdf> 
accessed 15 Oct 2012. See also Northern Ireland Assembly, Scotland Tuition Fees and Northern 
Ireland Students (Research and Information Service Briefing Note, Paper 68/12 (NIAR 264-2012), 
2012). 
510 Article Art. 1(vi) of the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ states that: ‘The birthright of all the people of 
Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so 
choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British and Irish citizenship is accepted 
by both governments and would not be affected by any future change in the status of Northern 
Ireland.’ This right was inserted into s.6 of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 by the Irish 
Nationality and Citizenship Act 2001. Irish citizenship also has a particularly wide scope of ius 
sanguinis and can be acquired by second generation descents ‘even where the parent entitled to be an 
Irish citizen had not obtained [Irish] citizenship’ (John Handoll, (2012) EUDO Citizenship 
Observatory Country Report: Ireland <http://eudo-




‘Loophole ‘lets Northern Irish students avoid Scottish tuition fees’’ [‘Scottish 
universities have denied they are facing an influx of so-called “fee refugees” 
from Northern Ireland after it emerged some students there are being told that 
they can obtain free tuition with an Irish passport’] The Scotsman 2 May 2012  
 
‘20% of NI students 'to exploit Irish passport loophole'’ BBC News 28 May 2012 
 
‘Grannygate' row over loophole that will allow thousands of English students 
with Irish heritage to attend Scottish universities for free’ [Thousands of English 
and Welsh students will be able to gain free tuition at Scottish universities by 
claiming Irish grandparents] Daily Mail 10 May 2012 
 
Despite enrolment figures at Scottish universities for the academic year 
2012/2013 having indicated that the number of persons from Northern Ireland 
accessing free tuition by these means were not as large as had been projected,511 the 
Scottish Government still considered it necessary ‘to take action to close it for future 
years to avoid any confusion for students and parents alike.’512 In September of 2012 
it was announced that ‘[w]ith effect from the 2013/14 academic year, dual nationals 
are not entitled to receive equal treatment with UK nationals normally resident in 
Scotland in relation to entitlement to be charged regulated fees and the availability 
of tuition fee support from SAAS simply because they are also a national of an EU 
member state other than the UK’.513 The revised policy requires an EU Citizen to 
provide proof of having exercised a right of residence throughout the Union 
(including in the Member State of which they are a national) before being eligible to 
access free tuition in Scotland as an EU Citizen.514 It remains to be seen whether this 
policy will be challenged on the grounds of its incompatibility with the right to equal 
treatment of EU Citizens, given that the CJEU has consistently held that ‘it is not 
permissible for a Member State to restrict the effects of the grant of the nationality of 
another Member State by imposing an additional condition for recognition of that 
                                                 
511 The Scottish Government reported that ‘the number of students with Northern Ireland postcodes 
accepted to Scottish institutions for session 2012/13 is down by 19 per cent according to UCAS 
statistics issued on 23 August. Equivalent figures for students with Republic of Ireland postcodes are 
down by 6 per cent’ (Scottish Government, ‘Action on fees for dual nationality students’ (14 Sep 
2012) <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2012/09/EU-students14092012> accessed 15 Sep 
2012 
512 Ibid. 
513 Scottish Government (Employability Skills and Lifelong Learning Directorate) (2012) 
514 Northern Ireland Assembly, ‘Scottish Universities – Proof of Residence’ (Research and 
Information Service Briefing Note, Paper 170/12 (NIAR 714-2012), 2012); Student Awards Agency 
for Scotland, ‘Tuition fee support for dual EU (non UK) and UK nationals’ (2012) 
<http://www.saas.gov.uk/student_support/funding_update.htm> accessed 20 Oct 2012 
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nationality with a view to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms provided for in 
the Treaty’.515  
 The ‘anomalies’ created by the juxtaposition of a national system that allows 
for sub-state polities to protect their educational systems against intra-state ‘welfare 
migration’, and a supra-state system that requires the opening of borders for persons 
moving between (and certain persons moving within) Member States would 
disappear in the event that Scotland gained independence. An independent Scotland 
would no longer be able under EU law to confer differential rights upon UK 
nationals, with the result that Scottish independence would necessitate removal of the 
‘rest of the UK’ fee rate introduced in 2011, and all UK nationals moving to Scotland 
for the purpose of study would be able to access grants in respect of fees on the same 
terms as Scottish nationals. This requirement casts some doubt on the sustainability 
of a policy of universally-funded higher education, but whilst this matter has 
received some attention in political commentary, it has yet to be dealt with by the 
SNP Government campaigning for independence.516 On the contrary, First Minister 
Alex Salmond has gone so far as to suggest that a universal right to free education 
ought to be embedded in a written constitution as constitutional rights.517 
 
                                                 
515 Case C-148/02, Carlos Garcia Avello v État belge [2003] ECR I-11613. The Court in this case 
found a link with Union law in respect of persons ‘who are nationals of one Member State lawfully 
resident in the territory of another Member State. That conclusion cannot be invalidated by the fact 
that the children involved in the main proceedings also have the nationality of the Member State in 
which they have been resident since their birth and which, according to the authorities of that State, is 
by virtue of that fact the only nationality recognised by the latter’ (paras 27-28). See also Case C-
353/06, Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul [2008] ECR I-07639. 
516 Speaking in a debate in the House of Lords, Lord Sewel asked ‘does the noble Lord recognise the 
supreme irony in the Scottish Government's position? On the one hand, they are arguing for 
independence, but the policy they are pursuing can be carried out only while they remain members of 
the United Kingdom. If they achieved independence within the EU, they would not be able to have this 
pernicious policy’ (Hansard HL 2 Feb 2012: Column 1722). See also The Herald, ‘The SNP policy on 
tuition fees will become even less affordable if Scotland becomes independent’ (15 Feb 2012) 
<http://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/opinion/the-snp-policy-on-tuition-fees-will-become-even-
less-affordable-if-scotland-becomes-independent.1329326656> accessed 12 Aug 2012; and BBC 
News, ‘Twelve unresolved questions on Scottish independence’ (25 Jan 2012) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-16636325> accessed 25 Jan 2012. 
517 In a speech delivered in January 2013, the Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond noted: ‘In 
Scotland we have a policy of the right to free education in keeping with our history as the nation 
which pioneered universal education…There is an argument for embedding those provisions as 
constitutional rights’ (Alex Salmond, ‘Speech delivered at Foreign Press Association, London, 
January 16, 2013’ <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Speeches/constitution-rights-16-01-2013> 
accessed 6 March 2013. See also Scottish Government, ‘Scotland’s Future: from the Referendum to 
Independence and a Written Constitution’ (2013) 
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0041/00413757.pdf> accessed 3 March 2013, pages 8-9. 
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 Differential social rights and ‘discrimination’ 4.4.
Differential social rights that result from the devolution of competence to sub-state 
units disrupt traditional frames of equality in several ways. First, the construction of 
sub-state membership groups means that a national who is subject to the regulatory 
competence of one sub-state unit may acquire more preferential rights than a national 
who falls within the jurisdiction of a second sub-state unit.  
More problematically, divergences in social policy have prompted sub-state units to 
enact measures to prevent intra-state welfare migration, with the result that two 
nationals subject to the regulatory control of the same sub-state unit may acquire 
differentiated rights. This situation manifests in the UK in the form of the differential 
prescription charges incurred by persons presenting English prescription forms at 
pharmacies in Scotland and Wales, and differential fees regulations applied to ‘rest 
of the UK’ students at HEIs in Scotland and Northern Ireland. This form of 
‘inequality’ does not exist in Spain, where the benefit of differential policy on higher 
education fees and prescriptions is bounded by the territory in which the service is 
provided. 
Both of these situations present a challenge to the equality demanded of 
formal citizenship, and are perceived as inequitable especially given that those 
differential policies are largely funded through shared national resources.518 That 
perceived inequity is thrown into even sharper relief in the case of access to higher 
education in the UK, given that EU law requires sub-state legislatures to extend 
benefits to migrant EU citizens. Differentiation of social rights has thus popularly 
been characterised in terms of unfair ‘discrimination’ – particularly against ‘the 
English’, whose rights are curtailed when accessing services in Scotland, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland. The following headlines give some indication as to how these 
issues have been represented in the British tabloid press: 
 
‘Taxpayers across country to foot £2bn bill for Scottish students' free university 
places’ Daily Mail 10 June 2007 
                                                 
518 Speaking in a debate in the House of Lords, Baroness Liddell of Coatdyke noted that: ‘it is largely 
the Barnett formula, which taxpayers throughout the United Kingdom contribute to, that allows the 
Scottish Government to act in this way [to secure tuition free at point of access]. We are 
discriminating against those taxpayers from England, Wales and Northern Ireland’ (Hansard HL 2 




‘Bitter pill for English as prescriptions rise again...just days after Scotland 
made them free’ [‘Prescription charges in England are to rise just days after 
Scotland scrapped them, prompting new claims of health apartheid in Britain’] 
Daily Mail 5 March 2011 
 
‘Free prescriptions for all in Scotland...never mind austerity for the rest of us!’ 
[‘While the English are tightening their belts in the wake of the credit crunch, 
Scotland will spend millions of pounds to abolish prescription charges.’] Daily 
Mail 3 March 2011 
 
Such perceptions of discrimination have engendered attempts by several 
members of the House of Lords to introduce legislation that prohibits sub-state 
legislatures from differentiating between UK nationals based on their place of 
domicile. Lord Foulkes of Cumnock and Lord Forsyth of Drumlean each tabled 
amendments to the Scotland Bill in 2012 that would ensure equality of treatment for 
persons moving within the UK to access Higher Education. Speaking in favour of 
their respective amendments, both Lord Foulkes and Lord Forsyth highlighted their 
discontent with the differentiation between UK nationals on the basis of domicile, 
and the simultaneous grant of access to migrant EU Citizens:  
‘My Lords, it is my pleasure to move Amendment 22, which would 
prevent the Scottish Executive and the Scottish Parliament from 
imposing discriminatory fees on students at Scottish universities who 
are resident in England, Wales or Northern Ireland…What has been 
agreed by the Scottish Executive and Scottish Government is 
tremendously unfair discrimination against students from England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland who go to Scottish universities. It really 
is quite disgraceful. It is astonishing, when you think of it, that 
students from Lisbon, Madrid or Berlin will all get in free to Scottish 
universities, but students from Belfast, London or Cardiff will have 
to pay fees.’519 (Lord Foulkes) 
 ‘The new clause in my amendment is intended to make clear that the 
Scottish Parliament is free to exercise its powers, but it cannot 
exercise its powers in a way that discriminates against people from 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland relative to people in other 
European states. That is the real wickedness involved in what is 
happening now: Greeks, Germans, Poles and French all get the 
                                                 
519 Lord Foulkes, Hansard HL 2 Feb 2012: Column 1721-2 
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same deal as the Scots, but English, Welsh and Northern Ireland 
people do not.’520 (Lord Forsyth) 
 
Though neither of the proposed amendments to the Scotland Bill was accepted,521 
Lord Forsyth reintroduced his proposed amendments in the form of the ‘Higher 
Education (Fees) Bill’, which had its first reading before the House of Lords on 17 
May 2012.522 The stated purpose of the Bill is to ‘ensure that Higher Education 
institutions in England and Wales and Scotland may not vary fees charged to British 
students based on a student’s place of domicile; and to require organisations using 
public funds to assist students in paying fees not to vary support based on a student’s 
place of study within the United Kingdom’.523 For this purpose it seeks to introduce a 
clause into the Scotland Act 1998 that curtails the legislative competence of the 
Scottish Parliament in respect of measures ‘would result in residents of England, 
Wales or Northern Ireland being treated differently to citizens of other EU member 
states’.524 
 
4.4.1. A legal case for discrimination? 
It has already been noted that the imposition of surcharges on prescriptions imposed 
by the Autonomous Communities of Madrid and Catalonia is currently the subject of 
legal contestation before the Spanish Constitutional Court, on the grounds that they 
contravene the constitutionally-protected right of equality of Spaniards.525 Whilst 
there has been a significant degree of political rhetoric surrounding the differential 
fee rates charged been UK-domiciled students in respect of tuition, the perceived 
‘discrimination’ resulting therefrom is unlikely to be justiciable under UK law. The 
prospect of litigation on this issue has been raised once: following enactment of the 
                                                 
520 Lord Forsyth, Hansard HL 2 Feb 2012: Column 1724 
521 Lord Foulkes withdrew his amendment, stating that ‘I hope that [the Education Minister in 
Scotland] can take some time out to talk to people about this anomaly, which clearly upsets so many 
people, not just in this Chamber but, far more importantly, outside it, and try to find a fair and 
equitable solution’ (Hansard HL 2 Feb 2012: Column 1743). Lord Forsyth’s amendment was not 
moved. 
522 The first reading of the Bill is a formality, and as of 15 March 2013 a second reading has yet to be 
scheduled. 
523 Higher Education (Fees) Bill [HL] 2012-13 (HL Bill 22) 
524 Ibid. 
525 See text at n.491, above.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
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Student Fees (Specification) (Scotland) Order in 2011 in order to remove the 
regulatory fee cap from ‘rest of the UK’ domiciled students, there was a brief flurry 
of interest in a statement issued by Phil Shiner of ‘Public Interest Lawyers’ 
concerning his intention to mount a judicial review against the regulations, on the 
grounds that they are contrary to the prohibition of discrimination under the Equality 
Act 2010.526 
Given that it held little prospect of success, it is unsurprising that this 
anticipated action never materialised. In order to bring a successful judicial review of 
the regulations under the Equality Act, a claimant would have to demonstrate that 
they belong to a group with common ethnic or national origins that are less able to 
meet the criteria of ‘ordinary residence’ in Scotland.527 The ‘English’, ‘Welsh’ and 
‘Northern Irish’ persons that are disadvantaged by application of this criterion are 
not, however, distinct national or ethnic groups, but rather are a set of persons 
domiciled in the UK. That group may include persons of any number of ethnicities 
and nationalities, including third-country nationals who are entitled to receive rights 
by virtue of their ‘sufficient connection’ to the UK.528 Phil Shiner has reportedly 
argued that ‘the argument about domicile and nationality doesn't hold water. If being 
Welsh, English, Irish or Scottish is not a matter of national origin then it makes a 
nonsense of the establishment of parliaments in each place’.529 In so claiming, he 
fails to distinguish between the dominant sub-state national identity that legitimates 
sub-state governance, and the group of domiciled persons that reap the benefit of 
                                                 
526 The Guardian, ‘Does Scotland's university fees system breach human rights laws?’ (24 Aug 2011) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/aug/24/scotland-university-fees-human-rights> accessed 25 
Aug 2012; Halsbury's Law Exchange, ‘The right to education: a legal challenge to Scottish university 
fees’ (2011) <http://www.halsburyslawexchange.co.uk/the-right-to-education-a-legal-challenge-to-
scottish-university-fees/> accessed 6 Sep 2012; UK Human Rights Blog, ‘University funding, 
Scotland and a question of equality’ (2011) <http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2011/08/22/university-
funding-scotland-and-a-question-of-equality/> accessed 10 Sep 2012 
527 Section 9(1)(c) of the Equality Act 2010 includes ‘national or ethnic origins’ within the definition 
of the protected characteristic of ‘race’.  
528 Sub-state membership groupings based on domicile within a particular sub-state territory are 
nested within the requirement that an individual have ‘sufficient connection’ with the UK.  A person 
has ‘sufficient connection’ with the UK if they are ‘settled’ there (they must be ordinarily resident in 
the UK with no restrictions on the period for which they remain), and have been ordinarily resident in 
the UK throughout the three year period prior to commencing study, other than wholly or mainly for 
the purpose of receiving full-time education (Education (Fees and Awards) (England) Regulations 
2007 (SI 2007/779), enacted under The Education (Fees and Awards) Act 1983).  
529 The Guardian, ‘Scotland's university fees 'discriminatory', says lawyer’ (21 Aug 2011) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2011/aug/21/scotland-university-fees-discriminate-lawyer> 
accessed 13 Oct 2012 
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devolved policy on the basis of their domicile in the territory. Whereas the former 
constitute a group of persons with shared ‘national origins’ falling within the 
protected characteristic, the latter do not. 
Neither can persons domiciled in the UK outwith Scotland claim redress on 
the basis that they are discriminated against vis-à-vis EU Citizens by reason of their 
UK nationality: the Equality Act allows for differentiation on grounds of nationality 
or ordinary residence, in so far as that action is ‘in pursuance of an instrument made 
by a member of the executive under an enactment’.530 Such ‘reverse discrimination’ 
also falls outwith the bounds of EU law, as a ‘wholly internal situation’.531 Whereas 
differentiated social rights are popularly perceived as inequitable, there is thus no 
legal redress under UK or EU law for those that perceive themselves to be subjected 
to such ‘discrimination’. 
 
 Conclusion 4.5.
Devolution of competence to sub-state legislatures in the field of social policy marks 
a departure away from the nation-state as the frame of equal membership, 
contradicting the presumption that rights constitutive of social citizenship are 
necessarily delivered by institutions of state and are legitimated and sustained by (a 
state-wide) national social solidarity.532 Exercise of devolved competences has 
witnessed the emergence of distinct and privileged membership groupings below the 
level of the state, contesting the equality traditionally associated with national 
citizenship.  
Public perception of differentiated social rights identifies an intrinsic tension 
within constitutional asymmetry, which requires a delicate balance between 
commonality and divergence across the constituent polities of the constitutional 
structure. On the one hand, differentiated social rights arguably secure equality of 
                                                 
530 Equality Act 2010 Schedule 23(1) 
531 See above at page 50. 
532 Keating identifies the duality of this relationship when he explains that observers have ‘noted the 
role of the welfare state in promoting integration across classes and religions or other social 
segments…later writers such as David Miller (1995) have insisted on the importance of shared 
nationality for solidarity and the welfare state. In this, the causation is reversed, with common 
nationality being the basis for social sharing, but the effect is similar’ (Keating (2009), page 501). 
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nationals through the protection of national minority groups.533 Devolution is, after 
all, predicated upon the right of self-government of national minorities, and its very 
function is to give a sub-state polity the ability to respond to the distinct socio-
economic needs expressed by that group. In this respect, it is arguably somewhat 
contradictory to devolve competence in order to secure equality for national 
minorities, only to maintain that equality demands that that competence be exercised 
in the same way across the territory.  
On the other hand, the nation and the state both continue to play a prominent 
role in the benefits enjoyed by persons across all sub-state territories: certain social 
rights remain organised at the level of the state,534 and funds for devolved policies 
largely come from shared state-wide resources that are predicated upon the social 
solidarity of the nation.535 The continued relevance of the nation and the state leads 
to a presumption of a common core of social citizenship enjoyed by nationals across 
the constitutional asymmetry, with the result that differentiated rights are frequently 
perceived as an affront to social justice. That perception is heightened under those 
circumstances in which differential rights are a result of one sub-state polity 
curtailing the benefit of services accessed by non-members in response to fears over 
intra state ‘welfare migration’, and where that benefit is simultaneously extended to 
non-nationals. Defence of differentiated rights on the basis of the rights of national 
minorities has done little to quieten perceived injustice, as those differential fees do 
not in isolation protect a particular cultural characteristic or socio-economic trait of 
the national minority, and are extended to all within the territory on the basis of 
                                                 
533 One school of thought contests that equality demanded by citizenship is achieved through the grant 
of universal rights, but rather suggests that equality in any meaningful sense demands group-
differentiated rights. Iris Marion Young, who advocated the grant of differential rights to protect 
social groups facing oppression, argues that a ‘strict adherence to a principle of equal treatment tends 
to perpetuate oppression or disadvantage’. Group representation, by contrast ‘is the best antidote to 
self-deceiving self-interest masked as an impartial or general interest…Group representation 
provides the opportunity for some to express their needs or interests who would not likely be heard 
without that representation’(Young (1989), page 251). Will Kymlicka has argued that differential 
rights are legitimated for minority groups bound by a ‘societal culture’, in order to secure equality in 
those circumstances in which a national minority is facing an unfair disadvantage, or in order to 
protect diversity of cultures (Kymlicka (1995) pages 76-77 and 108). 
534 Social security, for example, remains largely organised at the level of the State, as was illustrated 
in the previous chapter. 
535 See n.198 
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domicile or residence. 536 Moreover, whilst the right to pursue a distinct social policy 
may legitimate divergences between sub-state policies, it does little to address the 
inequity that flows from the curtailment of benefits to persons moving between sub-
state units, or the concurrent extension to migrant EU citizens. 
Perceived inequalities stemming from substantially diverging social rights 
have the potential to undermine the social solidarity upon which the welfare state is 
predicated. Though the fragmentation of competences need not necessarily lead to an 
‘absolute decline’ in social solidarity, which can be re-built in different forms and at 
different levels of government,537 it may tip the balance of union and differentiation 
that bonds polities of the constitutional asymmetry. This concern has been reflected 
by the Calman Commission on Scottish Devolution, which in considering the future 
of Scotland within the Union emphasised the role of a ‘social union’, an intrinsic part 
of which was a common understanding of social citizenship across the constituent 
polities of the asymmetric constitution: 
 ‘there are certain social rights which should also be substantially 
the same, even when it is best that they are separately run in 
Scotland. The most important of these are that access to health care 
and education should be, as now, essentially free and provided at the 
point of need. And when taxes are shared across the UK they should 
take account of that need. Our first recommendation is therefore that 
the Scottish and UK Parliaments should confirm their common 
understanding of what those rights are, and the responsibilities that 
go with them’.538 
 
                                                 
536 They are group-differentiated rights only in the indirect sense that they are the product of a broader 
right to self-determination and, under a generous interpretation, to the extent that they afford 
recognition to a distinct political preference. 
537 Keating argues that ‘it is a mistake to believe that if social solidarity weakens at the level of the 
‘nation-state’, this always and necessarily represents an absolute decline in solidarity…Of course, 
devolution does mean that individuals will be treated differently according to where they live within 
the state, as devolved governments make different policy choices. This is an anomaly and an injustice 
to those who see social citizenship as working only at the level of the whole state but not above or 
below it. …It is true that there may be a trade-off between solidarity at one territorial level and 
solidarity at another, and that solidarity at different levels may take different forms, be thicker or 
thinner, and rely on different policy instruments’ (Keating (2009), pages 504 and 506). 
538 Commission on Scottish Devolution (2009), page 6. The SNP, meanwhile, talk of a ‘social union’ 
between an independent Scotland and the rest of the UK, but fail to translate this into its real 
significance for terms of common policies on social rights. 
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In the absence of such an agreement, it is entirely possible that devolution will 
‘diminish the sense of, and importance of, shared and common interests that are at 
the heart of a national political community’, and will ‘become, in turn, a catalyst for 
new problems and further changes’.539 Fragmentation of social citizenship may thus 
contribute towards the ‘centrifugal forces’ identified by Charles Tarlton as an 










                                                 
539 John Roberts, ‘Asymmetrical Federalism: Magic Wand or 'Bait and Switch' Asymmetry Series 
2005 (17) <http://www.queensu.ca/iigr/working/asymmetricfederalism.html> accessed 7 August 
2010, page 3 
540 Tarlton’s initial exposition considered the importance of asymmetry to lie with its indication of the 
sustainability of a federal structure. ‘When diversity predominates’, he argued, ‘the "secession-
potential" of the system is high and unity would require controls to overcome disruptive, centrifugal 
tendencies and forces’ (Tarlton (1965), page 873). 
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5. Conclusions: equal membership in asymmetric 
constitutions 
The foregoing study of social citizenship rights in two constitutional asymmetries has 
sought to tease out the complexities of equal membership in a constitutional structure 
in which legislative competence is fragmented across interdependent polities. The 
study is focussed upon highlighting the ways in which constitutional asymmetry sits 
uncomfortably alongside the traditional ‘national’ model of membership, in which 
membership benefits are granted to nationals on the basis of a shared national 
community. 
 
Citizenship and the nation-state 
The study is premised upon the understanding of citizenship as a principle of 
equality, secured through a bundle of civic, political and social rights that form the 
substantive benefit of membership. It starts from the assumption that membership 
benefits have traditionally been conferred by the state, to nationals, on the basis of a 
shared national identity (a ‘national’ model of membership). In support of this 
assumption, chapter one of the study considered how the revival of citizenship in its 
modern form developed contemporaneously with the nation-state: a rise of cultural 
nationalism in the eighteenth century created self-conscious ‘membership 
organisations’ that asserted a democratic right of self-governance, investing the 
sovereign power of the state in a unified body of peoples. The solidarity and loyalty 
associated with the national community are credited with providing the conditions 
under which egalitarian membership could fully be realised, through the 
universalization of political rights and the grant of social rights. 
 
Contestation of the nation 
The homogeneous identity upon which a national model of membership is predicated 
has, however, been subject to contestation: the nation is subject to challenges ‘from 
above’ by way of globalisation and the movement of people across borders, and has 
been contested ‘from below’ by self-conscious national minorities. National 
membership organisations no longer map neatly onto the territorial boundaries of the 
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state. Such contestation problematizes the national model of membership, raising the 
question of how membership based upon a singular national identity can meet the 
demands of a liberal theory of citizenship. In particular, it has raised the question of 
the obligation of states towards resident non-nationals, and has generated criticism 
that national models of membership afford insufficient recognition of and protection 
to minority cultures. 
 In chapter one it is suggested that much of modern citizenship scholarship 
can be understood as an endeavour to reconfigure the bounds of equal membership in 
terms of balance between rights, status and identity, so as better to meet the demands 
of social justice. Some have defended the use of formal status as a means by which to 
allocate rights, claiming that the nation is not only a practical necessity of the modern 
political order, but also is of intrinsic value in sustaining a common solidarity 
necessary for the operation of democracy and to sustain the re-distributive functions 
of the welfare state. Theorists such as David Miller have thus sought to reconcile a 
national model of membership with the demands of liberal theory by realigning 
national identity along a ‘civic’ axis: a common national identity is sustained through 
a shared civic status rather than through common culture or ethnicity, thus preserving 
the integrity and significance of national boundaries but rendering them permeable 
enough to admit resident non-nationals through naturalisation.  
Other theorists have suggested a reconfiguration of national membership in 
such a way as retains the significance of formal membership, but which disputes the 
necessity of a singular cultural loyalty: Rainer Bauböck’s theory of ‘transnational 
citizenship’ argues that the dual loyalties engendered by transnational migration 
eschew the exclusivity of national identity in favour of multiple and overlapping 
identities, whilst theories of differentiated or ‘multicultural citizenship’ argue 
towards the protection of minority cultures through group differentiated rights. A 
third group of theorists argue that the nation no longer constitutes the necessary 
foundation for egalitarian citizenship, and that liberal democratic citizenship can be 
sustained on grounds other than the loyalty fostered by a common culture. Such 
theorists reject the presumption that membership benefits ought to be allocated to 
nationals on the basis of a shared national identity: Yasmin Soysal’s model of 
‘postnational citizenship’ has observed that membership benefits are increasingly 
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allocated on the basis of a universal status of personhood, whereas Dora 
Kostakopoulou’s ‘a-national’ model of membership has suggested a revised 
institutional design whereby membership benefits attach to a person’s domicile, 
rather than to their nationality. 
 
Contestation of the State 
The review of citizenship theory in chapter one highlighted the emergence of a body 
of literature devoted to the potential inequity resulting when a national model of 
membership is applied to a heterogeneous state population. What has received much 
less attention is the way in which national membership is further problematized by 
the disaggregation of state sovereignty. The assumption made by many 
reconfigurations of national citizenship is that whilst the significance of the nation 
may shift, the state remains the dominant organisational framework within which 
membership benefits are distributed. Yet such an assumption is no longer necessarily 
true. Discussion in chapter two has demonstrated that contestation of the nation is 
intimately bound up with a shifting constitutional landscape: claims to self-
governance asserted by national minorities have been accommodated through the 
devolution of competence to sub-state legislatures, and (in a reversal of causality) 
competences transferred to European Union have been underpinned by attempts to 
strengthen a common European identity. In this revised constitutional landscape, the 
organisation of certain membership benefits – notably social rights – has been 
transferred away from the state, and is delivered through alternative institutional 
frameworks below the level of the state. 
The development of sub- and supra-state polities has been addressed in 
citizenship literature primarily in terms of the capacity of those polities to foster 
loyalties and solidarities capable of sustaining alternative locations of citizenship. 
Little attention has been paid to the basis on which membership benefits are allocated 
within this revised constitutional landscape, or the way in which non-state polities 
meet the demands of social justice by extending (or withholding) the rights that they 
provide. In contrast to the large volume of literature addressing the way in which 
states allocate membership benefits in response to challenges to national identity, 
there has been very little consideration of the way in which membership benefits 
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granted by non-state polities map onto the nested identities with which they are 
associated.  
The concept of constitutional asymmetry – by which is meant both de facto 
variations in the underlying social and political fabric of the polities, and de iure 
variations in the scope of competences enjoyed by those polities – is used within this 
study as a means by which to represent the web of constitutional relations that 
characterise this shifting landscape. Such variation may occur between constituent 
territorial units (horizontal asymmetry), between a constituent unit and the polity as a 
whole (vertical asymmetry) and – in the case of England in the UK – between a 
constituent unit and non-devolved territory (diagonal asymmetry). 
The conundrum of how to balance rights, status and identity in order to meet 
the demands of social justice is replicated across multiple and nested polities of a 
constitutional asymmetry, introducing a secondary tension into membership 
definition: not only must non-state polities determine the basis on which they extend 
or withdraw the rights under their control, but they do so in a context in which the 
demands of social justice in one polity diverge from that of another in which they are 
nested.  
 
Constitutional asymmetry and the fragmentation of membership 
competences 
Chapter two embarked upon the task of untangling the implications of 
constitutional asymmetry for membership definition, by mapping the fragmentation 
of legislative competences determinative of social membership across two 
asymmetric constitutions. It presented a threefold classification of ‘membership 
competences’ that collectively are determinative of an individual’s access to 
substantive membership benefits: the competence to provide social goods and 
services (by which it is meant the competence to determine the level of benefit 
available, and the administrative responsibility to deliver it); the competence to 
allocate social goods and services (referring to the ability of a polity to include or 
exclude a particular group of persons from receipt of those goods); and the 
competence to determine access to social goods and services (through control of 
residence and nationality as ‘gateways’ to receipt of social rights).  
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The chapter examined the de facto asymmetries in culture and wealth 
between sub-state polities and the state (and between sub-state polities themselves) 
that have driven claims for increased autonomy, and mapped the resulting vertical 
and horizontal variations in competence across those structures.  
Devolution of legislative competence in certain fields of social policy has 
meant that the competence to provide social goods and services – traditionally the 
preserve of the state – is now enjoyed by both the state and sub-state polities. Certain 
aspects of social welfare have been devolved to sub-state polities in the UK and 
Spain (namely competence in the fields of education, healthcare, social care and 
housing) whereas others (namely social security) remain organised at the level of the 
state. In both Spain and the UK, sub-state welfare provision is funded primarily 
through centrally-collected taxes by way of block grant, thus preserving 
‘redistributive’ function of state and helping to retain its territorial integrity. 
Competence to allocate welfare is not, however, the sole preserve of those 
polities responsible for its delivery: the right of equality bestowed upon certain 
persons under EU law demands that the state and sub-state polities make available 
the goods that they provide to certain persons on equal terms as they do to their own 
members. Goods that are provided at the sub-state and state level and which are 
funded by state are thus also allocated by the EU. 
Finally, the membership benefits that an individual receives are determined 
also by controls over access to social goods and services. Control over residence and 
nationality, which form the ‘gateways’ to social citizenship, falls within the shared 
competence of the state and the EU. Competence to secure access to social rights is 
thus divorced from the competence to provide them: sub-state polities neither have 
control over their territorial borders, nor any capacity to confer or withdraw the 
status of nationality. The state has also surrendered some control in this area to the 
EU, and now has limited competence to restrict the right of residence enjoyed by EU 
Citizens and their family members (and, in so far as concerns Spain, certain other 
third-country nationals). Conversely, the scope of rights enjoyed under EU law is not 
ultimately determined within the competence of the EU, as Member State nationality 
provides the gateway through which an individual acquires the status of European 
Citizenship and the rights that flow from it. 
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The analysis in chapter two has illustrated two ways in which competence 
over membership definition in constitutional asymmetry differs from that of a 
sovereign state. First, it has illustrated that competence to allocate social rights is 
enjoyed at the sub-state, state and EU level, with the result that all of these polities 
adopt a position on the scope of persons entitled to benefit from the rights that they 
confer. Differential exercise of these competences, as is seen in the case studies in 
chapters three and four, contributes to the asymmetry that manifests across the 
constitutional structure. Secondly, the social rights that a given individual enjoys are 
determined by an interaction of fragmented competences to provide, to allocate, and 
to determine access to social rights, with the result that no one polity has exclusive 
control over the boundaries of social citizenship. 
 
Constitutional asymmetry and national membership 
The function of chapter two had been to demonstrate that the inclusion or exclusion 
of an individual from receipt of social rights is the product of multiple and 
interdependent decisions taken within the legislative competence of a number of 
polities. The purpose of the case studies in chapters three and four was to explore 
further the way in which these competences are exercised so as to define the 
boundaries of social membership, and to consider how those boundaries interact 
across the constitutional asymmetry. The two case studies focus upon different 
dimensions of the constitutional asymmetry: chapter three considers the vertical 
asymmetries in competence and membership definition that manifest in the EU-State 
relationship,, and chapter four considered the additional asymmetries that manifest 
between sub-state units (and, where the State legislates on behalf of a non-devolved 
territory, between sub-state territories and the State), and between sub-state units and 
the EU.  
Three primary observations can be drawn from the case studies that illustrate how the 
fragmentation of legislative competence across a constitutional asymmetry sits 
uneasily with a national model of membership. First, examination of the criteria 
conditioning receipt of social rights illustrates that constituent polities of the 
constitutional asymmetries under examination do not directly condition receipt of 
social benefits on the basis of nationality, thus lending qualified support to a theory 
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of domicile-based citizenship in respect of social rights. Secondly, differentiated 
rights enjoyed by a particular sub-set of nationals are incompatible with the 
presumed equality of nationals under a national model of membership, and result in 
the perception of inequity and discrimination. Conversely, extension of rights to EU 
Citizens suggests that participation in a singular national identity is no longer 
determinative of the receipt of rights. Finally, the interdependence of membership 
competences across the constitutional asymmetry means that it is no longer possible 
for a polity to restrict the membership benefits that it provides purely on the basis of 
interests within its own control, with the result that constituent polities reactively 
define the boundaries of equal membership in response to the exercise of 
membership competences in other polities. 
 
Criteria determinative of the allocation of social rights within the respective 
competences of sub-state, state and EU polities 
 
Both case studies commenced with a consideration of the criteria according to which 
social rights are allocated within the respective competences of the polities under 
examination, indicating the balance that they draw between rights, status and 
identity. The case studies have shown that social rights under consideration are 
granted by the state primarily on the basis of an individual’s residence within its 
territory, and are conditioned by requirements pertaining to the length of an 
individual’s residence (in the case of minimum income contributions in the UK and 
Spain), and the purpose of their residence (in the case of access to higher education 
in the UK). Allocation of these social rights is, however, not blind to an individual’s 
nationality, and in the UK a large number of non-nationals are excluded from 
accessing both minimum income allowances and the benefit of regulatory fee caps 
and student support by virtue of their immigration status. 
 Sub-state polities in both the UK and Spain have largely mirrored the external 
membership boundaries of the state when deliberating on the issue of inclusion of 
non-nationals, with the result that membership is ‘nested’: a person cannot receive 
the benefit of rights allocated from a sub-state polity without first having met the 
criteria of social membership of the state within which it sits. Sub-state polities also 
construct membership boundaries internally within the group of state members. Sub-
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state polities in the UK have carved out a privileged group of state members by 
reference to the sub-state territory within which an individual is resident (in the case 
of prescription fees) or domiciled (in the case of higher education benefits). By 
contrast, sub-state polities in Spain have delineated the benefits of the social rights 
under examination purely by reference to the territorial limits within which that 
service is delivered. 
 The right of equal treatment under EU law is conferred primarily by reference 
to the formal status of EU Citizenship, though has progressively been extended to 
certain persons on the basis of their residence in a Member State (through the right of 
equality enjoyed by long term residents, and through the extension of social security 
co-ordination to third country nationals in cross border situations, and to third-
country national workers resident in the territory of a Member State). 
 The case studies thus indicate that polities exercise their competences so as to 
allocate social rights primarily (though not exclusively) on the basis of residence 
within their territory. Both state and sub-state polities confer social rights on non-
nationals, and sub-state polities have not sought to replicate a national model of 
membership ‘writ-small’, by making rights conditional upon a civic status that is 
demonstrative of the shared cultural membership upon which their right of self-
determination is predicated. This would suggest that a national model of membership 
resonates less strongly in respect of social rights than it does with political rights. 
Nationality remains, however, a determinative factor in the receipt of rights 
from all polities: EU law confers entitlement predominantly on the basis of EU 
Citizenship (which itself is derived from Member State nationality), and certain non-
nationals are exempt from receipt of membership benefits from the UK and Scotland 
by virtue of their immigration status (‘persons subject to immigration control’ are 
precluded from accessing minimum income allowances in the UK, and persons who 
do not have indefinite leave to remain in the UK are exempt from the regulatory fee 
cap or student support in both the UK and Scotland). The national model of 
membership thus continues to assert influence over the allocation of social rights in 
the constitutional asymmetries under examination, as nationality remains a point of 




Differentiated rights and ‘discrimination’ 
The primary focus of the case studies has been upon those secondary tensions 
that result from the interaction of membership boundaries across the asymmetric 
constitutions and the extent to which they are compatible with a national model of 
membership. Chapter four focussed its attention upon the perceived inequity that 
flows from the pursuit of differential social policy by sub-state legislatures. In 
particular, it identified the perceptions of inequality that ensue from measures taken 
by sub-state polities in the UK to curtail the rights of persons accessing services in 
their territory who are domiciled elsewhere in the state (as seen in the de-regulation 
of tuition fees for ‘rest of the UK’ students in Scotland and Northern Ireland, and in 
the differential fee imposition for prescriptions cashed in Scotland and Wales), which 
have given rise to claims of one sub-state polity discriminating against the members 
of another (usually in terms of discrimination by Scotland/Wales/Northern Ireland 
against ‘the English’). The interaction of sub-state and EU competences has also 
given rise to claims of discrimination in regard to other forums, notably between 
persons domiciled in England and migrant EU Citizens, but also between UK 
nationals and EU citizens on the basis of ‘reverse discrimination’ that privileges 
migrant EU citizens (and dual nationals taking advantage of ‘passport movement’) 
over UK-EU Citizens purely by reason of their nationality. The issue of differential 
rights and discrimination was also examined in chapter three, which considered 
discrimination from an EU law perspective. This case study examined the exclusion 
under UK law of certain EU Citizens from receipt of minimum income allowances, 
and the extent to which those measures are incompatible with the EU law right of 
non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality. 
 These studies of discrimination serve to illustrate an inherent tension in the 
definition of membership across constitutional asymmetries, in which the demands of 
social justice and the correlative bounds of equal membership asserted by interrelated 
polities are in contention with one another. Equality of EU Citizens demands that all 
(migrant) EU citizens are allocated social rights on the same basis of nationals of the 
competent Member State; equality of nationals generates an assumption of universal 
social rights and the ability to protect social welfare provision through the exclusion 
of non-nationals; and equality of minority national groups demands differentiated 
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social policy and the ability to exclude non-members in order to guarantee the 
sustainability of that differentiated policy. The perception of ‘anomaly’ or inequity 
that results from differentiated rights for a sub-set of nationals and the extension of 
rights to non-nationals is thus one that is informed from a nation-centric perspective: 
it does not necessarily mean that such differentiation is inequitable per se, but rather 
that it is incompatible with a model of membership predicated upon nationality being 
the dominant frame of equal membership. 
 
Reactive definition of equal membership 
Competing demands of equality have prompted state and sub-state polities to 
reactively define the boundaries of equal membership, so as to condition the rights 
that a given individual may derive by reason of his membership in another of the 
constituent polities. 
 The study of minimum income allowances in chapter three probed how the 
UK and Spain have taken decisions on the inclusion and exclusion of persons from 
social benefits in response to the conferral of rights under EU law. The chapter 
demonstrated that rights derived under EU law widen the scope of persons entitled to 
access benefits provided by the state: the right of residence enjoyed by persons under 
EU law increases the volume of persons that are entitled to receive social benefits 
from the State by virtue of their residence, and the right of equality conferred under 
EU law allows certain third-country nationals to access social rights who would 
otherwise be exempt by virtue of their immigration status.  
In response to these developments, both the UK and Spain have reactively 
narrowed the bounds of equal membership in order to protect the sustainability of the 
welfare system. Both Spain and the UK have attempted to restrict access to social 
rights through control over an individual’s residence – primarily through tightening 
administrative controls in order give full affect to the leeway afforded to Member 
States under EU law (as illustrated by recent legislative reforms in Spain), and also 
indirectly through control over access to the labour market (as illustrated by the 
transitory restrictions imposed on Bulgarians and Romanians). Moreover, the UK has 
narrowed the allocation of social rights, exempting from their benefit persons 
exercising particular rights of residence under EU law (namely persons exercising an 
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unconditional three-month right of residence under EU law, jobseekers exercising an 
extended right of residence under EU law, and carers of dependent UK nationals).  
Reactivity of membership definition has also been identified in the 
relationship between the state and sub-state polities in the case study on differential 
fee imposition in chapter four. Study of the boundaries of social rights conferred by 
sub-state polities in the UK has demonstrated that Scotland has reactively narrowed 
the boundaries of equal membership in so far as concerns access to higher education, 
in response to significant divergence in social policy between sub-state units. Policy 
divergence has also prompted reactive membership definition from other constituent 
polities of the UK, albeit in a non-regulatory form: perceptions of disadvantage 
within England have prompted a wave of public resentment that some policy analysts 
fear will undermine the future of the Union. 
Reactive definition of membership in Scotland is largely a response to fears 
over ‘welfare-migration’, a fear that is exacerbated by the lack of control that those 
polities providing (and funding) social rights have over the ‘gateways’ through which 
they are accessed. Whilst both the logic and empirical reality of welfare migration 
have been called into question, the perception thereof is sufficient to provoke a 
restriction in the boundaries of equal membership. The ‘problem’ of welfare 
migration thus lies not so much in its impact upon the social welfare systems of 
receiving states, but rather in the curtailment of equal membership that it engenders.  
In one sense, then, the reactivity of membership boundaries between polities of the 
constitutional asymmetry has witnessed a return to a national model of membership, 
to the extent that measures enacted within the competence of the state have attempted 
to privilege nationals over non-nationals (as was seen in the UK context by the 
introduction of the ‘right to reside’ test that exempts certain categories of EU 
Citizens and their family members from receipt of minimum income allowances). It 
has also driven the reactive exercise of sub-state competence to construct more 
restrictive boundaries within a group of nationals. In the broader perspective, the 
reactivity of membership boundaries thus suggests that constitutional asymmetry sits 
uneasily alongside a presumption that membership benefits are allocated primarily 




Constitutional asymmetry and the reconfiguration of membership 
The study of allocation of social rights across the constituent polities of two 
asymmetric constitutions illustrates the additional challenge that the disaggregation 
of sovereignty presents to the definition of equal membership: not only is the 
national model of membership subject to contestation by reason of multiple 
identities, but is also subject to challenge by reason of the fragmentation of 
membership competences across nested polities. The transfer of membership 
competences away from the state has resulted in perceptions of ‘discrimination’ and 
inequality amongst nationals, and the interdependence of membership competences 
has encouraged polities at all levels to reactively define the bounds of equal 
membership in such a way as protects equality of alternative identity groupings. 
 
 What, then, does the future hold for citizenship in asymmetric constitutions? 
On the one hand, the reactive definition of polity membership – which invokes 
within a sub-state context the logic of closed boundaries previously associated with 
the nation-state – and the perception of inequality that ensues therefrom, may prove 
too destructive a force to overcome. In this scenario, the tensions inherent in 
membership definition within asymmetric constitutions contribute to the ‘centrifugal 
forces’ that Charles Tarlton envisaged would destabilize the constitutional 
framework and increase the ‘secession-potential’ of the constituent units.541 Other 
theorists have noted the process of ‘catch up’ that ensues from enhanced autonomy 
and claims to independence, and many fear that a vote for independence in the 
forthcoming Scottish referendum would not only fuel other secessionist claims 
within the UK (as, for example, have recently been floated in Shetland, Orkney and 
the Western Isles),542 but also for other sub-state units in Europe.543 We might thus 
                                                 
541 Tarlton’s initial exposition considered the importance of asymmetry to lie with its indication of the 
sustainability of a federal structure. ‘When diversity predominates’, he argued, ‘the "secession-
potential" of the system is high and unity would require controls to overcome disruptive, centrifugal 
tendencies and forces’ (ibid, page 873; see further above at n.102). See also John Roberts, who argues 
that devolution will ‘diminish the sense of, and importance of, shared and common interests that are 
at the heart of a national political community’, such that constitutional adaptations ‘become, in turn, a 
catalyst for new problems and further changes’ (Roberts (2005), page 3). 
542 Guardian, ‘Scottish independence: islands consider their own 'home rule'’ (17 March 2013) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/mar/17/scottish-independence-islands-home-rule> accessed 
17 March 2013 
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conclude from these tensions that constitutional asymmetry is doomed to fail, and 
will invariably see a return to independent states.  
 This is, however, not the sole and necessary consequence of the tensions 
identified within this study. In an alternative scenario, we might imagine a 
reconfiguration of citizenship that is tied less closely to national identity, within 
which membership delineation does not prove as destructive a force for the 
constitutional structure. The function of this study has not been to furnish a revised 
normative model of membership, but rather to provide a conceptual groundwork 
upon which further studies may be built. It has sought to illuminate the tensions 
inherent within membership definition in asymmetric constitutions, and in doing so 
to flag the need for further normative and empirical work in this field. Emerging 
theories of citizenship developed in response to national contestation may provide 
the building blocks by which we might reconcile some of these differences, but this 
study has demonstrated the need for such theories to pay closer consideration to how 
membership models operate across multiplicious and interdependent polities. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                          
543 There has been much speculation that Scottish independence would trigger increased momentum 
for separatist movements elsewhere in Europe (see, e.g. Vincent Manancourt, ‘Will Scottish 
independence cause a domino effect?’ The Journal (2013) <http://www.journal-




Annex 1: Background and development of European 
Citizenship, 1957 - 2011  
Information sourced primarily from Commission reports on Citizenship (see 
references in table below) and Antje Wiener, ‘From Special to Specialized Rights – 
The Politics of Citizenship and Identity in the European Union’ in Michael Hanagan 
and Tilly C (eds), Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring States (Rowman & 
Littlefield 1999), in conjunction with sources cross-referenced in the various reports 
This time-line was produced in the course of researching the development of 
European Citizenship as examined in chapter two (see n.201, at page 64) 
 
Year Content Title Reference 
1957 Residence for 
economically 
active 
Treaty of Rome (then) Arts 48, 
52 and 59 
 
1961  Council of Europe adopts 
European social charter 
 
1964  Council Directive 64/221/EEC 
on coordination of special 
measures concerning movement 
and residence of foreign 
nationals justified on grounds of 
public policy, security or health 
 
1968  Council Regulation 1612/68 on 
the freedom of workers within 
the Community 
1968 OJ L 257, p.1 
1968  Council Directive 68/360 on the 
abolition of restrictions on 
movement and residence within 
the Community for workers of 
Member States and their families 
1968 OJL 257, p. 13 
1970 Right of 
retired person 
to remain in 
host MS 
Commission Regulation 1251/70 
(right of workers to remain) 
1970 OJ L142/30 
1972  Council Directive 72/194/EEC 
extending scope of Council 
Directive 64/221/EEC to 
workers exercising right to 
remain 
 
1973   Council Directive 73/148 on the 
abolition of restrictions on 
movement and residence 
within the Community for 
1973 OJL 172, p.49 
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nationals of a Member State with 
regard to establishment and the 
provision of services 
1974 Right of 
retired person 
to remain in 
host MS 
Council Directive 75/34 (right of 
self-employed to remain) 
 
1975 OJ L 14/20 
  Council Directive 75/35/EEC 
extending scope of Council 
Directive 64/221/EEC to self-
employed exercising right to 
remain 
 







Communique following Paris 
summit 10 Dec 1974 
Bull. EC 12-1974 
1975  Towards a citizens’ Europe: 
Commission report on special 
rights 
COM (75) 321 final  
Bull. EC Supplement 
7/75, pages 26-32  
1976  Tindemans’ Report on special 
rights 
Bull. EC supplement 
1, 1976 
1976  Council ‘Act concerning the 
election of the representatives of 
the Assembly by direct universal 
suffrage’ 
OJ L 278, 8.10.76, p.1 







EP Resolution on the granting of 
special rights to the citizens of 
the European Community 
(adopting Scelba) 
OJ C 299, 12.12.1977, 
p.26 
1979  First elections to European 
Parliament 
 
1979 Right of 
residence 
Commission proposal for a 
Council Directive on a right of 
residence for nationals of 
Member States in the territory of 
another Member State (not just 
for economically active) 
COM(79)215 final; 
OJ C 207,p.14 
1981  Council resolution on creation of 
single passport 
OJ C 241, 19.9.81 
1983  Legal affairs committee: 
‘Macciocchi report’ 
Doc 1-121/83 
1983  EP Resolution on right of MS 
citizens in another MS to vote 
and stand in municipal elections 




(in favour of formal proposal for 
Directive) 
1984 ‘A People’s 
Europe’ 
Fontainebleau summit Bull. EC 6-1984, pg 7 
(see point 6 @ pg 11) 
1984  A People’s Europe: 
Implementing the Conclusions 
of the Fontainebleau European 
Council (Communication 
Commission – Council) 
COM (84) 446 Final 
1985  Pietro Adonnino report 
(Includes 2 documents: 1st report 
submitted to Brussels European 
Council 29-30 March 1985, 2nd 
report submitted to Milan 
European Council 28-29 June 
1985) 
Bull. EC supplement 
7/85 
1985  Council Resolution on a people’s 
Europe 
OJ C 345, 31.12.1985, 
p.27 
1986  Single European Act (signed 17 
February 1986, entered into 
force on 1 July 1987) – aim 
completion of internal market as 
area without frontiers by 1992 
OJ L 169, 29.6.1987 
1986 Voting rights 
(MS) 
Commission report in voting 
rights in local elections 
(following up point 2 of 
Andonnio 2nd report, pp. 19-20) 
Bull. EC supplement 
7/86 
1987 Right of 
Petition 
Establishment of parliamentary 
Committee on Petitions on 1 
January 1987 
 
1988  Proposed directive on voting 
rights for Community nationals 
in local elections in their 
Member State of residence 
(suspended in light of IGC) 
OJC 246, 20.9.1988, 
p. 3; amended in 
1989: OJC 290, 
18.11.1989, p. 4 
1990 Right of 
Residence 
Council Directive 90/364/EEC 
on the right of residence 
1990 OJ L 180, p. 26 
1990  Council Directive 90/365/EEC 
on the right of residence for 
employees and self-employed 
persons who have ceased their 
occupational activity 
1990 OJ L 180, p. 28. 
1990  Council Directive 90/366/EEC 
on the right of residence for 
students: Annulled in  
Case C-295/90 Parliament v 
Council [1992] ECR1-4193 
And replaced by Directive 




1990  Letter from Spanish Prime 
Minister to inter-institutional 
conference 
SEC(90) 1084; AE 
No. 5252 
1990  Dublin Council 25 – 26th June: 
Spanish recommendation for 
consideration of European 
Citizenship 
Europe Documents 
No. 1628 p.2 
1990  Spanish second proposal on 
citizenship (20 Feb) 
CONF-UP 1731/91, 
20.2.1991 
1990  Commission contribution on 
citizenship to IGC 
SEC(91) 500, 
30.3.1991 
Bull. EC Supplement 
2/91 pp.85 
1990  IGC on political union, Rome 14 
– 15th December 
 
1991  Interim report on Union 
Citizenship, EP Committee on 
Institutional Affairs  
PE 150.034/fin, 
23.5.1991 
1991  EP Resolution on Union 
Citizenship 
OJ C 183, 15.7.1991, 
p.473 
1991  Draft treaty on ‘the Union’  Europe Documents 
No. 1722/1723, 5 July 
1991 
1991  Final report on Union 




1991  Maastricht European Council 9 – 
10th December  
 
1992 Citizenship of 
the Union, 
JHA 
Maastricht Treaty (signed 7 
February 1992, entered into 
force on 1 November 1993) 
OJ C 191 of 29.7.1992 
1992  Communication of 8 May 1992 
on abolition of border controls 
SEC(92)877 final (@ 
p.10) 
  Directive 93/96/EC on right of 
residence for students (replacing 
annulled directive 90/366/EC) 
OJ L 317, 18/12/1993 
p.59-60 
1992  Van Outrive report to EP 
considers residence-based 
citizenship as means to address 
issue of TCN 
(Second report on entry into 





 Guidelines for the Protection of 
Unrepresented EC 
Nationals by EC Missions in 




Group on Consular Affairs) 
1993 Voting Rights 
(EP) 
Draft proposal for a Council 
directive 
On EP voting rights (23 June 
1993) 
SEC(93) 1021 final 
1993  Formal proposal for a Council 
Directive on EP voting rights 
COM(93) 534 final 
1993  Council Directive 93/109 on EP 
voting rights (6th Dec) 
OJ L 329, 30/12/1993 
p.34-38 
1993 Right of 
petition 
Parliament amended Rules of 
Procedure (Articles 156 
to 158 of the new version 
adopted in September 1993 
(former arts 128 to 130) 
 
1993 COM report 
on citizenship 
First report on citizenship  COM(93)702 final 
1994  Council Directive 94/80 on 
municipal voting rights 




Council Decision on consular 
protection 
OJ L 314, 28/12/1995 
p.73-76 
1995  Schengen Agreement (26 March 
1995) 
 
[1996  Council of Europe amends 
European Social Charter] 
 
1996  Council decision on emergency 
travel document 
OJ L 168, 06/07/1996 
p.4-11 
1996  Launch of ‘Citizens’ first’ 
dialogue to increase awareness 
of Union rights 
 
1997  Treaty of Amsterdam  
1997  Report of the High Level Panel 
on the free movement of persons 
chaired by Mrs Simone Veil 
presented to the Commission on 
18 March 1997 
http://tinyurl.com/7t3nk3n 
(accessed 20 March 
2012) 
1997 Single market 
for benefit of 
all citizens 
Single Market Action Plan 
(reconfiguration of single market 
agenda) 
SEC(97)1 final 
1997  Action plan for free movement 
of workers 
COM/97/0586 final 
1997 COM report 
on citizenship 
Second report on citizenship COM(97)230 final 
1998 Voting Rights 
(EP) 
Report on EP Directive COM(97) 731 final 
1999  Tampere Summit 15 and 16 
October 1999 
http://tinyurl.com/ykh4r2y 
(accessed 1 April 
2012) 
2000  Lisbon Summit 23 – 24 March http://tinyurl.com/6xgtxh 
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2000 (accessed 1 April 
2012) 
2000  Nice summit 7 – 9 Dec 2000 http://tinyurl.com/7ucgojx 
(accessed 2 April 
2012) 
2000  Communication on European 
Elections Directive 
COM(2000) 843 final 
2000  Imbeni report to EP  
(& resolution adopting, 5 Sep 
2000) 
A5-0191/2000 
(OJ C 135, 5.9.2000 
p.59) 
2001 COM report 
on citizenship 
Third report on citizenship COM(2001) 506 final 
2002  Council Decision 2002/772 
amending the Act concerning the 
election of the representatives of 
the European Parliament by 
direct universal suffrage 
OJ L 283, 21/10/2002 
p.1-4 
2003  Commission report on 
derogations on EP voting rights 
COM(2003) 31 final 
2003  Communication on EP voting in 
enlarged Union 
COM(2003) 174 final 
2003  Council Directive 2003/109/EC 
concerning the status of third-
country nationals who are long-
term residents 
OJ L 16, 23/1/2004, 
p.44 
2004  Directive 2004/38/EC OJ L 158, 30/4/2004 
p.77 
2004  Brussels summit 4 and 5 
November 2004… (presidency 
conclusions) 
14292/1/04 REV 1 
  …adopting the Hague 
programme  
OJ C 53, 3/3/2005 p.1 
2004 COM report 
on citizenship 
Fourth report on citizenship COM(2004) 695 final 
2005  Report on derogations to right to 
vote and stand in municipal 
elections 
COM(2005) 382 final 
2005  ‘A Common Agenda for 
Integration Framework for the 
Integration of Third-Country 
Nationals in the European 
Union’ (Commission 
communication) 
COM(2005) 389 final 
2006  Commission report on the 
participation of European Union 
citizens in the Member State of 
residence 
COM(2006)790 
2006  Proposal for amendments to  
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Directive on municipal voting 
2007  Report on effective consular 
protection 
COM(2007) 767 final 
2007  Report on derogations from right 
to vote in EP 
COM(2007) 846 
2008  Report on Directive 2004/38/EC COM(2008) 840 
2008 COM report 
on citizenship 
Fifth Report on Citizenship  COM(2008) 85 
2009  Lisbon Treaty  
2009  Communication on better 
transposition of Directive 
2004/38/EC 
COM(2009)313 
2009  An area of freedom, security and 
justice serving the citizen 
(Commission communication) 
COM (2009) 262 final 
2009  Barrosso II commission 
guidelines 
http://tinyurl.com/y9n2teb 
(accessed 5 April 
2012) 
2010  The Stockholm Programme — 
an open and secure Europe 
serving and protecting citizens 
OJ C 115, 4/5/2010 
p.1 
2010  EU Citizens' Rights - The way 
forward - Consultation on 
strengthening Eu citizenship 
http://tinyurl.com/86fjdql 
(accessed 5 April 
2012) 




Sixth Report on citizenship: 





Commission report on progress 




Report on 2009 EP elections COM(2010) 605 
2011  Consular protection for EU 
citizens in third countries: 




Annex 2: Overview of ‘gateway’ competences in the UK 
This table refers to the ‘gateway’ criteria of nationality, as discussed in chapter two 
(see n.Error! Bookmark not defined., at page Error! Bookmark not defined.) 
 
 Nationality Entry and residence 
Scotland 
RESERVED 
Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 5, 
Part II (specific Reservations), 
Head B: 
 
B6. Immigration and nationality 
Nationality; immigration, 
including asylum and the status 
and capacity of persons in the 
United Kingdom who are not 
British citizens; free movement 
of persons within the European 





Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 5, 
Part II (specific Reservations), 
Head B: 
 
B6. Immigration and nationality 
Nationality; immigration, 
including asylum and the status 
and capacity of persons in the 
United Kingdom who are not 
British citizens; free movement 
of persons within the European 
Economic Area; issue of travel 
documents. 
… 
Wales NOT DEVOLVED 
 








Northern Ireland Act 1998, 
Schedule 2 (Excepted Matters): 
 
8. Nationality; immigration, 
including asylum and the status 
and capacity of persons in the 
United Kingdom who are not 
British citizens; free movement 
of persons within the European 




Northern Ireland Act 1998, 
Schedule 2 (Excepted Matters): 
 
8. Nationality; immigration, 
including asylum and the status 
and capacity of persons in the 
United Kingdom who are not 
British citizens; free movement 
of persons within the European 
Economic Area; issue of travel 
documents. 
 
[BUT ‘domicile’ is a reserved 




Annex 3: Legislation determinative of minimum income 
guarantees in the UK 
This table identifies the legislation determinative of receipt of minimum income 
allowances in the UK (see n.357, page 105) 
 
Primary Legislation Secondary legislation 
Immigration and 
Asylum Act 1999 
s115 
Social Security (Immigration and Asylum) 
Consequential Amendments Regulations 2000 (S.I. 
2000/636) s 2 
Social Security 
Contributions and 
Benefits Act 1992 
 
 
Jobseeker’s Allowance Regulations 1996 (S.I. 
1996/207), Regulation 85(4) and 85A; Schedule 5 
Income Support (General) Regulations 1987 (S.I. 
1987/1967), Regulation 21(3) and 21AA; Schedule 7 
para. 17 
Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008 
(S.I. 2008/794), Regulation 69, 70; Schedule 5 
Housing Benefit Regulations (S.I. 2006/ 213), 
Regulation 10 (read in conjunction with Social Security 
Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 s.130) 
Council Tax Benefit Regulations 2006 (S.I. 2006/215), 
Regulation 7 (read in conjunction with Social Security 
Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 s131(1)(b)) 
State Pension Credit Regulations 2002 (S.I. 2002/1792) 
Regulation 2 (Read in Conjunction with State Pension 





Annex 4: Eligibility criteria for receipt of minimum income 
allowances in the UK 
The following categories provide a consolidated summary of the eligibility criteria 
determinative of the receipt of minimum income allowances in the UK (as stipulated 
in the legislation listed in Annex 3) 
 
In order to be eligible for receipt of ‘income-related benefits’ in the UK, an 
individual: 
 
a) Must not be a ‘Person Subject to Immigration Control’,  and  
 
b) Must not be a ‘Person from abroad’544  
 
‘Persons Subject to Immigration Control’ 
2. A person is a ‘person subject to immigration control’ (PSIC) if they are not an 
EEA national and they:  
 
a) require leave to enter or remain but not have it,  
b) have leave to remain that is subject to restrictions on access to public funds,  
c) have leave to enter or remain subject to a written undertaking by a third 
person assuming responsibility for their maintenance and accommodation, or  
d) have continuation of leave to enter or remain subject to an impending 
decision on an appeal against refusal to vary limited leave or grant asylum. 
[Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, s115] 
 
Persons from Abroad 
3. Subject to the exception noted in point 6 below (persons who are not persons 
from abroad), a person is a ‘person from abroad’ if they are not ‘habitually 
resident’ in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man or the 
Republic of Ireland. 
                                                 
544 or ‘person not in the UK’ for the purposes of the State Pension Credit – the two concepts are 




4. No person will be ‘habitually resident’ unless they have a right to reside in the 
United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man or the Republic of Ireland. 
The following persons do not have a right to reside for these purposes, and 
therefore are ‘persons from abroad’: 
a) Persons exercising their 3 month unconditional right of residence in the UK 
under EU law 
b) Persons with extended right of residence in the UK under EU law who are 
jobseekers or the family members of jobseekers  
c) Persons with a right to reside in the UK under EU law as the primary carer of 
a British citizen (a ‘Zambrano’ right of residence) 
[Point 5(b) does not apply for the purposes of receipt of jobseekers’ allowance] 
 
[Jobseeker’s Allowance Regulations 1996 (S.I. 1996/207), Regulation 85A(2) and 
(3) 
Income Support (General) Regulations 1987 (S.I. 1987/1967), Regulation 21AA(2) 
and (3) 
Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008 (S.I. 2008/794), Regulation 
70(2) and (3) 
Housing Benefit Regulations (S.I. 2006/ 213), Regulation 10(2) and (3) 
Council Tax Benefit Regulations 2006 (S.I. 2006/215), Regulation 7(2) and (3) 
State Pension Credit Regulations 2002 (S.I. 2002/1792) Regulation 2(2) and (3)] 
 
5. The following persons are not ‘persons from abroad’, and thus their eligibility to 
receive income-related benefits is secured (irrespective of their residency status):  
a) Member State national workers and self-employed persons 
b) Member State nationals who have retained the status of worker or self-
employed persons because they are temporarily unable to work due to illness, 
or are in involuntary unemployment 
c) Family members of persons stated in (a) and (b) 
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d) Persons who have acquired a right of permanent residence in the UK under 
Art 17 Directive 2004/38/EC (Exemptions for persons no longer working in 
the host Member State and their family members) 
e) Bulgarian or Romanian nationals who hold an accession worker authorisation 
document and who are working in accordance with the conditions set out in 
that document 
    
[Jobseeker’s Allowance Regulations 1996 (S.I. 1996/207), Regulation 85A(4)(a) – (f)  
Income Support (General) Regulations 1987 (S.I. 1987/1967), Regulation 
21AA(4)(a) – (f) 
Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008 (S.I. 2008/794), Regulation 
70(4)(a) – (f) 
Housing Benefit Regulations (S.I. 2006/ 213), Regulation 10(3B)(a) – (f) 
Council Tax Benefit Regulations 2006 (S.I. 2006/215), Regulation 7(4A)(a) – (f) 




Annex 5: EU law entitlements to minimum income allowances 
in the UK 
 
The following table identifies the eligibility criteria circumscribing EU law 




Eligibility criteria for EU law right of equal treatment to income related benefits in 
the UK 
Income-related benefit Eligibility criteria for equality with British 
nationals 
Income assessed Jobseeker's 
allowance 
 
1. An individual must either be: 
 
a) an EU Citizen who is/has been insured 
in one or more Member state; or 
 
b) a third-country national worker, self-
employed person or student who 
is/has been insured in one or more 










Income-related employment and 
support allowance 
State pension credit 
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Income support  
1. An individual must either be: 
 
a) an EU Citizen who is/has been insured 
in one or more Member state and who is 
resident in a Member State; or 
 
b) a third-country national worker or 
self-employed person or student who 
is/has been insured in one or more 
Member State, who is legally resident in 





2. The individual must be insured in UK 
 
(persons who are insured in the UK by reason of 
their employment or establishment need not be 
resident there in order to be eligible to receive 
income-related benefits on the same grounds as 
British nationals, but must be (legally) resident 
in a second Member State) 
Housing benefit 
Council tax benefit 











Annex 6: Legislation determinative of higher education fees 
in the UK 
 
The following legislation is determinative of an individual’s liability for higher 










Action Primary legislation Secondary legislation 
Authorisation for HEIs to 
charge higher fees to those 
without ‘sufficient 
connection’ to the UK; 
authorisation for Secretary 
of State to confine awards in 
connection with education 
to persons with ‘sufficient 
connection’ to the UK 
The Education (Fees 
and Awards) Act 
1983, s.1 
Education (Fees and 
Awards) (England) 
Regulations 2007 (S.I. 
2007/779), s.4; Schedule 
1  
Regulatory fee cap for 
students at HEIs in England 
with ‘sufficient connection’ 
to the UK 
Higher Education Act 
2004, s. 23, 24, 29 
Higher Education (Basic 
Amount) (England) 






Tuition fee loans for 
students at a HEI in the UK 
with ‘sufficient connection’ 
to the UK 
Teaching and Higher 










Action Primary legislation Secondary legislation 
Authorisation for 
HEIs to charge 




The Education (Fees and 
Awards) Act 1983, s.1 







fees payable by 
those with sufficient 
connection to 
Scotland 
Further and Higher Education 
(Scotland) Act 2005, s.9  
[Act of Scottish Parliament] 
Student Fees 
(Specification) (Scotland) 
Order 2011/455 s.3 
Scottish Statutory 
Instrument 
Universal and full 
grants for tuition 
fees (paid directly to 
HEI) 
Education (Scotland) Act 
1980, s73(f) 
Act of UK Parliament 
relevant provision inserted by  
Education (Graduate 
Endowment and Student 
Support) (Scotland) Act 2001 








Annex 7: Eligibility criteria for regulatory fee cap and student 
support in England 
 
Criteria consolidated from legislation noted above in Annex 6 (see chapter four, 
n.462 at page 137). Categories are replicated subject to variation in Scottish 
legislation 
 
The following persons are eligible to benefit from a regulatory fee cap and non-
means tested loan in respect of tuition fees from the UK government. They are 
subject to various permeations of three central conditions of eligibility, all of which 
operate within restrictions on immigration status: 
 
 Ordinary residence in England/the UK on the first day of the first academic year 
 Ordinary residence in the UK/EEA or Switzerland throughout the three year 
period prior to the first day of the first academic year… 
 …other than wholly or mainly for the purpose of receiving full time education 
 
General: persons ‘settled’ in the UK 
1. The individual on the first day of the first academic year of the course: 
a) is ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom with no restriction on the 
period for which he can remain (‘settled’ in the UK), and 
 
b) fulfils the following residency criteria: 
i. he has been ordinarily resident in United Kingdom and Islands 
throughout the three year period preceding the first day of the first 
academic year of the course, and 
ii. that residence has not during any part of the three year period been 
wholly or mainly for the purpose of receiving full time education 
 
1A.  For the purposes of being eligible for a tuition fee loan, the individual also 
must be ordinarily resident in England on the first day of the first academic year of 
the course. A person who is ordinarily resident in England, Wales, Scotland, 
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Northern Ireland or the Islands, as a result of having moved from another of those 
areas for the purpose of undertaking the course, is considered to be ordinarily 
resident in the place from which the person moved. 
An EU Citizen or family member ordinarily resident in the UK 
2. The individual on the first day of the first academic year of the course: 
a) is either: 
i. an EU citizen who is ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, or 
ii. a third-country national who is ordinarily resident in the United 
Kingdom and who has a right of permanent residence in the United 
Kingdom under Directive 2004/38/EC 
 
b) fulfils the following residency criteria: 
i. he has been ordinarily resident in United Kingdom and Islands 
throughout the three year period preceding the first day of the first 
academic year of the course, and 
ii. where that residence has during any part of the three year period been 
wholly or mainly for the purpose of receiving full time education, the 
individual was ordinarily resident in the territory of the EEA/Switzerland 
[other than the United Kingdom] immediately prior to the three year 
period of residence in the UK 
 
2A. For the purposes of being eligible for a tuition fee loan, the individual must 
also be ordinarily resident in England on the first day of the first academic year of 
the course. A person who is ordinarily resident in England, Wales, Scotland, 
Northern Ireland or the Islands, as a result of having moved from another of those 
areas for the purpose of undertaking the course, is considered to be ordinarily 
resident in the place from which the person moved. 
An EU Citizen or family member ordinarily resident in the EEA or Switzerland  
3. The individual on the first day of an academic year of the course: 
a) is an EU citizen or their family member undertaking a designated course in 





b) fulfils the following residency criteria: 
i. he has been ordinarily resident in the territory comprised of the EEA and 
Switzerland [other than the United Kingdom] throughout the three year 
period preceding the first day of the first academic year of the course  
ii. that residence has not during any part of the three year period been 
wholly or mainly for the purpose of receiving full time education 
3A.  For the purposes of being eligible for a tuition fee loan, the individual must 
be undertaking a designated course in England  
3B. For the purposes of benefiting from the regulatory fee cap, the requirement in 
b)(i) does not apply to family members of EU citizens where that EU citizen is either  
a) a UK national who has exercised their right of residence in a second 
Member State, or 
b) a non-UK national who has been he has been ordinarily resident in the 
territory comprised of the EEA and Switzerland [other than the United 
Kingdom] throughout the three year period preceding the first day of the 
first academic year of the course  
 
A UK national who is settled in the UK and who has exercised right of free 
movement  
4. The individual is on the first day of an academic year of the course: 
a) a UK national who is ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, who has 
exercised a right of residence in a second Member State, and who was 
ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom prior to exercising that right of 
residence. 
 
b) fulfils the following residency criteria: 
i. he has been ordinarily resident in the territory comprised of the EEA 
and Switzerland [other than the United Kingdom] throughout the three 




ii. where that residence has during any part of the three year period been 
wholly or mainly for the purpose of receiving full time education, the 
individual was ordinarily resident in the territory of the 
EEA/Switzerland [other than the United Kingdom] immediately prior 
to the three year period of residence in b(i) 
 
4A.  For the purposes of being eligible for a tuition fee loan, the individual must 
also be ordinarily resident in England on the first day of the first academic year of 
the course (and prior exercising a right of free movement). A person who is 
ordinarily resident in England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland or the Islands, as a 
result of having moved from another of those areas for the purpose of undertaking 
the course, is considered to be ordinarily resident in the place from which the person 
moved.  
Workers/self-employed persons 
5. The individual on the first day of the first academic year of the course: 
a) is ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom and is either: 
i. an EEA or Swiss worker/self-employed person, 
ii. the family member of an EEA or Swiss worker/self-employed person 
iii. the child of an EEA, Swiss or Turkish worker, and 
 
b) fulfils the following residence criteria: 
i. he has been ordinarily resident in the EEA/Switzerland throughout the 
three year period preceding the first day of the first academic year of the 
course 
ii. [Applies only to the child of a Swiss worker: where that residence has 
during any part of the three year period been wholly or mainly for the 
purpose of receiving full time education, the individual was ordinarily 
resident in the territory of the EEA/Switzerland immediately prior to the 
three year period of residence in b(i)] 
 
4A. For the purposes of being eligible for a tuition fee loan, the individual must 
also be ordinarily resident in England on the first day of the first academic year of 
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the course. A person who is ordinarily resident in England, Wales, Scotland, 
Northern Ireland or the Islands, as a result of having moved from another of those 
areas for the purpose of undertaking the course, is considered to be ordinarily 
resident in the place from which the person moved. 
 
4B.  The requirement that the person be ordinarily resident in the United 
Kingdom/England on the first day of the first academic year does not apply to 
frontier workers and their family members. 
 
Sources: 
Higher Education Act 2004 s.23, 24 and 29 
The Education (Fees and Awards) Act 1983, s.1 
Education (Fees and Awards) (England) Regulations 2007 (S.I. 2007/779), s.4 and 
Schedule 1 
Education (Student Support) Regulations 2011 (S.I. 2011/1986), s.4 and Part 2 of 
Schedule 1 
 
In these conditions noted above, a person is to be treated as ordinarily resident in the 
qualifying area if they would have been so resident but for a period of temporary 




Annex 8: Evolution of ‘sufficient connection’ with the UK test 
for purposes of access to higher education 
 




Principal Regulations made 
under 1983 Act 
Amendments 






*inclusion of EC nationals ordinarily resident 
in EEA 
S.I. 1988/1391 
*removal of 9-month residency requirement 




The Education (Fees and 
Awards) Regulations 1994 
(S.I. 1994/3042) 
 
*provision for accession of states 
to EEA area: residence in new 
member states prior to accession 




*added exceptions for the spouse of an EEA 
migrant worker 
The Education (Fees and 








*introduced requirement of 
settlement 
S.I. 2003/3280 
*Extended to include Switzerland 
S.I. 2006/483 
*re-structured Schedule to implement 
provisions of Directive 2004/38/EC 
S.I. 2007/1336 
*exceptions for children of Turkish workers, 
implementing Decision 1/80 
The Education (Fees and 




*Added overseas territories as qualifying 
residence, and designated that those who move 
from Islands will be ordinarily resident in the 
Islands 
S.I. 2011/87 
*narrows category of eligible irregular 
migrants  
S.I. 2011/1987 
*removes the requirement for non-EU family 
members of EU citizens to have been 
ordinarily resident in the EEA for the 3 years 
immediately preceding the start of their course, 
where the EU citizen has been ordinarily 
resident in the EEA throughout the preceding 
three-year period 
S.I. 2012/1653 






 Principal Regulations made under 1983 Act 
UK Statutory 
Instruments 
Education (Fees and Awards) (Scotland) Regulations (S.I. 
1983/1215) 
The Education (Fees and Awards) (Scotland) Regulations 
1997 
(S.I. 1997/93) 
Functions of the Secretary of State were transferred to the Scottish 
Ministers by virtue of section 53 of the Scotland Act 1998 
Scottish Statutory  
Instrument 
The Education (Fees and Awards) (Scotland) Regulations 
2007 
(S.I. 2007/152) 
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